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Preface 
Cooperation between Finnish and Italian historians started 
officially at the symposium in Perugia, Italy, in October 1979 
with the theme "Italy and Finland during World War ii (1939-
1945)". The second symposium was held in Helsinki under the 
auspices of the Finnish Ministry of Education and organized by 
the Finnish Historical Society on May 24-28, 1982. The 
general theme of this symposium was "Nationality and 
Nationalism in Italy and Finland from the mid-nineteenth 
century to 1918". The present publication includes the papers 
on this theme, with the exception of Professor Clara Castelli's 
contribution, which has been published, with the title "Il 
panslavismo" in "L'etå contemporanea" (ed. by Lucarini) in 
Rome, Italy in 1983. 
Maija Väisänen 
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Mario Belardinelli 
Catholics and their 
attitude to nationality 
in Italy 
I think it would be a good idea first to make a definition of the 
subject I am going to discuss. The term "Catholic" in a country 
like Italy, where in the 19th century the Catholic religion (by 
habit or convenience) was the one normally professed, only 
seems valid to me in respect of those distinct groups who 
explicitly considered religious values important in the choice of 
politics. I know it is not easy to distinguish religious 
motivation from politico-social or even economic motivation, 
but I have tried to do so when sources and coherence of 
attitude have permitted. 
Secondly, I should particularly like to dwell on three distinct 
problems: independence and national unity, the unified state of 
1861 and finally the relationship between Catholics and 
Nationalism. 
In the period following the Vienna Congress the prevalent 
attitude among Italian Catholics was to favour a return to the 
'good old days', the authority of legitimate sovereigns and 
ancient regional states; this seemed to them the most suitable 
climate, although with just a trace of past jurisdictionalism, for 
the calm civil and religious life which had been shaken by the 
events of the revolution and Napoleonic domination. However, 
not all the Catholic world was in favour of a conservative and 
reactionary policy; with the flowering of the romantic 
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movement there had arisen a desire to look beyond the narrow 
confines of the 'little fatherland' and to aim at an independent 
and modern political organization which could hopefully 
comprise all the Italian people. Such a reaction had been 
prompted partly by the short-sighted dynastic polities of the 
small Italian states and the fact that in Lombardy and the 
Venetian states Austria was ruling with a rod of iron. The 
national organization envisaged could draw its roots from the 
culture and glorious memories of the free cities (communes) of 
the Middle Ages when the church had been able to defend the 
peninsula from the foreigner and exert a civilizing influence. At 
the beginning the movement was composed only of a few 
personalities and their circle of friends: Manzoni, Cantü and 
Pellico in Milan; Cesare Balbo in Piedmont; Lambruschini and 
Capponi in Tuscany; Nicola Tommaseo in exile in Paris wrote 
"Dell'Italia" (About Italy) in 1835 in which he affirmed his 
faith in an initiative of the people and maintained that "peace 
and freedom can come to the world and Italy only from the 
religion of Christ"; Tommaseo, instead, spoke of "the spectre of 
Rome" (that is, a rhetorical recollection of imperial Latin 
grandeur) which represented another characteristic source of 
inspiration for the nationalist movement. 
But a much larger sector of moderate Catholic opinion which 
had until then been influenced by Mazzini's call for unity was 
influenced by Gioberti's work: "Of the moral and civil primate 
of the Italians" (Del primato morale e civile degli Italiani) 
(Brussels 1843); although containing little religious inspiration 
and a lot of politics, it did present the attractive idea of 
national unity to be realized not by a revolutionary change of 
the existing state of affairs but by voluntary adherence of the 
Sovereigns of the peninsula themselves to a federation to be 
presided over by the most prestigious figurehead — the Pope 
himself. This solution aimed at overcoming the serious 
obstacles created by the notable difference between institutions 
and habits among the different Italian populations, and in 
addition ensured the Church's support and the respect of other 
nations. 
I do not wish to dwell further on the Neo-Guelph movement: 
I will only recall how, after the election of Pius IX (who 
seemed to personify the ideal of a patriotic and evangelistic 
Pope ready to fulfil the role predicted by Gioberti) the 
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nationalist cause gained enormous ground among the Catholics 
in all classes everywhere. It has now been ascertained that the 
Pope's intentions has been misinterpreted and that there had 
been forced persuasion by many liberals and by Mazzini himself 
of their followers to take part in demonstrations in favour of 
Pius IX in order to encourage the expression of patriotic and 
anti-Austrian sentiments. 
As you know, the Italian phase of the war of 1848 with 
Austria appeared to be directed at the liberation of Italy from 
the Austrian yoke, and the name of Pius IX had appeared large 
in manifestos: the clergy in many places never missed a chance 
of preaching a "Holy Crusade againts fhe foreigner", and the 
volunteers who rallied from all over Italy to the Paduan plain 
were termed Crusaders. 
Pope Pius IX's declaration of 29 April 1848 (after the 
Austrian threats of schism) announced that he could not 
participate in a war against another Catholic country and this 
supernational religious choice of the Pontiff shattered the Neo-
Guelph dream. Even if the Pope on 3 May did send the 
Austrian Emperor a plea to renounce domination of Italian 
territories, the Pope immediately lost his charisma and the 
anti-unification attitude of the Pontiff and his state (and even 
his supporters) in withdrawing from national solidarity was 
denounced. 
The events which followed, from the failure of the war 
against Austria and experience in democracy (firstly of the 
Roman Republic) up to the second Restoration, provoked 
notable divisions between Catholics as regards political unity. 
The Legitimists, faithful to the old dynasties and advocates 
of the traditional alliances between throne and altar which, to 
their mind, provided the best guarantee of religious and civil 
peace, affirmed the need for obedience to the existing 
authorities and defended the status quo in Austrian Lombardy-
Veneto. 
The clerical groups (that is, those who held that it was 
morally acceptable to be guided by an ecclesiastical hierarchy 
in political matters) only in part sided with these views: the 
clerics were harshly critical of anti-ecclesiastical arrangements 
whether of absolutist juridictionalist type or liberal stamp and 
were watchful enough of intellectual and mass public opinion 
to reject the nationalist principle entirely. Thus, the Jesuit 
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"Civiltå Cattolica" ("Catholic Society") (which was the most 
influential voice in this field) did not deny that national unity 
could offer advantages, but denounced the dangers of a mass 
rising to achieve it and the diffusion of 'Jacobin' ideas. As De 
Rosa has recalled, Luigi Taparelli (who was the most solid 
thinker of the Jesuit school) had theorised from a Catholic 
viewpoint on the primate of civil society: the latter was seen as 
a living organism whose fundamental nuclei (families, 
communes, regional populations) constituted a reality endowed 
with their own autonomous rights. Every State had to come to 
terms with this reality and thus society (as similarly the 
Church) could not be subjected to any national plan which did 
not respect its requirements. 
But these philosophical motives were not the only ones to 
influence the Catholics, clergy and people. They were also to no 
small extent influenced by the reactionary withdrawal of Pius 
IX and the appearance of rationalist-Voltairian tendencies 
inside the innovating liberal movement on both the left and 
right. The phenomena of secularization which had been 
developing for some time in Europe began to appear in Italy in 
this period, and it is worth noting that they were at their most 
advanced precisely in liberal Piedmont, which was hastening to 
become leader of the national movement. 
However, in the 1850s there was no shortage of patriotic 
Catholics: ex-Neo-Guelphs, liberal Catholics such as Ricasoli 
and Minghetti, exiles of 1848 like Tommaseo and D'Ondes 
Reggio, some rare Republican priests such as Anelli and Don 
Tazzoli who were hanged in 1852 at Belfiore; and in addition 
many without precise ideological or party connotations whose 
sentiments had been won over by the national ideal. For them 
there was no incompatibility between realizing independence, 
the formation of a constitution and religious life; they looked 
sympathetically at the government in Turin and hoped that the 
national initiative would stem from there. Although in general 
rejecting extremist solutions, they held that it was necessary to 
move in pace with the times, and solicited the Church itself to 
update its ideals and rethink its attitudes even through a 
renunciation of temporal power which was no longer acting in 
support of religion but was instead a burden and scandal. 
When the war of 1859 and the risings of Central Italy took 
place, followed by the expedition into the Mezzogiorno 
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(Southern Italy), on the one hand there was enthusiasm from 
the Catholic-Patriot circles who fully supported Cavour's 
initiative, and who favoured solution of unity; on the other 
hand there was unconditional hostility in Legitimist quarters 
and stern lecturing by the clerics which became increasingly 
bitter when the possibility of the creation of a unified state 
under the Savoy Monarchy arose. 
According to "Civiltå Cattolica" Italy had not become 
"mistress of herself" but "a servant of others". The war had 
broken out not between the people and the oppressing 
government but between a faction of "greedy, ambitious and 
fanatical men" and "legitimate powers surrounded by all that 
is honest Catholic, knowledge able ... conservative." The 
annexations had been "a farce", in reality amounting to a 
military conquest by the Savoy Sate which was tyranically 
exerting its power through the "revolutionary party formed by 
Cavour's league and the rebels and revolutionaries of all the 
other Italian states." 
This line received support from the clerics not only on 
account of the blows suffered by the Pontifical State in 1860 
but also on account of Cavour's own declaration in Parliament 
in March 1861 in which he declared Rome as the capital of the 
new Kingdom. As A.C. Jemolo recalled, Cavour made this 
declaration not because he was attracted by the ideal 
fascination of Rome but for political utility, to put an end to 
the rivalry of other Italian cities for the primacy. In that period 
Cavour was involved, through the Pantaleoni-Passaglia 
mission, in trying to obtain a spontaneous renunciation of 
temporal power from the Pope (Pius IX), offering in exchange a 
renunciation, by the Italian State, of all jurisdictional bonds 
then in existence. Cavour's formula "A free church in a free 
state" however, satisfied neither the Curia nor the clerics: they 
saw it as a way of excluding the Church from society, moreover 
of depriving the Pope of his traditional security (now reduced 
to Latium alone). In a moment when secularizing pressure was 
increasing and the Church was going through the profound 
crisis of a change in attitude and values within itself, the 
spontaneous renunciation of privileges, power and substance 
was something of extreme seriousness. 
Thus the Catholic clerics chose the path of protest against a 
State which, in their view, prevented the beneficial, social 
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influence of the Church and tended to undermine the Pope's 
independence; they abstained from participating in the 
elections of a National Parliament and decided almost to 
isolate themselves from public life while waiting for some 
catastrophe to dissolve the Italian State, as had happened for 
the Napoleonic Empire in 1814. 
The positions, which were mostly coincidental, of clerics and 
Legitimists were, however, destined to become more distinct in 
the space of a few years: already in 1866 when, despite the 
military defeats against Austria, the national campaign 
appeared solid, the clerics, firm in their condemnation of the 
origins of an Italian State, realized that which such a tide in 
favour of Unification they would have to act to defend their 
own religious positions. So, after their very first attempts to 
promote a "Catholic Movement" they moved to assume a 
national denomination and organization, thus progressively 
excluding Legitimist tendencies and rejecting conspiratorial 
methods in favour of legal ones. 
After the Italian conquest of Rome in 1870 the clerical 
protest at the "Pope's imprisonment" increased but did not 
change direction: between solemn invectives against the "evil 
Masonic State" the clerics decided not to participate in the 
political life of the country, dominated by the political, liberal 
elites, and dedicated themselves to the organisation of religious 
and social associations and to the conquest of municipalities in 
order to defend their beliefs among the people. 
Reacting against those who accused them of not loving their 
country, they declared that they did not accept the "legal 
Italy" of the revolutionaries, but would honour the Italy of the 
Catholic people and its civil and religious interests which the 
ruling class were almost unaware of. 
A notable differentiation took place among patriotic 
Catholics after Unification. Some of them like Ricasoli, Peruzzi, 
Minghetti became exponents, in the full sense of the word, of 
the moderate ruling class and identified with the system. 
Many thousands of members of the patriotic clergy 
sympathised with the view published by the Jesuit Passaglia, 
who asked the Pope to renounce Rome and temporal power in 
favour of the new Kingdom and to reconcile himself with the 
nation; but the censorship of the ecclesiastical hierarchy and 
the stern attitude of Liberal governments towards ecclesiastical 
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matters were such that this initiative was short-lived. 
Some Catholics such as Cantü and D'Ondes Reggio who were 
in favour of Unification but critical of 'Piedmontesism' 
entered Parliament but found themselves very soon in a 
minority, protesting in vain about the laws of centralization, 
dispersal of congregations and destruction of ecclesiastical 
goods. 
A group of Catholics, natives of the ex-Savoy States and 
Lombardy, decided to issue some newspapers and magazines 
such as the "Catholic Annuals" (Annuali Cattolici) and "The 
Universal Review" (Rivista Universale) which aimed at exalting 
the new National and Constitutional State and weighed up the 
role the Catholics could play with their participation in 
elections and public activities. This group (which was called 
'transigent') after the election of Leo XI, who appeared in 
favour of a settlement of the conflict, was responsible for the 
publication of the "National Review" (Rassegna Nazionale), 
which looked towards the formation of a conservative-national 
party: this party, however, which, with the support of 
moderate liberals and constitutional Catholics, was to have led 
to a reconciliation between the Italian State and the Church, 
avoiding a radicalization in an anti-religious and social sense, 
was never formed because of the suspicions of the Holy See and 
the ruling class itself. 
The two ranks of 'transigent' and 'intransigent' had different 
developments. While the transigent, after a fortunate period in 
the first ten years of Leo XIII, were reduced to a small 
minority, the intransigent increased in numbers also because of 
the political and social crisis which had hit Italy in the last 
decade of the century. Having formed a big politico-religious 
organization called "L'Opera dei Congressi" (the work of 
Congresses) which had hundreds of thousands of followers, 
they took a position againts the concept of national grandeur 
which had especially been advocated by Crispi through colonial 
expansion and military power. While the transigents' 
mouthpiece, the "Rassegna Nazionale", upheld an increase in 
religious Catholic influence in proportion to Italian political 
representation (for example, through the work of missionaries 
in Africa), the intransigent thought it absurd to link the 
"society of blasphemers" and of brute force with that of the 
Faith. 
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The pattern of the argument, however, changed between the 
end of the century and the period which preceded the First 
World War. While the Liberals ceased considering the Pope and 
Catholics as mortal enemies, and encouraged their electoral 
support for conservative reasons inside the clerical camp, there 
was, at the same time, a new generation growing up which had 
not experienced the politico-religious conflict of the 
Risorgimento and which considered a National State as an 
indisputable reality. These young people hoped to be actively 
useful not only in a social and municipal field but also on a 
political level. From 1904 onwards, although without creating 
an actual party (which was only created in 1919), some of these 
Catholics offered themselves as candidates in Parliament with 
declarations of national and constitutional loyalty, and were 
elected. Thanks also to Giolitti's tolerant government, which 
often sought Catholic votes to support the vacillating liberal 
system, a hope was taking shape in the Catholic world of being 
able to 'escape from the Ghetto' and to have some influence in 
the new State, provided, however, that it was able to make a 
clear national choice; it would thus be possible to modify from 
the inside all those anti-popular, centralizing and secular 
characteristics of the Italian State. 
This explains the well-known national patriotism which in 
the ten years preceding the First World War became more 
heated in all fields, except perhaps for the circles of the 
intransigent survivors gathered around the "Unita Cattolica" 
in Florence. This 'national development', which implied 
recovery by the nation of the people's Catholic energies which 
had been overlooked in the solution of the early Risorgimento, 
was also useful in the battle which was taking place at that 
time between ranks of conservative constitutionalists and 
groups of the 'masses' from the extreme left, the latter strongly 
impregnated with Masonry, internationalism and anti-
clericalism. 
The support which the majority of the Catholic movement 
(but not the democratic groups of Murri and Sturzo) gave to 
liberal conservative coalitions represented both support of a 
political sector which was prepared to give the Catholics and 
their ideas some space, and also a new position in favour of the 
institutions which were no longer hostile. 
The most clamorous demonstration of national feelings 
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among Catholics was on the occasion of the Italo-Turkish war 
of 1911-12 for the possession of Libya. There was an enormous 
gathering of clergy and catholic laymen and a great 
demonstration of enthusiasm. Many saw the war as a crusade 
against the infidels and also — and above all — the way to 
demonstrate that they were real patriots. Philip Meda, one of 
the greatest political exponents among the Catholics, is said to 
have scorned this abandonment to "the national wind which 
blew from the coasts of Africa"; and this leads us to the 
problem of the relationship between Catholics and the 
Nationalist movement, which was then put to its most incisive 
test. 
As Veneruso recalls, the first genuine expressions of a 
nationalist attitude, that is the reviews "Il Marzocco" (1896) 
and "Il Regno", (1903) with their explicit Nietzschean, Pagan 
and Individualist attitude, were seen by the Catholics as an 
affiliation with Liberalism. Corradini, however, avoided in "Il 
Regno" any hostile reference to the Church considered as a 
powerful, openly political institution, inheritor of 'Latin genius' 
and a possible vehicle of Imperialist expansion for Italy. It was 
a conception of religion as a skilfully used "instrumentum 
regni" which would have its influence in the following years 
when the growing tension within the extreme left and the 
restraint that the ecclesiastical hierarchy exercised in a 
political direction led some groups of young people to gravitate 
towards the Nationalist movement. The latter was considered 
an expression of new patriotism, unconnected with anticlerical 
prejudices and the old bourgeois parties and capable of 
absorbing and stimulating the country's energies of whatever 
origin. Such young people were not just exponents of the 
Catholic right, nostalgic for Neo-Guelphism or promoters of 
antisocialist reaction, but were also democrats such as Arcari 
(similar to the "Osservatore Cattolico" of Albertario) who 
played an important part in the events of the Nationalist 
Association. They wanted to fight both Giolittism, that is the 
political system of the sceptical and parasitical, and also 
classic, atheist and anti-patriotic socialism. 
In addition there was also a certain sympathy for 
Nationalism from within the National Democratic League, 
formed by young 'Murrian' Catholics and politically 
autonomous among the ecclesiastical hierarchies. 
2 Nationality and Nationalism ... 
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According to Areari, the function of Nationalism was to 
break up the liberal patriotic monopoly and to supply a 
doctrinal base which was able to appeal equally to all of Italy's 
spirits: the pagan and christian (Savonarola and Lorenzo de' 
Medici); the industrial and proletariat (patriotic 'disinfection' 
of the working classes); bringing to light, that is, "the deep 
solidarity between the individual and the nation" (equation 
between nation and people). The war with Libya coincided 
with the peak of Catholic and Nationalist convergence, but 
already in 1912 more precise standpoints had been taken: Meda 
in the name of Catholic constitutional reformists declared that 
"as a moral and political system Nationalism cannot belong to 
us" and, exalting peace among classes and nations, affirmed 
the necessity of maintaining their own identity. 
It was the "Osservatore Romano", semi-official mouthpiece 
of the Vatican, which denounced the new Nationalist Party as 
"warmongering and arrogant", and it was Cacciaguerra in the 
newspaper "Azione", mouthpiece of the National Democratic 
League, who now maintained the incompatibility between the 
universal mission of civilization and fraternity advocated by 
Christianity and the Nationalist cause. 
The electoral alliances between Catholics and Nationalists 
which were set up in 1913 were not the result of growing 
understanding but rather the result of the ideas contained in 
Gentiloni's pact, that is: the agreed support of those 
constitutionalist candidates who undertook to respect religion 
and not promulgate laws against her. 
If the philo-catholic declarations of the Nationalist Congress 
of Milan of 1914 and the clear separation of the Nationalist 
Party from the Liberal ideological survivors pleased many 
Catholics, the debate on Italy's intervention in the First World 
War provoked a definite division: while the Nationalists since 
August 1914 had sought in every way to urge a war to allow 
Italy to expand her frontiers and rid herself of the dregs of 
humanity, the Catholics, for various reasons, were prevalently 
neutral. 
Even if many Constitutionalist Catholics in the spring of 
1915 ended by accepting intervention in favour of an Accord as 
proof of loyalty towards the nation which aspired to the 
unredeemed lands of the Trentino and Venezia-Giulia (the 
clerical-moderate group from Brescia, not to mention the 
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Christian Democratic League, were, indeed, open supporters), 
such a decision never assumed an imperialist colour or exalted 
the call to arms. 
One must finally remember that Italian intervention in the 
war provided the occasion for a declaration by the Pontifical 
Curia which could be interpreted as the first signs of a solution 
to the Roman question. Cardinal Gasparri, at the manoeuvres 
of the Central Empire, declared that the "Holy See, out of 
respect for neutrality, does not intend to create embarrassment 
for the (Italian) government and places its trust in God in the 
hopes that a convenient solution to the problem will be found 
— not through foreign arms but through the triumph of justice 
which the Holy See sincerely prays will continue to inspire the 
Italian people in their quest for their ideal". 
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Yrjö Blomstedt 
National and 
international viewpoints 
of the Finnish upper 
class in the 19th 
century 
In the beginning of the 19th Century Finland was a remote and 
out-of-the-way corner of Europe. In reverse, the great world 
was beyond the horizon for the common Finns. The majority of 
the nation, which was very small in numbers, were common 
peasants for whom the world ended at the parish church or the 
nearest small town. Most members of the insignificant upper 
class were only concerned with their personal goods, offices 
and properties. 
Some figures of the population development are quite 
illustrative. In the beginning of the 19th century the total 
population of Finland was about 900,000, and when Russia, the 
new overlord from 1809 onward, had incorporated in 1812 the 
former Finnish provinces behind the frontier of Peter the Great 
in the newly annexed Finland, the figure rose to about one 
million. The growth during the century was rapid, so that in 
the 1860s the population had risen to about 1.8 million, and in 
the end of the century about 2.5 million were living here. 
The country was almost purely agrarian, with over 90 % of 
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its population living in the beginning of the century in the 
countryside, and 80 % earning its living from agriculture. The 
upper class was a thin film of cream risen to the top of the 
milk of country bumpkins. In the last census during Swedish 
rule, in 1805, the number of the upper strata was about 21 000 
including all family members, wives, widows and children. In 
the 1860s the upper strata were absolute figures of the same 
size, which means that they had in relative figures shrunk from 
2.3 % to only 1.3 % of the total. In the more modern society of 
the 1890s such figures are no longer available, but we know, for 
instance, that people with more than elementary education 
amounted to only 36,000. 
The Finnish nobility, aristocrats by parentage, were a very 
small group of society, and also very poor. Grown-up male 
noblemen numbered only about one thousand, their significance 
small or non-existent; here the thirty, forty or fifty prominent 
people of the upper strata are not to be taken into account. In 
1819 the former Swedish diplomat and political tool of king 
Gustavus III, Johan Albrecht Ehrenström, with the splendid 
Russian-style title of Conseiller d'Etat actuel was leader of the 
building enterprise at Helsinki, whose imperial style can still 
be admired here. This Ehrenström wrote in 1819 asking 
rhetorically: "What is the use of this nobility, with seats in the 
House of Nobles only by right of a small copper plate with their 
coats of arms on the wall, but without a square inch of land to 
their name." 
Of course there were some individuals with broader wiews 
and deeper knowledge of state and world affairs, even a few 
with experience of high life on the continent. Before the French 
Revolution one or another young Finnish officer had served in 
the Royal French Army, or in Dutch or Ducal or Royal German 
Armed Forces, perhaps even in the British Navy, but after the 
great revolution the attractiveness of foreign military service 
had quite faded. For the surplus sons of Finland's rural 
aristocracy a new way opened when Finland in 1809 became an 
autonomous Grand Duchy under the Russian Empire. During 
the Russian interlude of Finnish history hundreds of Finns rose 
to the rank of General in the Imperial Army, and there were 
thousands upon thousands of Finns in the lower ranks. Not a 
few of them returned to Finland having retired from active 
service, and some brought with them broader views than when 
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they had left. 
In this society members of the aristocracy or upper strata 
with international viewpoints were exceptions. Some of these, 
however, were splendid and illustrious. Count Gustaf Mauritz 
Armfelt, a luminescent personality, was, I think, the most 
remarkable. Already in 1778 — just twenty years of age — he 
was forced to quit Sweden and go abroad. He made his tour 
through Petersburg, Warsaw and Berlin to Paris, but nobody 
was in need of his sword. He went to his king, Gustavus III, 
then staying at Spaa, and became one of the king's most 
preferred favourites. He was appointed to posts in the Swedish 
court, and even in the army his career was very rapid. He was 
a general at thirty. He organized theatrical performances at the 
court, and, which was very important to his intellectual 
development, went with Gustavus III to Italy in 1783, 
travelling through Europe, being introduced at the court of 
Vienna, to His Holiness Pope Pius VI and staying several 
months with his king in Naples. King Ferdinand and Queen 
Caroline became his friends for the rest of life. Then the 
Swedish king went back north through Paris and Versailles 
and the court of Louis XVI. Armfelt took part as a statesman in 
the negotiations between the two kings and their ministers, 
thus learning important things for a politician. After a period 
in the royal sunshine Armfelt was pushed aside after the 
murder of Gustavus III. He did not become a member of the 
regency council, but was more or less expelled to Naples as 
Swedish ambassador. Then in 1794 he was accused of high 
treason and had to escape from Naples; in contumaciam he was 
sentenced to death in Sweden. He lived three years in Kaluga 
in Russia in a kind of deportation, then in Courland and 
Bohemia; in 1800 he was pardoned in Sweden and in 1802 he 
became Swedish ambassador to Vienna. From 1804 until 1808 
he was in military service. After some hesitation he went back 
to his home country Finland in 1811; after having sworn his 
oath of fidelity to the Russian Emperor. He became very soon 
one of the favourites of the Emperor Alexander I and was 
entrusted with Finnish and also importat Russian affairs until 
his sudden death in 1814. 
As one of the most intelligent men in his generation, Count 
Armfelt was an industrious writer of letters and aide-memoires. 
He saw the world theatre as a whole and was capable of 
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evaluating the actors and the play in detail. He was involved in 
plans for post-napoleonic Europe, not only plans concerning 
the position of Finland. But Count Armfelt, called the splendid 
Armfelt or the Alcibiades of the North, was a unique 
personality. Some of the younger men he had dragged along 
with him to Petersburg were in a way trying to imitate or copy 
him, some of them not without success. But already in 
academic circles, at the University of Åbo, there was no 
interest in bigger things than academic gossip and intrigue. At 
the university men were lacked contact with their colleagues 
on the continent, and most modern studies were not practised 
at the Finnish university. 
But the ideological athmosphere in Finland was not a 
hermetically closed entity. The ideas of romanticism and 
nationalism were finding their way to Finland. The Finnish 
academic world from the 1820s onward was more and more 
interested in the development of science on the Continent, 
especially in Germany, where many Finns then begun to travel 
for the purpose of studying. Our national philosopher, the great 
J.W. Snellman, went in the 1840s to Tübingen, to mention only 
one example. And through other channels influences from, let 
us say, Great Britain and France reached Finland's shores. 
England and Scotland were at that time the most important 
merchant nations, and many a Finn was practising 
merchandise and business in London, Liverpool and 
Edinburgh. Johan Jacob or John Julin, then ennobled as von 
Julin, was studying pharmacy, commerce and banking when he 
married a Scottish vicar's daughter and became a founding 
father of the savings bank and trading bank systems in 
Finland. One of the adepts of Gustaf Mauritz Armfelt, the 
bureaucratic statesman and privy councillor Baron Lars 
Gabriel von Haartman, called "His Dreadfullness", often paid 
visits to the continent and as leader of the financial 
administration of the Grand Duchy studied very keenly the 
modern transportation systems, canals and railroads of Europe. 
He became an ardent supporter of canals. 
There was great pressure towards the formation of a more 
international upper class, arising quite simply from the need to 
communicate with the Russians. All Finnish officials coming in 
direct contact with His Majesty the Emperor-Grand Duke had 
to speak French, and French was also often used in 
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correspondence between Finnish officials. In those parts of 
Finland which had been under Russia during the 18th century 
the Baltic-German influence was more or less to be seen, so 
that in the capital of the Viipuri Government, it was a common 
saying, that old Viipuri was an international city where the 
inhabitants talked four languages: Swedish, German, Russian 
and Finnish. It may be called provincial internationalism. 
In the nationalistic struggle a major part of the Finnish 
upper class was on the side of the swedophils. Swedish had 
through six centuries been the official language in Finland, and 
the upper class considered Swedish as the language of their 
culture. Finnish was for them only the language of peasants, a 
langue de pärkele, lingua di diavolo, as Lars Gabriel von 
Haartman once put it. Never, most of the upper class members 
thought, could the Finnish language rise to the level of a 
cultural language, it was too undeveloped and too raw to be 
used in complicated expressions. 
The major part of the upper class or the bureaucratic upper 
strata was not favourable to Finnish and could not understand 
Snellman's nationalistic views based on the conviction that 
only a Finnish national awareness could save Finland from 
being swallowed in the grey mass of depressed Russian 
nationalities. But there were also some dissidents, who thought 
that the nationalism of the Suedo-Finns could lead the nation 
to the right way of development. Both nationalistic movements 
were based on the common people, and the real aristocrats 
were thinking in more universal terms. It was the noblesse 
oblige principle that they tried to follow; it was their duty to 
save the country form such democratic tendencies as were the 
aims of both nationalistic movements. 
One of those real aristocrats was Casimir von Kothen, 
brother-in-law of Lars Gabriel von Haartman. As pro-chancelor 
of the university (which had the Tsarevich as Chancellor) and 
as first Chairman of the Central Board of Schools in Finland he 
followed a conservative school programme: good humanistic 
schools for the sons of the upper classes, good practical schools 
for sons of Finnish extraction, elementary schools for the sons 
of peasantry and workers. He also wanted to intensify both the 
quality and quantity of the teaching of Russian as a means to 
strengthen the bands between the Empire and the Grand 
Duchy. von Kothen was not only a Finnish but also an 
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international aristocrat, as much a member of the Finnish 
House of Nobles as of the European aristocracy. After failing in 
his school policy he lived his last years in Mecklenburg-
Strelitz. 
Through Russia and the court of St Petersburg the Finnish 
aristocracy was in contact and linked with the Russian 
aristocracy. Since the latter was part of the continental 
aristocracy there were many beautiful Finnish girls married to 
foreign aristocrats, not only Casimir von Kothen's daughter, 
but many more. The great-uncle of Field Marshal Mannerheim, 
August Mannerheim, Chamberlain of the Imperial Court, 
former Member of the Board of the Bank of Finland, died at 
San Donato in Italy in 1876. His death was announced to his 
relatives and friends through a printed letter signed by his 
nearest relatives. First of these were his brother Fridolf living 
in Nice and the children and sons-in-law of another brother, 
the late Count Carl Gustav Mannerheim; the Italian diplomat 
Francesco Cotta, the Finnish-Swedish explorer A.E. 
Nordenskiöld and Count Carl Robert Mannerheim, the Field 
Marshal's father, a gentleman of the bedchamber at the Russian 
Court. Then his cousins, the Privy Councillor and Minister-
State Secretary of Finland Emile Stjernwall-Walleen, Aurora 
Karamsin, Lady-in-waiting of the Russian Empress, and their 
brother-in-law the Portuguese Ambassador in Paris, Jose 
Maurizio Correa de Henriques, Count do Seisal. Then the son 
of Aurora Karamsin in her first marriage, the multimillionaire 
Paul Demidov, Principe di San Donato, and his wife, née 
Princesse Bonaparte. This mourning notice contains a real 
example of the diffusion of this group of Finnish aristocrats in 
international circles, the jet set of the 1870s. The Baroness von 
Oertzen-Kittendorf — the daughter of Casimir von Kothen —
was also a member of this family group. 
But I think that these relations or links with European 
aristocracy were of no consequence to Finland during the 19th 
century. They were merely a curiosity, because international 
affairs until the 1880s had very little impact on Finnish affairs. 
Of course it would be an exaggeration to assert that all Finns 
were living in innocence, unaware of the great world around 
them. For instance, the academic world in the 1840s obtained 
its first scholarships or travel grants for studies abroad. Many 
of our famous scholars studied in their younger years in Paris 
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or in Germany and maintained contacts with foreign colleagues 
through their whole life. 
And, of course, the Finnish upper class was forced to think in 
terms of international politics during the Crimean war and the 
Polish insurrection in 1863. The bureaucrats were naturally 
loyal to the monarch and the Empire, the so-called national 
Finnish army was defending Finland in 1854-55 against 
French-British naval actions and taking part in the subduing of 
the Polish insurgents in 1863 (as already in 1830). Merchants 
and academic youth were in different ways not on the official 
line; the merchant shipowners intended to raise a Finnish 
merchant flag of their own design, and students were drinking 
to freedom and the health of the Poles. 
And, during the risorgimento period, Finnish students were 
full of enthusiasm for Garibaldi and his campaign; Carl August 
Weurlander, who had been studying modern literature in Paris 
since 1857 took part in it. He enrolled as a volunteer in the 
French army in 1859 and was at Solferino. After the peace of 
Villafranca he returned to his books and went to London, 
where he was caught by the news of the rise of Sicily and the 
Spedizione dei mille of Garibaldi. Without hesitation he took 
ship to Sicily and followed Garibaldi to Cosenza, where he 
enrolled as a volunteer in the bersaglieri. In February 1861 he 
got his commission as an officer. After the campaign he was 
transferred to the Volunteer corps of Piedmont, and then to the 
Garde mobile at Naples. In 1862 he is mentioned as a 
lieutenant in General Istwan Türr's legion. We have no facts 
concerning his further life. Some sources tell us that he was 
with Colonel Francesco Nullo in the Italian Legion on the 
insurgent side in Poland in 1863 and was killed there; 
according to others he went to America and was killed in 
action somewhere during the Civil War in the Confederate 
Army of the South. 
The Spedizione dei mille also inspired some Finns living in 
Finland; the former non-commissioned officer Herman 
Liikanen arrived in Italy too late to become involved in the 
campaigns, but took up arms for Denmark against Prussia in 
1864. The younger son of our national poet laureate J.L. 
Runeberg, Lorenzo Runeberg was aiming also to enrol in the 
garibaldian army, but he did not complete his military training 
before the war was over. He became instead a very 
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distinguished district physician. 
But these enthusiastic young people were without doubt 
exceptions in the Finnish society of 1860s. The late Professor 
Lauri Hyvämäki in his doctoral thesis from 1964 analyzed 
Finnish newspapers and their following the international 
affairs. He found out that in the end of the 1870s the Finnish 
press was still not very interested in international politics, 
when it took up such a question it wrote in pro-Russian terms 
and with great understanding for the Russian viewpoint. Then 
in the 1880s, and especially during the Afghanistan crisis of 
1885, some of the liberal newspapers, especially Dagbladet and 
its editor-in-chief, the stubborn liberal A.H. Cydenius were 
ventilating their thoughts of Finnish neutrality during a 
possible war between England and the Russian Empire. 
Warned by Russian reactions, the Finns very soon learned to be 
more discreet in discussing world politics openly. Strict 
censorship is another reason for the Finnish unwillingness to 
express opinions. 
But from 1890 onward Russia attempted to change relations 
between the Empire and the Grand Duchy — which Professor 
Jussila will discuss in his article. The Finnish upper class was 
in fact seeking contacts with the European cultural elite and 
asking for moral aid in their struggle against what was called 
Russian oppression. Scientists were using their etablished 
contacts, business men their liaisons, the aristocracy their 
relations with influential people on the continent and in 
England. 
When in 1899, after flagrant violation — as it was commonly 
regarded then — of the constitutional rights of Finland through 
the so-called February Manifesto, which allowed Russian 
intervention in Finnish affairs and thus violated the autonomy 
of Finland, names were collected in Europe to sign an address 
of protest, the collecting was organized by the Finns using their 
international contacts. They got a thousand and fifty names, 
among them some of the most prominent members of the 
European intelligentsia. In this seminar it may be correct to 
mention that more than 25 % of the names were collected from 
Italy, mostly university professors. There were about 280 
Italian names, but only 180 Scandinavian names. The operation 
was led by Professor Emilio Brusa in Turin, the most renowned 
Italian name was, I think, Carducci. 
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Finland had thus become quite clearly a part of European 
intellectual circles. The struggle against Russian oppression 
strengthened the bonds with Western Europe. Already from the 
1880s Finnish upper class families had been visiting European 
Holiday Centres; some of the most well-to-do Finns retired to 
live in high style on the Italian or French Riviera, where they 
found some kinsmen among the retured Russian generals and 
Privy Councillors. Still, the Finnish upper class as a whole had 
during the 19th century become more and more nationalistic. 
The large core of this class had embraced Swedish nationalism, 
partly because Swedish was the languange of their culture, 
partly because of their inability to adopt the democratic 
attitudes of the Finnish national movement. But the Finnish 
national movement was gaining ground steadily. In 1882 the 
leader of this party, Professor G.Z. Yrjö-Koskinen was inivited 
to be a member of the Finnish Governement, and on the same 
day the leader of the Swedish Liberals, Leo Mechelin, joined 
the Senate. 
Both these leaders of the Finnish intelligentsia were Finnish 
nationalists: Yrjö-Koskinen was strengthening the national 
identity of Finnish-speaking Finns, Mechelin trying to fight 
Russian aggression with legal weapons. And both were also 
men with large international interests. Yrjö-Koskinen had 
contacts occasionally with the great peace theoretician 
Frederic Passy, and Leo Mechelin was also very well known in 
the peace movement of the 1890s. But still, their major concern 
was the development and progress of the Finnish people, the 
Finnish nation, both economically and ideologically. 
To put the whole problem in a nutshell: throughout the 
future of the Finnish nation was for its upper class the 19th 
century the most important question. Firstly, the international 
contacts were mainly on a private and personal basis; then, 
when the turmoil of Great Power politics began more and to 
raise high seas even on Finnish shores, the Finnish upper class 
was forced to rely upon their social and intellectual 
counterparts in Europe. 
Of course there was also immigration, caused mostly by 
industrialisation and enlarging trade, also by the enormous rise 
of the standard of living in Finland which followed in the steps 
of urbanization. But the Finnish upper class — in spite of its 
origin — was mostly national and nationalistic. And as a result 
27 
of the educational system, which had been enlarged step by 
step with Finnish as the teaching language, the Finnish upper 
class, at least the younger generation, was mainly Finnish-
speaking. Belonging to a national culture with few traditions, 
this younger generation perhaps was less disposed to think in 
international categories than its predecessors. 
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Patrick Bruun 
Freedom fighters at 
close quarters 
In European history Garibaldi and Mazzini stand out as 
magnificent and colourful figureheads in the incessant struggle 
of the nineteenth century for national independence and civic 
liberties. Supporters of ideas formed and expressed in the 
French revolution and with the Bonapartist empire transferred 
in concreto to southern and continental Europe, they carried 
the fight of the carbonari into the harsh climate of the 
restoration. 
Though the political history of Europe during most of the 
nineteenth century was permeated by this struggle for freedom 
at different levels, autonomous Finland generally speaking 
played the part of an interested but neutral spectator. Many 
times sympathy for liberal ideas was expressed indirectly, often 
focussing on individuals, fighters and heroes rather than 
movements or philosophical abstractions. 
In the programme of this symposium I have named my 
contribution "Freedom fighters at close quarters. Fenno-Italian 
friendship in Greece". My point of departure is the fact that 
Finnish citizens who engaged actively in European wars of 
liberation or rebellions were very few indeed. One only is fairly 
well known to us, a legendary hero venerated by all his 
compatriots when in retirement, but always suspected of 
conspiratorial activities by the authorities. He was buried in 
Stockholm with full military honours in 1867 as a protest 
against Russia and the suppression of the Polish rebellion of 
1863. 
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His name was August Maximilian Myhrberg, born 1797 in 
Raahe (Brahestad), a student of Uppsala and Turku — and a 
somewhat unruly student at that — when he suddenly in 1823 
decided to go to Sweden in order to get some military training, 
this being the time when security conferences under the 
guidance of Metternich suppressed all efforts to light the torch 
of freedom in Europe and beyond the seas. Myhrberg fought 
successfully and valiantly in Greece and in the course of four 
years was promoted from private to captain, next to major 
commanding the fortress of what was the capital of Greece, 
Nauplion; he fought in Poland in 1831 and at least once in 
Spain (1823 and possibly later during the Carlist war). He was 
a modest and reticent man who never commented upon the 
fantastic feats of bravery connected with his name — a 
particularly interesting one seems to connect him with 
Garibaldi's flight to South America and his subsequent 
transatlantic military successes. Documents have been 
preserved from his time in Greece — a batch comprising well 
over 100 items unexpectedly turned up in 1964 in an attic in 
Bromma, a suburb of Stockholm. Very few of them are official 
documents, the majority being private notes and letters dealing 
with the everyday drudgery of camp life. Thus they give 
glimpses of the international society of freedom fighters at that 
time engaged in an effort to liberate Greece from the yoke of 
the Turks — the world of the Philhellenes in action. 
Among these Philhellenes the most interesting group, to my 
mind, is the Italian, and it would appear that among 
Myhrberg's friends Italians formed the majority. 
The Greek war of liberation has proved an inexhaustible 
source of historical research both on the level of great power 
politics and at the grassroots level focussing on the aims and 
activities of the indigenous population as well as the 
volunteers, the Philhellenes. According to the records of all 
Philhellenes known, the Italian group with 137 freedom 
fighters was the third largest, surpassed only by the 342 
Germans and the 196 French (cf. Appendix). Myhrberg's papers 
reveal some hitherto unknown participants. Without indulging 
in any analysis in depth of the Philhellenic movement, I believe 
that the different ethnic or national groups of volunteers can, 
in an general way, be accorded some common characteristics. 
The Germans and British were strongly influenced by the 
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slogan of repaying the debt of Europe to ancient Greece, the 
cradle of western culture. A Winckelmannian enthusiasm, we 
are told, emptied the German universities of professors and 
students very soon after the outbreak of the war; similarly the 
Byronic example exerted a strong moral pressure on British 
opinion, yielding a quota of 99 (the majority of whom arrived 
fairly late, after the death of lord Byron). The French and 
Italians, however, flocked to recruiting offices in two 
instalments, the early period of 1821-2 and the period of mid-
1825 or later. In between very few came, because at that time 
radicals were fighting in Spain. The picture of the Italians is 
clearly revealing. After the abortive rebellions in Italy of 1820-1 
many fugitives went to Spain (a minority to Greece), and from 
Spain, after the French intervention, to England. From 
England a great number of promiment Italian Philhellenes 
arrived with the ship Elizabeth on June 4, 1825. The purpose of 
most Italians seems to have been specifically to gain experience 
and to train for the final struggle to liberate Italy. We even 
know that some Italians volunteered on the Turkish side (in the 
army of Ibrahim Pasha) for the same reason, and entrenched in 
hostile camps they nevertheless could remain in touch with one 
another, exchanging and comparing notes. 
The French contingent was dominated by unemployed 
Bonapartists longing for revenge after so many adversities; a 
young member of the former imperial dynasty, Paul Marie died 
by accident in the harbour of Nauplion in 1827; Mme Laetitia 
Bonaparte's residence in Rome seems, incidentally, to have 
been a rallying point for Bonapartists. After Navarino, I 
suggest, it was mainly the genuine freedom fighters who 
remained, those who had nowhere to return to, and mainly the 
Italians (if we exclude the heavy German contingent preparing 
for the arrival in Greece of the Bavarian king). Myhrberg, too, 
without specific plans, lingered on until early 1831 when he, 
failing to be promoted, was passed over in favour of a Russian 
officer. 
Myhrberg shared the fate of the Italians in lacking the 
support of the great powers present in Greece. 
The Greek background of the revolutionaries or, rather, of 
the revolutionary movement which fearlessly in subsequent 
decades continued the struggle for a better world, can be 
reconstructed with fair certainty, but a considerable amount of 
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research is required, for instance in the archives of the secret 
police, in order to map out the course of events which followed. 
Liberals and radicals were under close observation even before 
the Congress of Vienna, as the spies of the Russian Czar, acting 
in Italy, suggest. In trying to discern the connections between 
opposition to the Holy Alliance and the revolutionaries of the 
later part of the nineteenth century. I propose to employ my 
compatriot Myhrberg once more as a suggestive link. 
Myhrberg, as already mentioned, left Greece early in 1831, 
obviously planning to return to the North. This brought him in 
the first instance to France, where much had changed with the 
revolution of July 1830. The Bonapartist Philhellenes were no 
longer outcasts — Myhrberg's one-time military commander 
Fabvier had in fact been hailed as a national hero in advance of 
the revolution when returning to France in 1828. Thus the 
progressive forces could gather in France. Here Mazzini in 1831 
founded la Giovine Italia. Several years later he was joined by 
Garibaldi after the break with la Charbonnerie, that frail 
offshoot of the carbonara. 
In the meantime Poland exploded and rose against the 
prototype of oppression, Czar Nicolas and his brother 
Constantine, viceregent of Poland. With the usual efficiency, 
offices for the recruitment of volunteers were opened in Paris. 
Myhrberg left his luggage in Paris and joined the freedom 
fighters, amply equipped with letters of recommendation to 
various commanding officers in Poland. He arrived, however, 
only to be taken prisoner during the final phase of the war. 
Though he succeeded in escaping, his way back to Paris caused 
him many hardships and lasted several years. The late thirties 
saw him probably in Spain — volunteers for both sides in the 
Carlist war were recruited in France — and he reappeared in 
the French capital in 1839, whence he secured his return to 
Sweden with the aid of the personal agent of the Swedish king 
(Bernadotte). 
Let me now proceed to the 1860s. Myhrberg lived a peaceful 
life of retirement in Stockholm, a popular figure who moved in 
the best circles, a legendary hero much publicized by writers of 
fact and fiction. He was not welcome in Finland; during the 
Crimean war he must have been regarded as representing 
Swedish revanchist ideas, plans aiming at the reconquest of 
Finland. 
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In the early sixties the activities of Polish agents, emissaries 
from the Czartoryski residence, Hotel Lambert, in Paris, 
increased preparations for the next Polish war of liberation. 
The general idea of the Poles was to co-ordinate a Polish rising 
with Swedish military intervention in order to liberate Finland. 
The Polish agents found ready support in a group of liberal 
politicians and journalists mixed with influential Finnish 
immigrants. Myhrberg belonged to this group, not because of 
political talent, analytical power, or practical knowledge of 
world affairs, but simply because of his popularity. In 
connection with the Polish question, moreover, he had the 
reputation of a participant in the rebellion of 1831. In fact, 
when the rebellion broke out in 1863 and Prince Konstantin 
Czartoryski visited Sweden for a final effort to convince the 
Swedes of the wisdom of military intervention, Myhrberg was 
introduced to him and invited by him to Paris and Rome, an 
innocuous and friendly gesture, though with a slight flavour of 
propaganda. 
If Myhrberg, when approaching seventy, could not be 
considered an active agent as far as power politics go, this does 
not mean that the Polish conspiracies were void of political 
value. The activities of the Polish agents gain in importance 
when seen in conjunction with another remarkable visitor to 
Sweden with a similiar purpose — to entangle Sweden in the 
Russo-Polish conflict. This was the famous anarchist Michael 
Bakunin, who stayed in Sweden from March to October 1863. 
He was received with friendship by the already mentioned 
group of Scandinavists who had liberal leanings. He was even 
smuggled into the Royal Palace for a personal audience with 
the king himself. He was uncommonly popular among the 
liberals. Silvio Furlani, an expert on this subject, writes: 
"Bakunin aveva annodato rapport di personale conoscenza 
con molti eminenti sostenitori del liberalismo politico e dello 
scandinavismo come pure con personalitå di rilievo delle alte 
sfere governative. L'attivitå oratoria ... gli aveva praticamente 
aperto quasi tutte le porte politicamente rilevanti the 
esercitavano una loro influenza sulla formazione dell'opinione 
pubblica, dai Finlandesi emigrati ... e ad eminenti uomini 
politici quali ...". 
Bakunin's stay in Sweden, protracted far beyond the point 
when the Swedes definitely refused to be dragged into the war, 
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indicates that he had other tasks to complete in Scandinavia, 
namely to organize a transport service by which literature 
could be smuggled into Russia through Stockholm and Finland. 
He had also to investigate the possibilities of printing in 
Stockholm. Albert Bonnier, founder of one of the greatest 
publishing houses of Sweden, appears to have been interested 
in the latter project. The real planner of this diffusion of 
propaganda was, however, not Bakunin but the Russian 
emigrant N.P. Ogarev in London. However, other matters 
brought Bakunin back to Sweden the following year for a 
sojourn of six weeks (Sept. 6 to Oct. 12, 1864). 
Interesting traces of these visits are known to us, first and 
foremost a draft of a secret international society for the 
emancipation of mankind (Societe internationale secrete de 
l'emancipation de l'humanité) found in 1953 among the papers 
of the Swedish journalist August Sohlman, now in the Royal 
Library of Stockholm and properly analyzed for the first time 
by the Finnish scholar Prof. Lolo Krusius-Ahrenberg. Since 
then this document has been discussed, for instance, at the 
Quinto Convegno degli storici italo-sovietici in Moscow and 
later at Il convegno di studi "marxisti e riministi" in 1972. 
From Sweden Bakunin in 1863 went by way of London to 
Florence, where he took up residence on January 26. Refugees 
of diverse origin and nationality visited him there, and his 
home was turned into a centre of revolutionary planning. The 
police reported that even the Swedish author and journalist 
August Blanche, "questo capopopolo del regno Scandinavo", 
was saluted there. The debates were republican in tenor, and 
the participants discussed "dell'alleanza dei popoli contro 
tiranni, del trionfo completo del principio democratico e 
dell'urgente bisogno de rinovare il diritto pubblico europeo". 
Other problems of major concern were the Polish question and 
the possibility of rebellions in Hungary and Austrian Galicia. 
At this juncture Denmark was attacked by Prussia and by 
Austria. 
Europe was certainly ripe for a revolution, but in order to 
prevent or exclude shortcomings such as those of 1848 an 
international secret organization was to be formed with centres 
ready to strike in each country. This was to be a union of the 
revolutionaries in all countries united against the Holy 
Alliance of all the tyrants of Europe, religious, political, 
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bureaucratic and financial. 
Having completed this plan, Bakunin left Florence and 
arrived in Sweden on Sept. 6. According to new documents 
discovered in the Royal Library his purpose was to create an 
"organisation de la Familie des Freres Scandinaves" as a 
branch organisation of La grande societe revolutionnaire 
internationale de l'Europe. The supplementary documents start 
with an analysis of the political situation in the Scandinavian 
countries which Bakunin did not yet find ripe for republican 
reform. One question could, however, activate these 
surprisingly liberal but slow northerners, he reflects — l'union 
Scandinave, because of the instinctive and general hatred of 
Russia and the new very deeply felt hatred of Prussia. 
In a letter from London discussing the Scandinavian union 
with regard to publication of the programme, Bakunin 
exclaims: "Et pourquoi ... ne feriez-vous pas un appel 
courageux å la Finlande?" You are a group of free citizens, not 
members of the government. "Il faut oser — comme disait 
Danton". 
He goes on to point out the negative side of maintaining 
silence concerning Finland. If that were done, the Finns would 
not be prepared to act and the Russians could easily persuade 
them that if the political situation in the North were 
aggravated, Sweden would simply try to reduce Finland to the 
state of a province, and those Finns who nevertheless persisted 
in their hopes of future liberation from Russia would be 
reduced to contacts with the king alone. Consequently, what 
ought to have been a great national cause would reveal itself as 
a petty intrigue according to Quanten or Nordström (two 
Finnish émigrés holding key positions in Stockholm. In this 
context it should be pointed out that J.V. Snellman, the 
Hegelian philosopher and leading spirit of the Finnish 
nationalist movement with its stress on the Finnish language, 
had criticized with searing sarcasm in a well-known essay the 
behaviour of his fugitive compatriots, Quanten, Nordström and 
others). 
If I were one of you, Bakunin continues, I would make a 
solemn appeal to Finland and declare that in given 
circumstances Finland would return to Sweden "comme une 
soeur egale en independence et en liberte, non comme une 
province, mais comme un etat confedere seulement pour les 
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grands interets generaux politiques de toute Scandinavie et 
conservant toute son independence interieure, la langue, et sa 
legislation particuliere". 
The advantage of such an appeal and such a policy would be 
that it would attract a large part of the Finnish population of 
the northern regions of Russian Europe, possibly also Estonia 
and Lithuania, without conquest and violence; by a 
spontaneous movement would thus be born La grande 
federation du Nord. Bakunin was prepared to accept, at least 
at the beginning, a king as head of the Nordic federation. But, 
and this was much more important, the union should be 
directed by a Scandinavian parliament as a superstructure of 
the national parliaments. 
The statutes of L'organisation regionale scandinave stipulate 
that the regional government was to be formed by the four 
Scandinavian countries (Finland included); that it would 
comprise three members chosen without regard to their 
Scandinavian nationality, and four members representing one 
each of the four countries. The national governments would be 
subordinate to the Regional Government. All cabinet members 
on both levels had to be Freres internationaux, but exceptions 
were permissible at the outset. 
It seems superfluous, in this context, to dwell upon the lesser 
details of the Statutes; the general programme of La societe 
internationale also falls outside the scope of this paper. With 
regard to Michael Bakunin it should be sufficient to say that 
his plans came to nought; his Swedish correspondents August 
Sohlman and Adolf Hedin did not take any definite steps 
towards forming the Scandinavian union, though there are 
proofs that an English section of the international federation 
was constituted. 
We have now seen, in two different contexts, the pattern of 
European radical and/or revolutionary co-operation. We have 
seen the radicals taking the field in Greece in the 1820s, and 
plotting and conspiring in Sweden and Italy in the 1860s. My 
link between these two peaks of activity was weak, admittedly, 
but on the other hand, beyond the valiant Major Myhrberg, 
who gave us the lead, other common denominators are 
discernible, in the first place the Italians, in the second place 
the Poles. 
The recruiting offices for the Greek war subsequently served 
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volunteers going to Poland and, later in the thirties, to Spain 
and Portugal or South America. After the failure of the Polish 
rebellion Mazzini's Giovine Italia and the Czartoryski 
headquarters in Paris constitute the institutional framework of 
radical conspiracy embracing most European countries; after 
the labours of 1848-9 London becomes the active centre with 
at least two nuclei, one formed by Mazzini with the Hungarian 
Lajos Kossuth and the Frenchman Ledru-Rollin as prominent 
and conspicuous members planning for a future pan-European 
republic, the other by Karl Marx developing his socialist ideas 
and working for the international solidarity of labour. In the 
first International, founded in September 1864 during 
Bakunin's absence in Sweden, these camps effectuated an 
unholy alliance, ultimately torn asunder by the rivalries of 
Marx and Bakunin, the socialists and the anarchists. 
Meanwhile, Garibaldi's active intervention in 1860 in Italian 
politics with his 1,000 brave "redshirts" had aroused the 
enthusiasm and admiration of all freedom fighters and radicals, 
and Bakunin's plan for the European brotherhood had found 
nourishment in the companionship of successful Italian radicals 
in Florence in 1864. Here, I assume, is to be found one source 
of inspiration for his Scandinavian secret society and for a 
regional alliance including not only Denmark, Norway and 
Sweden but also Finland. 
The international brotherhood outlined by Bakunin was 
never, as far as we know, converted into fact in the form and to 
the extent suggested by the Russian anarchist. Nevertheless, it 
could be said that the flesh and blood fraternity of the freedom 
fighters of the nineteenth century was a fact of life. It was 
created in the backwash of the French Revolution by the 
Napoleonic expansion transmitted to large parts of Europe; it 
began to assume cohesion in Greece and Spain in the 1820s 
and was further articulated in the decades to follow and 
frequently interspersed with outbursts of armed insurrection. 
The sixties provide us with sufficient material to reconstruct 
certain features of these underground movements, which 
normally are reluctant to deposit the literary evidence of their 
activities with the national archives. Garibaldi had become not 
only the liberator of Italy but also the champion of European 
liberty. The indomitable recluse of Caprera took an active 
interest in everything that happened on the European scene, 
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but particularly when it came to the possibilities of returning 
Venetia to Italy and to striking at Austria, his ingenuity and 
resourcefulness knew no limits. Little known are, for instance, 
his endeavours to weaken the position of the Austrians in the 
Balkans both by direct attack and by getting the support of the 
Greeks. Late in 1861 Garibaldi's emissary Lombardos in 
Athens submitted to King Otto a Rapporto confidenziale 
sottoposto all'eroe delle Nationalitå oppresse Generale 
Garibaldi, wording which eloquently illustrates the aspirations 
of the great freedom fighter. Garibaldi at that juncture hoped 
for a Slavonic uprising (in 1862) in the Balkans against 
Austria. This could have been brought about by the concerted 
action of an expedition into the Tyrolean mountains 
(volunteers had, in fact, assembled at Sarnico on Lake Iseo, not 
far from Bergamo) and a landing on the east coast of the 
Adriatic, either at Antivari (Montenegro) or Durazzo (Albania). 
The support of Greece, moral or active, would have been of 
prime importance for successful operations. 
His appeals from Caprera for the Polish cause were 
numerous — Poles had fought with him in all his campaigns. 
His relations with the Hungarians were intimate. A Hungarian 
legion was scheduled to take part in the Balkan campaign. 
Lajos Kossuth from his London exile with Mazzini moved to 
Italy in 1861 and finally settled down in Turin, another 
indication of the bond between Italian and Hungarian 
revolutionaries. 
Details such as these serve to demonstrate that the 
revolutionary movements, as far as we known them, display a 
fair amount of unity combined with an international outlook 
and a common purpose. The Nordic countries were but little 
touched by these activities for reasons perspicaciously outlined 
by no other than Michael Bakunin. The main function of 
Scandinavia was to serve as a supply route for revolutionaries, 
providing the oppressed peoples of Russia with political 
propaganda when the Polish rebellion had closed the 
continental frontiers of Russia. In addition Sweden might be 
induced to intervene with force, and the émigré Finns in 
Stockholm formed a nucleus of those interested in such a 
venture. The Philhellene and freedom fighter Myhrberg 
symbolizes the political aspirations of these liberals. 
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Analysis of known philhellenes by nationality and 
time of arrival in Greece' 
Early 
Period 
1821— 
end 1822 
Middle 
Period 
1823— 
mid 1825 
Late 
Period 
Mid 1825 
onwards 
Time of 
arrival 
uncertain Totals 
Germans 265 10 50 17 342 
Died 116 9 13 4 142 
French 71 2 114 9 196 
Died 19 — 39 2 60 
Italians 62 12 48 15 137 
Died 19 4 13 6 42 
British 12 31 56 99 
Died 4 7 10 — 21 
Swiss 19 14 2 35 
Died 8 — 3 — 11 
Poles 24 3 3 30 
Died 10 — 1 — 11 
Dutch and Belgian 12 1 4 17 
Died 1 1 1 3 
Americans 1 5 10 16 
Died 1 — 2 3 
Hungarians 4 2 3 9 
Died 3 — 3 — 6 
Swedes 5 3 1 9 
Died 3 1 4 
Danes 7 1 8 
Died 3 — — — 3 
Spanish 3 5 1 9 
Died 1 3 — 4 
Others and 
unknown 4 8 21 33 
Died — — — 3 3 
TOTALS 489 64 318 69 940 
Died 188 21 88 16 313 
1 William St. Clair: That Greece Might still be Free, Oxford, 1972, p. 356 
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Mario D'Addio 
Political thought and 
nationality in Italy 
The new concept of nationhood which inspired European 
politics in various ways from the end of the Restoration to the 
First World War, was without doubt connected with the 
political experience gained through the French Revolution: the 
French nation had taken over from the monarchy of the old 
regime; the principle of legitimacy which had been expressed 
in the divine right of hereditary monarchy had been replaced 
by the will of a nation which expressed itself through its 
representatives and which laid the foundations for a new 
political and social order. The nation, in that it was the active 
subject of politics, was the people, while the people found their 
personality, that is the factor which distinguished them from 
all other races in the nation: the French people became the 
French nation, gained liberty not just for itself but for all other 
nations. The famous Decree of the Convention of 19 November 
1792 expressly proclaimed this principle with the new 
international order in mind based on the freedom of the people: 
"The national convention declares, in the name of the French 
people, that it will grant fraternity and assistance to all those 
peoples who want to reclaim their lost freedom; it encharges 
the executive power to give the generals the necessary orders 
to aid these peoples and defend the citizens who have been 
oppressed or who might be oppressed in the cause of freedom." 
The wars fought by the victorious revolutionary armies aroused 
enthusiasm, hopes, new civil and political energy forcing 
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friendly and hostile countries to acquire self-awareness and 
thus a desire to see their national rights recognized. 
The new European order instituted by Napoleon damped 
these inspirations in many ways, in that it tended to channel 
the new, national energies of the people into a bureaucratic, 
military and exceedingly centralized organization to guarantee 
the French Empire's power. But precisely for this reason, while 
it gave a new, unified order to populations who, like Italy, had 
been divided for centuries by different traditions, laws and 
institutions, it simultaneously created a historical and political 
situation which would allow an organic, systematic 
formulation of the idea of a nation: it is worth remembering 
Fichte's "Speeches to the German Nation" resulting from a 
course of lectures in Berlin during the French occupation. The 
idea of a nation, expressed for the first time as an idea-force 
during the course of the French Revolution and Napoleonic era 
had in certain ways been pre-announced by those writers and 
political thinkers such as Montesquieu, Burke, Moser, Herder, 
and Vico who considered customs, laws and institutions as the 
result of a historic process in which the people gradually came 
to express their own specific and particular characteristics and 
therefore common identity. 
It was above all Vico who inspired the first Italian theorists 
of nationality with his concept of a political society as a human 
world deriving from the creative activity of people and nations 
who in their symbols, languages, legends, cultures and poetry 
gradually became conscious of their own personality, identity 
and those elements which an individual recognizes as being 
unifying: language thus expresses the life of a people, 
preserving its memories and traditions and expressing itself in 
different forms during the course of a people's history while 
retaining its basic identity. The Italian nation is thus found in 
both the vernacular of the new language arising at the end of 
the ancient Greco-Roman civilization and in Dante's great 
poem in which the spoken language becomes the bearer of 
ideas and values of a universal nature. 
We find the first interesting ideas on nationhood in the 
political writings of those Southern political writers who 
participated in the events of the Republic of Naples in 1799 and 
in whom the Vichian cultural tradition was much more alive. 
They began to pose the problem of the political unity of Italy 
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which began to be considered no longer a "nation" in the 18th 
century sense (which was mainly based on the classic meaning) 
but which was considered in the context of all those factors 
which lead populations to become just one people. Francesco 
Lomonaco, in the last chapter of his "Report to the Citizen 
Carnet" (Rapporto al cittadino Carnet), significantly entitled 
"A look at Italy" (Colpo d'occhio sull'Italia) began by 
remarking that Italy had precise geographical limits; that its 
boundaries consisted of the Alps and Mediterranean, and that 
its territory was characterized by the Appenines. From this 
point of view Italy was "separated from the other populations 
by a chain of inaccesible mountains, and was as if destined by 
nature to from a single power." But, in addition to the 
geographical factor, Lomonaco emphasized the general unity of 
the people which was mainly evident in common language, 
sentiments and passions, and in a common moral development 
and a single religion. "Its inhabitants speak the same language, 
have the same type of passions and character, enjoy equal 
moral development and physical energy, are not divided by 
either interests or religion, and are made to be members of the 
same family". These, for Lomonaco, were the basic 
requirements for Italy's political unity and therefore its 
independence — independence being the solution to all 
problems — political, civil and social — which Italian society 
had to bear. Italian political unity, seen as a consequence of the 
diffusion of these principles arising out of the French 
Revolution, was considered as one of the essential conditions of 
the new European equilibrium: "because, to be brief, in Europe 
there is a political balance, war is ceasing and it is right for 
Italy to be united in a single government, creating a line of 
strength." Now it is precisely through political unity and 
independence that Italy will affirm itself as a nation. That is, 
through the knowledge of its own strength to defend itself from 
possible foreign attacks, through guaranteeing its own 
autonomy with respect to other powers, through an awareness 
of the close link between love of one's fatherland and love of 
freedom, the principle which confers a genuine moral value to 
the nation: "By realizing these ideals the Italians, by having a 
nation, will acquire a spirit of nationality; by having a 
government, will become politicians and warriors; by having a 
fatherland, will enjoy freedom and all its benefits; by forming a 
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united population they will be inspired with a feeling of 
strength and public pride and they will establish a power 
which will not be subject to the attacks of foreigners, for woe 
betide that nation which has to resort to others to conduct its 
home affairs!" 
The political problem of making an actual nation out of Italy 
was precisely defined in its historic dimensions by Vincenzo 
Cuoco, who was certainly the most interesting political writer 
of a group of patriots who participated in the dramatic events 
of the Neapolitan Republic. In his essay entitled "History of the 
Neapolitan Revolution of 1799"* he bases his interpretation of 
political events on the fact that every people and thus every 
nation has a concrete historic individuality which must 
absolutely be taken into account whenever a radical reform of 
the laws and institutions needs to be made. It is not a matter of 
creating a constitution which faithfully resembles the French 
one, but more of creating a system of government inspired by 
the principle of freedom which derives its strength and 
legitimation from the traditions, customs and long-established 
institutions of self-government which every nation has 
retained. "If I were invited to be the law-giver of a nation, I 
would first wish to be acquainted with it. There is no nation, 
however corrupt or wretched, which has no customs worth 
preserving ... every nation which is now in slavery was once 
free ... these remnants of customs and governments of time 
past which are found in every nation are precious to a wise 
law-maker and must form the basis of his new legislation. The 
nation always respects what its superiors give it: such respect 
sometimes has bad affects but often enormously beneficial, 
ones. Do not those who wish to destroy this realize that, by 
doing so, they are destroying every foundation of justice and 
social order?" 
The political problems which were raised by the French 
Revolution, as far as Italy was concerned, all consisted in 
finding the most suitable way of allowing the Italian 
population to participate in the new rules of the constitution: 
that meant that they had to acquire knowledge of their own 
traditions, customs and finally their own history from which to 
* Saggio Storico sulla Rivoluzione Napolitana del 1799 
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draw the inspiration and impulse necessary for a suitable 
response to the new political and civil regulations. The latter 
could not be a simple imitation of the French ones, but had to 
be essentially Italian, that is the result of the active 
participation of the people. Not an abstract legality but a 
concrete, actual, historic reality and therefore not purely 
theoretical ideals and principles. For this reason Cuoco did not 
believe in constitutions which were "too philosophical", since 
the true base of a constitution should be the traditions, 
opinions and habits of a people deriving from their character 
and from that which the people have in common. "This base 
must rest on the character of the nation and must precede the 
constitution; and while the way in which a nation must 
exercise its sovereignty is in this way determined, there must 
be many more sacred things in the constitution itself which the 
Sovereign, whoever he is, must not change." 
According to Cuoco it was necessary to realize that the most 
efficient way of limiting a Sovereign's power so that it was not 
transformed into absolute power did not lie in the constitution 
but in that system of principles and values, precisely the 
expression of the character of the nation, which represented 
the real complement of the constitution. Such a system of 
principles and values implied a living and functional political 
reality. 
For Cuoco, the new political legislation introduced into Italy 
thanks to French influence had to be enlivened by public spirit 
and a sharp national awareness: the Italian Republic and the 
Kingdom of Italy were not to be considered as mere political 
entities set up to guarantee France's influence and maintain 
the system of Napoleonic states, but more as the beginning of a 
political experience which would prove itself 'legitimate' in the 
true sense of the word by bringing about a real national 
awakening. This idea is developed by Cuoco in his famous 
"Project proposed by an Italian Newspaper" (Disegno di un 
giornale italiano) which he presented in 1805 to the Vice 
President of the Italian Republic Melzi d'Erilisi. Briefly it dealt 
with the formation of an Italian public opinion which was both 
cognisant of the reasons why the Italians formed a nation and 
aware of their affinity, founded of course on common interests 
but essentially moral, deriving from their traditions and 
history. Only by remembering the historical events which had 
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influenced political events in Italy and by reflecting on the 
significant contribution that Italian civilization had given to 
Europe could Italians feel and exert their national dignity, the 
feeling that induced citizens, i.e. the people, to participate in 
the new Institutions of the State: "In Italy it is not a question 
of preserving the public spirit but of creating it". We should 
accustom the minds of the Italians to think nobly, and 
introduce them, almost without their realizing, to the new 
ideas that their destiny requires, transform all those who were 
born in the provinces or even in the humblest village of the 
provinces into citizens of the State. The new State which arose 
from the French Revolution, observed Cuoco, had to relate to 
everyone, not just the 'active' citizens but also the 'passive' 
citizens, those who formed part of the poorer classes and who 
lived far from the political centre. Now this was only possible 
through a feeling of national dignity. Thus the people acquired 
a new confidence of their own strength and deeds, 
accompanied by a self-esteem and respect for the things which 
belonged to them. Thus "a consensus of opinion on those 
objects which could be useful or harmful" was made possible. 
National consciousness, therefore, becomes a power to 
accomplish and does not remain in the abstract. It rennovates, 
transforms, works in such a way as to make society and 
institutions correspond to its ideals. It is therefore a stimulus of 
activity which redeems individuals form their servile habits 
and from simple imitation and reminds them of the 
responsibility of their actions and their duty to make a 
personal, individual contribution in order to achieve a common 
end. From this they acquire the energy necessary to carry out 
generous and noble works, and likewise the strength of spirit to 
support general difficulties and to make the sacrifices which 
will sometimes be required of them to achieve a common end: 
"self-esteem and respect for their own possessions arise in 
great nations as a result of that strength which has enabled 
them to accomplish great works, and that patience which has 
allowed them to support difficulty and serious sacrifices and 
that affection for their own government which is cooled or 
killed at the thought that it is not operating in their interests; 
and finally that constancy of thought in deeds and actions 
which, based on the respect we have for our superiors, cannot 
prevent us from obtaining the very best results." 
46 	 3 
According to Cuoco, when nations are compared their 
differences, both in attitudes and sentiments, can easily be 
seen; the nation's historic personality is founded on a principle 
of development and activity which in the course of history 
leads to a unity of behaviour and activity in individuals, 
groups, social classes and their works and obligations, which 
thus from the root of a people's identity. In this perspective a 
nation's essence is represented by the contributions it has made 
to the formation of modern civilization, and in this respect 
Cuoco thinks that it is useful for nations to discover themselves 
through comparison with others. This prompts Cuoco to urge 
the Italians to recall the unity of their history, to recognize the 
most significant works of Italian genius and to meditate on the 
errors, divisions and internal strife which led to Italy's 
domination by foreign powers. Cuoco in "Giornale Italiano" 
exhalts and defends the virtues and genius of the Italians, but 
at the same time is severely critical of Italy's vices, above all 
those which affect the Italian civil sense, such as separatist 
sectarian movements. He repeatedly recalls the attention of 
readers of "Giornale Italiano" to the fact that national spirit 
does not mean the attitude of a person who only regards and 
values what takes place in his own country, thus isolating 
himself from the outside world. On the contrary, he urges the 
Italians carefully to note what is going on in other countries 
and points out that, once provincialism and municipalism have 
been eliminated, it is necessary to enter into debate with other 
nations by promoting an exchange of ideas — which is the true 
climate for national renewal. In this context Cuoco dwells on 
the theme of the ancient Italic primate in the philosophical-
pedagogical novel "Plato in Italy" which, as he wrote to the 
Vice-King Eugenio, was "aimed at forming the Italians' public 
morale, and inspiring them with that spirit of unity, love for 
their country, and love for their armed forces which they have 
not so far possessed". The great civilization of the Italic cities 
of Magna Grecia thus represents a model which helped 
understanding of the processes behind the political union of 
peoples and which could therefore be useful experience at the 
present time. 
In contrast, in a work of Giandomenico Romagnosi printed 
anonymously in 1815 with the title "The Constitution of a 
National Representative Monarchy" (Della costituzione di una 
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monarchia nazionale rappresentativa) we find the concept of a 
nation seen from a different cultural viewpoint, that is with 
precise reference to Italian Enlightenment at the end of the 
18th century. This work was published in its entirety after 
Romagnosi's death in 1848 with the title "Science of 
Constitutions". (Scienze delle costituzioni). 
Romagnosi felt that political problems must be considered in 
a systematic way from a rational-utilitarian point of view: he 
dwelt particularly on the positive factors which should be 
considered when dealing with problems regarding the 
organization of society. Romagnosi held that there was no 
difference between people and nation since both were formed of 
the same individuals with the same specific interests in 
common and able to establish an exchange of such interests. He 
saw the consequences, for political order, deriving from this: 
the unity of the people-nation existed even if it was subdivided 
into various state-political systems (as was the case in Italy) 
because whatever was the result of a completely natural 
formation could not be destroyed: "I say nation: and when I 
use this term I mean to denote a population which has been 
imprinted with a moral and geographic natural unity". 
The existence of nations is thus the result of both a natural 
and a people's law, in the sense that men, for reasons of 
ambience, ethnic characteristics and on account of their 
cultural patrimony tend to gather in large collective 
communities whose characteristics are, indeed, completely 
natural: nations are the result of the process of organization of 
diversification which has characterized the history of the 
human race. From this Romagnosi moves on to become a 
theorist of 'Ethnarchy', that is, the right all nations have to 
establish their own particular political system and therefore 
government. The arch, the command, the principle, which 
legitimizes the political power derives from the unity of action 
of the individuals and therefore of the nation. Ethnarchy 
asserts itself as a right that cannot be denied upon a nation's 
conclusion of its natural cycle of development and upon its 
reaching its natural limits: in this event the need for "natural 
domination" arises and this is realized through "the reunion of 
the nation's physical and moral forces in a united political 
power". This factor, according to Romagnosi, characterizes 
modern history: the formation of great unified states such as 
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Spain, France and England demonstrates that a genuine 
natural impulse pushes nations to seek political unity. 
Resistance to such an impulse means altering the politico-
social balance formed through the completely natural laws of 
the great human communities and their reciprocal influences. 
The political order of every people, like that of a nation, will 
always be precarious, and often cause ruinous wars until 
nations are based on the principle of nationality: "Equilibrium 
between the nations of Europe will never be re-established 
until every nation has acquired its own independence". 
The idea of a nation is expressed in an organic, philosophical 
concept by Vincenzo Gioberti in a work which had very great 
impact on the Italian culture of the Risorgimento: "Of the Civil 
and Moral Primate of the Italians" (Del primato morale e civile 
degli italiani), first printed in Brussels in 1843. For Gioberti 
the relationship between religion and politics was of particular 
importance and he was interested in the role that Christianity 
and, in particular, Catholicism, had to play in the formation of 
modern civilization. He was convinced that civilization's 
origins, like those of development, lay in religion, which is the 
root of organization, preservation and rebirth. Already in 1838 
in his "Teorica del sovrannaturale, or sia discorso sulle 
convenienze della religione rivelata colla mente umana e col 
progresso civile delle nazioni" (Theory of the supernatural or 
discourse on the aptness of religion as revealed by the human 
mind and the civil progress of nations) he had observed that 
the "political conditions of a people have their foundation in 
corresponding moral conditions which precede it, form it and 
preserve it and the two principal elements of the 
moral life of a people are language and religion". The crisis of 
the modern world for Gioberti derived from the scission which 
had taken place between religion, the Catholic Christian faith, 
and philosophy and science. He attempted to show the basic 
relationship which existed instead between religion and civil 
progress, simultaneously giving rise to an intense renewal of 
Catholic culture. Religion and, in particular, Christianity forms 
the basis of the historical individuality of nations, and in 
religion the particular character, vocation and almost the 
destiny of every people is manifest. Gioberti observes that 
"every race is a creation of God and carries its own destiny 
within itself from birth and its beginnings. Such destiny differs 
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from that of other races because nature, the creator, which is as 
rich and varied as the mind governing it, never copies and 
never exactly reproduces itself but changes the different 
aspects of its work incessantly. Any nation wanting to 
contradict this law is punished like the individual who turns 
against his natural or given vocation; that is, he becomes 
unproductive ... (1875). Every nation, therefore, has its own 
personality, that is its own vocation and finally a particular 
mission to fulfil, mission which can only be understood in its 
true sense in the context of a history of civilization, in which 
the 'relationships which exist between individual civilizations 
and the principles on which they are based can be seen. 
The principle of nationality requires a nation to be constantly 
faithful to itself, to have activities which correspond to its 
"ethnological statute" and therefore to continue to perfect 
itself; it should avoid settling for a bland imitation of other 
nations because this means weakening and sometimes changing 
the national spirit by introducing a slow and inevitable process 
of dispersion of the national community". Gioberti observes "it 
is difficult for a race to grow and prosper without statutes 
which are inborn and incorporated into its character and 
connected with its history ... this does not prevent occasional 
changes from taking place, corresponding to the successive 
growth and perfecting of the original rudiments, changes which 
concern occasional events and not the essence of institutions 
which are immune from every event". Just as it is necessary to 
maintain and defend, with the appropriate education, the 
character, spirit and talent of a nation, it is not necessary to 
make the mistake of retaining at any cost the customs, 
intellectual habits, laws and institutions which have been 
superseded and are of no more use in the process of renovation 
and perfecting which characterizes all nations in that they are 
endowed with an autonomous spirit of life and organization: 
the idea of a nation, therefore, promotes the civil progress of 
races, implies a decisive criticism of every form of 
traditionalism which does not know how to distinguish the 
constructive form the destructive and which idolizes superficial 
forms, mortifying and suffocating in this way the free creative 
energy which belongs to the national spirit. "This maturing 
and successive development is very necessary to the happiness 
of a nation, just as much as the constant perpetuation of the 
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basic intrinsic order of its institutions; for this reason the life 
and progress of states are preserved in two such conditions 
which are in harmonious accord. There are many nations 
which want to change their composition and some which want 
to perpetuate outdated procedures in contrast to the dictates of 
time. The latter nations are not alive but dead or at least ill, 
and their civilization will collapse immediately at the onset of 
a sudden unexpected event or will come to a standstill and die 
of sloth and languor" (i, 138, 139). 
It is thus necessary to distinguish the ideal nation from the 
actual nation: the latter exists (in the corresponding 
etymological sense of the Latin word ex-sisto) in that it derives 
from the former and subsists (always in the Latin sense sub-
sisto) in that it is supported by the ideal nation: the idea in 
fact, does not change but guarantees continuity which becomes 
intelligible through language — language being the means 
through which the People's individuality and personality are 
expressed: "In such a way one can distinguish from the real 
Italy the ideal Italy ... which is so much more substantial and 
constant than the other, since the former varies from year to 
year and century to century while the latter is immutable (ii, 
250). 
Now, according to Gioberti, Italy's primate, the ideal 
material for nationality consists in its civilization; in Italy, 
ancient Greek civilization came to an end with the Roman 
Empire; in Italy, Christianity laid the foundations for medieval 
civilization from which modern civilization drew its origins in 
that it expressed the nations which formed a better, because 
ideal, community: Europe. Italy's primacy was expressed in 
literature, art and philosophy as a capacity to 'link itself' to its 
past, revive it and reformulate it in universal terms for all 
other nations: the mark of Italy's nationality was being able to 
express the universal in a form of civilization which made the 
cooperation of peoples possible and sanctioned their equality 
and fraternity, excluding any superiority or hierarchy." 
According to Gioberti, Italy's decadence depended on the fact 
that Italy had failed in her mission: Italians no longer had any 
awareness of the genius of their nation, they were ignorant of 
the factors influencing their history and did not understand the 
real meaning of their civilization. For these reasons Gioberti 
exhorted them to be aware of themselves as a nation, and of 
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their unity which is for most the ideal expression of a 
civilization which recognizes itself as such, and secondly a 
material or rather political expression. "Italians, in order to be 
able to perform deeds of great merit and genius, both mental 
and physical, must above all be aware of their strength and of 
the immortal privileges of their race. The only people capable 
of this are those active, ardent and magnanimous spirits who 
stimulate enterprises which, by virtue of the formers tenacity, 
succeed. Certainly no people can achieve its destiny if it has no 
knowledge of it. In this respect, the Delphic precept "Know 
yourself" which the father of the renewed Greek philosophy 
held sacred, is also applicable to nations no less than to 
mankind" (ii, 250-1). 
The political unity of a nation is the necessary consequence 
of a revived and reformed national awareness. Such awareness 
forms the nation's real foundation, since from it derives the 
necessary energy to achieve and, above all, defend the nation 
and allow her to be esteemed by other nations. From this point 
of view political unity and thus independence represent the 
most important safeguard for national spirit: "First of all I say 
that Italy must revive, above all, her life as a nation and that 
life as a nation cannot exist without political union between its 
various members. This union may be interpreted and conceived 
in many ways; but it is necessary in one way or other for 
without it the nation is weak and defenceless" (i, 70). 
Piedmont's defeat in the first war of Italy's independence, as 
we know, meant the end of the Giobertian political plan to 
realize a federation of Italian states under the aegis of the 
Piedmontese monarchy and the Pope and, at the same time, 
reminded Italian patriots of the necessity of a more careful 
consideration of the positive historical factors of the Italian 
nation. Giacomo Durante in this connection wrote an 
interesting analysis in an essay published in 1846 with the title 
"Italian nationality: a politico-military essay". (Della 
nazionalitå italiana. Saggio politico militare.) Durando did not 
believe Gioberti's Neo-Guelph plan to be possible, as events 
were later to confirm. The greatest obstacle was represented 
precisely by the Church, which could not neglect its universal 
mission and which was to have a decisive influence on the 
league of Italian states being formed. Durando observed "The 
Pope at the top of his hierarchy cannot allow his office to 
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become secondary and completely temporal, as would be the 
case if this plan of a league aiming at Italian independence 
were carried out. It is improper for him to become the first and 
only person responsible for the consequences of an undertaking 
which tends to combat a Catholic and apostolic nation such as 
the Italian" (250). 
The political program to rebuild Italian political unity and to 
guarantee the independence of the peninsula had to take into 
account some real political forces, especially military ones, 
which were to maintain the action of a league of Italian States 
against Austria. In such a way the initiative of the Italian 
States would be linked with actual factors and conditions of 
Italian nationality. Of particular relevance, according to 
Durante, to the history of the formation of nations were 
strategic requirements connected with the territory in which 
those populations forming nations abode. It was also necessary 
to take into account the formation of the territory favouring or 
discouraging the social factors on which the artificial 
conditions of nationality, such as language, customs, laws, 
institutions, common interests, were founded. According to 
Durante nationalities evolve in a strategic sense: that is, one 
can identify in a nation's history the original nucleus which 
offers the best possibilities of offence and defence and which, 
with the existence of corresponding social conditions, is able to 
succeed in attracting all the adjacent populations to itself, thus 
promoting that process of unification which will form the 
nation. 
Italy was divided into three strategic areas: Northern and 
Continental Italy, limited by the Alps and Northern Appenines; 
peninsular Italy, characterized by the Appenine chain, and 
insular Italy. The Appenines had always represented the great 
enemy of the nation and of political unity in Italian history. 
This geostrategic factor had to be taken into account in the 
preparation of alliances between the Italian states to ensure 
political independence. In other words, the principle which 
governed the policy for the formation of nationality had to be 
considered. "When a people manages to take possession of that 
proto-strategic point of a country destined in itself to serve as 
the base for a concentration of other peoples, and when they 
know how to exert a political and religious power from this 
point, then they have their future destiny in their hands (77)." 
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Durante thus indicated the ultimate goal which Piedmontese 
policies should have taken into consideration in order to 
promote Italian political unity. But Durante did not stop at 
underlining the importance of geostrategic conditions: he knew 
that, by then, the war had to have a legitimate policy that 
corresponded to the people's need for renewal. "The war is no 
less, and need not be other in the present state of civilization, 
than the putting into practice of a political concept, to which 
all strategic operations should be coordinated and directed" 
(239). Therefore, the cause of nationality, political unity and 
independence for the Italian nation is inseparably bound to 
freedom and the institutions which express such freedom. Only 
Parliament is able to express a true national public opinion 
and only parliamentary representatives can blend the Italian 
sub-nationalities to form just one nation. Liberty must finally 
be understood as the true base for the construction of nations: 
"a nation's strength consists in its moral cohesion; this moral 
cohesion can only derive from political freedom since anything 
else will mean uncertainty, confusion, continual terror, and 
therefore no cohesion, no strength, no national independence 
(180)". 
The idea of nationhood assumes significant proportions in 
Giuseppe Mazzini, where it becomes the centrepoint of all 
considerations of Italian and European problems that the great 
Italian patriot had matured during his long political career. In 
the authors we have so far considered, the fulfilment of the 
plan of unification and national independence depended on the 
nature of the political systems, the harmony of the States and 
especially the ruling classes who, after the experience of the 
French Revolution and the failures of insurrection in Italy and 
of July 1830 in Paris, were sceptical of 'mass' initiatives. 
Instead, for Mazzini, the nation above all signified the people 
and thus the people's initiative directed at realizing the 
fundamental principles, in their entirety, of national political 
order, unification and independence; therefore the wars of 
Kings and Princes had to be contrasted with the war by the 
people to conquer that which could not be given, presented or 
ceded to them, since it was by its origin theirs: freedom. The 
people were the nation in that they formed a substantial ethnic 
unity. This had a very important consequence insofar as the 
conception of political unity was concerned, since it could not 
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be achieved either with a confederate or a federal solution; 
from this point of view Mazzini, let us say, was passionately for 
Unification: political unification had to sanction and guarantee 
the indivisibility of the nation. 
The relationship between nation and people has, for Mazzini, 
a politico-social content of which we must be fully aware. The 
people's initiative, like its freedom and independence, is put 
into effect through a democratic and republican political 
system: a democracy and a republic are the two forms of 
government which complement each other alternately, since 
one cannot be without the other. Freedom interpreted as full 
participation of the people in public life can only be achieved 
in democracy, and the sovereignty of the people requires that 
the supreme authority of the State be elected by the people and 
by their representatives. 
For Mazzini, a Republic is founded on the principle of 
association which eliminates any element of dominion or 
subordination and which establishes relations of solidarity and 
cooperation among all citizens who are given a new feeling of 
freedom which derives from recognition of their own duties. 
Such a principle is particularly important for a soulution to the 
social problem. That is, it allows the working classes to redeem 
themselves from their harsh working conditions through 'work 
in association': the principle of association finds its 
application, according to Mazzini, primarily in the 
organization of economic production allowing the workers to 
dispose of the capital necessary for their activity. Republican 
democracy represents the political and social system in which 
the people's new need for a religious, moral and civil renewal 
are fully met. In some respects this is the result of that 
constant progress which characterizes Western history. The 
great achievement of the French Revolution was to have finally 
freed the individual, recognized his fundamental and 
inalienable rights and adequately guaranteed them; but 
freedom, if it lacks an awareness of the ethical-religious 
foundation of the law which disciplines and defines it, is 
reduced to the affirmation of anarchic individualism, a 
disuniting principle in every form of society, which therefore 
ends by encouraging the battle between opposite factions. 
The work of the French Revolution, according to Mazzini, 
was complete: a new era was beginning in which the individual 
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was to fulfil himself as a man, that is recognize and utilize all 
the bonds which link him to mankind and which make him 
thus participate in the destiny of humanity. "We are now 
between two epochs: between the grave of one world and the 
cradle of another: between the ultimate in individual synthesis 
and the threshold of humanity." The new feeling of humanity, 
that is of participation in the experience of mankind implied, 
for Mazzini, an authentic religious reform which expressed 
itself in perception of the inseparable link between God and 
humanity, God who manifests himself in humanity which in 
turn becomes trustee and interpreter of the laws. Thus men 
acquire awareness of their duties in the sense that they now 
have a sure point of reference to the definition and 
foundation of such duties. But man cannot acquire knowledge 
of the principles and values which should inspire and guide his 
life without the nation and the people, which therefore 
constitute the necessary intermediary between man and 
humanity: "when the idea ... of mankind's collective and 
progressive life ... became the supreme aim of every step made 
along the road of righteousness, then so was humanity 
recognized. And from that day the importance of the nation 
grew, the nation representing the intermediate step between 
humanity and the individual: the latter, if he cannot rely, 
during his work, on a collective force formed of millions who 
share his tendencies, customs, traditions and language, fails in 
his intent and, for want of anything better, sinks back into 
selfishness and egoism ... nations are the individuals of 
humanity as citizens are the individuals of the nation". 
From this viewpoint Mazzini believes that just as it is every 
citizen's duty to make the nation prosperous and happy, so 
every nation has the duty to cooperate in the best possible way 
with all other nations along the road of human progress. The 
new historical epoch must, in fact, be characterized by the 
affirmation of the principle of nationality and consequently 
independence, equality and fraternity of nations and their 
harmonic development, and by working together to attain 
common ends. France with the revolution completed her 
mission; now political initiative passes to the oppressed nations 
such as Poland, Germany, Hungary and Italy. They are the 
bearers of new values on which the new Europe has to 
founded: a new Europe which must transform itself from a 
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system of powers founded on internal and external oppression 
into a real association of peoples and nations. "As we believe in 
the freedom, equality, fraternity and association of individuals 
composing the State, so we believe in the freedom, equality, 
fraternity and association of nations" (677). 
The Mazzinian idea that the nation must be taken as the base 
of a new international order was given a systematic 
formulation (especially in the patriot's busiest years) in the 
field of international law: in 1851 Pasquale Stanislao Mancini, 
introducing the first course of international law at Turin 
University gave his opening address entitled "Nationality as 
the foundation of law for the people" (Della nazionalitå come 
fondamento del diritto delle genti) which was said to have 
aroused lively debate in Italy and abroad, not to mention the 
protests of Austria and the Kingdom of Naples. 
For Mancini the social factors of nationality must instead be 
considered like its conditions, that is the material elements 
which made up the nation. The principle which constitutes it is 
completely spiritual and of the mind, and is an awareness of 
nationality. "But the two lines of natural and historic 
conditions so far discussed, the same sharing of territory, origin 
and language are still not enough to constitute nationality as 
we understand it. These elements are like inert materials which 
manage to live but in which there is no life. Now this vital 
spirit, this divine complement to a nation, this root of its 
visible existence — what does it consist of? Ladies and 
Gentlemen, it is the awareness of nationality, the feeling that 
the nation has of herself and which makes her able to 
constitute herself within and manifest herself without". Such 
an awareness is possible thanks to a common shared way of 
thinking which allows the nation to realize itself as a moral 
unity. And it is precisely from the latter that the personality of 
the nation derives, which correspond to the personality of 
individuals: just as each man's inviolable right to exercise his 
freedom must be recognized, so it is necessary to recognize an 
equal right for communities of individuals who form their own 
unity and personality, that is the nation. A nation's right to 
freedom is the juridical consequence of the individual's right to 
freedom, so that the "preservation and development of 
nationality are for men not merely a right but due to them by 
law." The affirmation of the principle of nationality as a 
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foundation of international law manifests itself in two ways: 
with the free inner constitution of the nation and with its 
independence in respect of other nations. In such a way every 
nation has precise limits to its freedom of action: she can carry 
out any act which does not injure or offend another nation. 
According to Mancini, Kant's formula of law, seen as a 
necessary form of co-existence for free individuals, can be used 
as the base on which international society is formed, which 
becomes the "coexistence and agreement of the free 
nationalities of all peoples". 
Mancini gave international law a basic plan which permitted 
new forms of collaboration and supernation organization to be 
created, with respect, however, for the rights of individual 
nationalities. In this way he expressed the common belief of 
Italian political writers of the time of the Risorgimento that the 
idea of the nation, precisely because of its intrinsic moral 
essence, sanctioned recognition of equal dignity and equal 
rights for all nations: a policy of power and dominion could, 
therefore, find no justification in the principle of nationality. 
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Franco Gaeta (t) 
Nationalism in 
historiography 
Before dealing with the subject which has been assigned to me, 
a linguistic and likewise a conceptual comment needs to be 
made. The Anglo-Saxon term nationalism has a far wider 
meaning than the Italian word "nazionalismo". Nationalism, in 
fact, is used to indicate not only the movement and political 
development which, during the 19th and first half of the 20th 
century, led to the constitution of national states, but also 
those intellectual currents and operations which, after states 
had been constituted in more or less complete forms, tried to 
establish the supremacy of single national states to the 
detriment of others in the period which is commonly called the 
Imperialist Era. In general, a historical survey reveals that 
while the process which led to the formation of national states 
contained (although with some exceptions) democratic 
elements which were maintained or subsequently forgotten 
after the formation of these states, the national currents in, let 
us say, the Italian sense were always of an authoritarian and 
antidemocratic character. Such currents for different reasons 
criticised and contested liberal institutions in the historical 
form they had assumed and in their actual functioning which, 
especially at the beginning of the 20th century, led to the 
establishment of those systems which are commonly called 
liberal-democratic. 
In all West-Central Europe during the 19th century the 
principle of nationality was first of all affirmed and then, from 
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nationality, the transition was made to nationalism. In 
whatever form it took, the principle of nationality was 
correlated to an ideal of human harmony. At the root of the 
concept of nationalism there was, in fact, a need for harmony: 
once nations had formed themselves into national states, what 
other motive for struggle could exist among them if every 
nation were intent on fulfilling its duty? This was a two-fold 
illusion, and founded on two ideas. The first was a direct 
consequence of the purchasing power of the bourgeois classes 
who were supporters of nationalistic ideas. In Europe there 
was a bourgeois cliché founded on: respect for the right of 
ownership, national representation formed of members having 
this right, and faith in the system of free trade which was then 
considered the natural regime of the economy. International 
commerce had been considered by Cobden as a guarantee of 
peace, but this could only stand if the conductor of this 
commerce were one alone and if the ruling body were also one 
alone. 
Today it is easy to prove that the free trade system was 
indeed not a 'natural' system but a product of British economic 
supremacy which had created an open market for its own 
interests: it was, however, much less easy to see in the first 40 
years of the 19th century. Secondly, there was a deeply rooted 
conviction that the wars and conflicts of the past were the 
work of egoistic princes and tyrants. It was not generally 
thought that the individuality of nations might have the very 
same results. The idea or ideology of a hard-working 
bourgeoisie dedicated to production and commerce, anxious for 
peace so that business would prosper, was gradually taking 
hold. And this bourgeoisie, for better or worse, was or 
represented the nation because the great revolution of 1789 had 
had the result of identifying political capacity (that is national 
activity) with ownership. 
Things began to change when western nations achieved their 
aim of a national state when the central European order of 
1815 underwent a definite change and when the development 
of national states, together with great progress in technology, 
gave rise to Weltpolitik. Symbolically this turnabout can be 
dated to 1870. It is true however that it had been foreseen 
thirty years before by Friedrich List who had published "Das 
Nationale System der politischen Oekonomie" in 1841. This 
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book criticised the elaborate mechanisms of the traditional 
schools of economics and measured the economic possibilities 
of the nation. Between 1843 and 1891 it was translated into 
Hungarian, French, English, Japanese, Swedish and Russian 
and had an indisputable influence. Briefly, List posed the 
problem of development, or rather stages of development, and 
came to a conclusion which was not very different from an 
economic point of view from that which the Italian economist, 
Mazzini, had formulated on an ethical-political level: that is, 
how the individual acquired knowledge, strength, productivity, 
security and prosperity thanks above all to the nation and 
within the nation. Likewise, civilization of the human race was 
only attainable progressively through the development of 
individual nations. 
After 1870 and especially after 1890 Europeans, following the 
economic crisis of the continent, began to think and act in 
different ways. The economic-social process in turn started a 
complicated spiritual and political process which profoundly 
modified the way in which nationhood was imagined and 
which generated the phenomenon of nationalism. The latter 
must not be considered as just a new conception of 
international relationships but as an organic vision of all 
political life. Since the political problem of the transition from 
nation to national state had been resolved, the new problem 
was that of confrontation between nations and between classes 
within each nation. The necessity and logic of industrial 
development destroyed not only the illusions of free trade but 
also the ideals of a harmonious co-existence of nations. The 
first results of the new ideas were protectionism and the search 
for a balance of power through various ingenious alliances. The 
'people' was were considered in the abstract while the State 
was concrete, and the classes, especially the dominant ones, 
were rendered increasingly stronger by the success they 
achieved in building the state and in founding the national 
economies, all of which seemed to legitimize their powers of 
government. The nation's will to exist evolved into a will to 
possess power, and anything which appeared to oppose or 
undermine such actual and ideal efficiency was destined to be 
called 'anti-national'. The nation, from a spiritual unity, had 
evolved into an organic unity, reaching economic-political 
success through acquisition of suitable strength. 
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It would, however, be wrong to reduce nationalism to the 
ideology and action of second-comer countries. It was 
something much more complex, because the crisis in itself did 
not bring about antidemocracy, the prospect of oligarchy and 
the cult of violence. There were, however, in the doctrine of 
nationality some elements which made their presence strongly 
felt in the new European political, economic and social context. 
As regards Italy, the Mazzinian ideas of the mission of nations, 
of the third Rome and of the duties of man along with 
Gioberti's exaltation of Italian 'moral pre-eminence' which 
relied on reviving the past in terms of tradition, were far more 
enthusiastically welcomed than other ideas that the 
philosophers had expressed. 
Naturally, one does not have to wait until the present day to 
find a state with desire for power and expansion, but in 
comparison to the past there then existed a political nation 
which was a collective person, capable of desiring and 
achieving its desires. Paradoxically, however, the politically 
active 'people' was in no way the vague 'people' created by 
national mythologies. The poorer classes with lower incomes 
were simultaneously the nation and not the nation. They were 
the nation when they were called to contribute to the life and 
grandeur of the national state in terms of taxes and military 
service: they were not the nation when determination of the 
size and distribution of taxation, the politics of the state and 
the formation of the nation's representatives were concerned. 
There was a deep rift between class and nation which could, 
however, be overcome by accepting a democratic solution: 
increasing the political capacity of those who were now called 
the 'masses' would allow them to learn their own strength 
while the nation's economy was gradually getting off the 
ground. 
The problem for the ruling classes was not to lose control of 
the State, and this problem from their point of view had two 
solutions: the first consisted in satisfying the basic 
requirements of the lower classes so that their desire to 
challenge the institutions was diminished, the second consisted 
in refusing to allow the very existence of class dialectics and in 
proposing the nation as a synthesis of the interests of social 
groups which, while in conflict inside the state's classes, could 
be seen as an 'external' fight between the nation and the 
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individual. Both solutions led to the national integration of the 
masses but in different ways and with different results. The 
first relied heavily on the hypothesis that the proletariat would 
transform itself into the bourgeoisie of its own accord; the 
second aimed at smothering social clashes within the nation 
and forcibly transferring them onto an international plane by 
means of the myth of the 'proletariat nation' and the struggle 
between proletarian and plutocratic nations. The national 
cohesion which had ended in this struggle implied the 
suppression of the class struggle. The workers' movement was 
in reality becoming nationalized, but that was not all: this very 
nationalization and the adoption of an increasingly less 
revolutionary and more pointedly reformist base made it more 
dangerous by making it more aware of the problems of the 
State. Reformist socialism became the No 1 enemy of the ruling 
bourgeois class because of its proletarian nature and daily 
repercussions which reduced the margins of capitalistic profit 
and led to a systematic penetration of local power. 
It is an established fact that — leaving aside all that has 
misleadingly been said about precursors and precedents — the 
Italian nationalist movement was born in the first years of 
1900. It gained strength in 1908, boomed after the war with 
Libya, exploded in all its virulence on the outbreak of the First 
World War and was one of the principal elements in the crisis 
of the liberal State and its transformation into a totalitarian 
State. It spread myths which only apparently and initially were 
of the decadent type, as Benedetto Croce noted in 1907 
(reconfirming, with less foundation, the same view in 1929). 
For the decadent movement decadence was an ideal, not a 
stage to surpass, as it was for nationalism. For the decadent 
movement contempory society was, above all, anti-aesthetic 
because it was anti-individualist; nationalism did not reject the 
society of the masses but wished to introduce bourgeois order 
into it as part of its scheme for an industrial society without a 
difference in class dialectics. For nationalism, liberalism had 
been the instrument with which the bourgeoisie had asserted 
its power, but this same liberalism had had become a means of 
suicide when the bourgeoisis used it as the base for their 
programme of government. The founder of the nationalist 
movement, Enrico Corradini wrote in 1904: "If we wanted to 
replace the abstract, utopian and fatal concept of freedom with 
5 Nationality and Nationalism... 
	 63 
a realistic, beneficial concept which could be put into practice, 
we would feel the need for a very rigid regime of repression 
and surpression." 
The nationalists were first of all against reformist socialism 
and against the democratic wing of the bourgeoisie. Their 
movement began in 1903 at precisely the same time as the 
Giolitti era began and with the beginning of a policy of wide 
liberal tolerance of the workers' movement which corresponded 
to vigorous action by trade unions to improve the conditions of 
peasants and workers. In reaction to the large-scale strikes of 
agricultural and industrial workers, Enrico Corradini and 
Giovanni Prezzolini exhorted the Italian bourgeoisie to be more 
militantly class-conscious and not to be afraid of entering the 
class struggle against the reformists. He encouraged them to 
withdraw their support from Giolitti because the latter, aiming 
at integrating the workers' movement with the bourgeois state, 
would end up by handing over (in their opinion) this state to 
the new forces which were emerging from the industrial 
development. The strikes and workers' demands created 
disorder, reducing profits and the motive force behind 
development; socialism, besides, was opposed to a policy of 
military reinforcement and colonial expansion which for the 
nationalists was a necessity and a duty for Italy. 
From the first vague but symptomatic affirmations of a group 
of men who, like Corradini, Prezzolini and Paganini, were 
writers of dilettante philosophers, the Italian nationalist 
movement evolved, in the space of a few years, into a series of 
precise political proposals which, on the eve of the First World 
War, constituted a sufficiently organic whole and which were 
later perfected. In my opinion almost all these nationalistic 
proposals were fulfilled in the construction and juridical 
structuring of the authoritarian-totalitarian fascist state. 
Here a methodological commet needs to be made. Nationalism 
must be studied in its historical autonomy, that is not as pre-
fascism, although it cannot be denied, as I have said, that many 
nationalistic proposals were welcomed by the fascist regime. 
The distinction between the fascist regime and fascism as far as 
the movement is concerned which Renzo de Felici introduced 
into the study of fascism, is useful in this case despite the 
observations and objections which can be raised to it, not 
without, in my opinion, a certain foundation. But in any case, 
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to study Italian nationalism from, let us say, a fascist 
observatory means making a substantially reduced evaluation 
of it. Such studies originated in the writings of the nationalists 
themselves after 1922-23. During 1922 and especially after the 
march on Rome and the fusion of nationalism with fascism in 
1923, the nationalists were particularly energetic in 
proclaiming that they had been the political and intellectual 
precursors of the victorious fascism which was presented as the 
final result of the "National Revolution"; when fascism fell, the 
surviving nationalists did not withdraw from their position, but 
maintained that fascism had, with time, become a political, 
ideal, dictatorial and plebeian 'degeneration' of fascism. Rather 
than historiography in this case we are dealing with political 
literature: one which contains, however, a basic truth which I 
will try to show in my conclusions. On the other hand, 
publications and democratic historiography have very often 
reached conclusions not far different from those of nationalist-
fascist historiography and publications. For democratic 
historiography the objective was to throw into relief the 
deficiencies and lack of balance inherent in the process of 
Italian national unification and to demonstrate that decadence 
and the elimination of liberal institutions and of the pseudo-
democratic bourgeoisie derived precisely from this lack of 
balance and deficiency. For nationalist-fascist historiography 
nationalism and fascism were presented as inheritors of the 
Risorgimento tradition after the dark period of Italian history 
in the post-1870 period and especially in the Giolittian era. In 
such a way, with inverted values, nationalism, for better or 
worse, was presented as the inheritor of the Risorgimento. 
Historiography and liberal publications of every type presented 
nationalism as a break with all the political and idealistic 
politics of the Risorgimento, indeed, as a contorted negation of 
this tradition. 
An early phase of historiography on nationalism can be dated 
to the pre-First World War period. Nationalism in the early 
years of the 1900s was portrayed as a movement of rather 
gladiatorial attitudes: not only did it appeal for a bourgeois 
'reaction' but it also defended the war, condemned democratic 
mentality in its entirety plus any demonstration of humani-
tarianism, and exhalted expansionism and militarism. 
Corradini, Papini and above all Prezzolini sought to confer 
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greater intellectual dignity to their historico-political 
arguments by linking them with the complex theory of the 
'circulation of the élite' of Pareto and Mosca whose function 
they declared was purely instrumental. In 1907 Benedetto 
Croce in a fundamental essay "Di un carattere della pin 
recente letteratura italiana" drew a very precise picture of 
contemporary literary and political currents and concluded 
that the majority basically represented the activity of what he 
defined as "the great industry of the void", fruit of a radical 
insincerity deriving from the "lack of inner clarity". As regards 
nationalism in particular, Croce commented ironically on the 
mania for grandeur, the imperialistic desire for expansion and 
the love of violence which were backed by scanty means and 
hazy objectives. He also condemned the pretence of wanting to 
destroy the workers' movement in a delirium of aristocratism. 
Nationalism was an expression of surging irrationality, of an 
enormous spiritual crisis which was primarily the crisis of 
reason and an illness of the mind. 
Twenty years later in "Storia d'Italia dal 1871 al 1915" 
Croce further defined his position. This was primarily the 
result of historical developments which he could not disregard. 
Croce defined nationalism as precisely the transition from a 
literary phase to a more purely political phase. He saw it as a 
mouthpiece for some sectors of major industries; he very 
clearly saw the implications of an alliance of catholic forces 
with the "atheistic catholicism" of the nationalists; he 
appealed against the uncalled for appropriation by the 
nationalists of some of the great figures from recent Italian 
history; and finally he had no hesitation in indicating that the 
nationalists' reactionary imperialism would end upon Italy's 
participation in the First World War: "they wanted war to be 
able to achieve, through such a war ... success ... industrial 
expansion, victory over liberalism and the authoritarian 
regime". 
Croce's works, those of the other great idealistic intellectual 
Giovanni Gentile and the works of almost all those who wrote to 
various extents about Italian nationalism before the First World 
War invariably consist of evaluations in ideological or prevalently 
ideological terms. This is a characteristic of a large part of Italian 
historiography about nationalism for reasons we have indicated. 
Gentile's criticism particularly fell into this category. 
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The first person to give nationalism not only a cultural-
ideological but also a political-sociological interpretation was 
Luigi Salvatorelli in a book which has rightly been considered 
a minor classic on this subject and which contains in its very 
title an indication of the themes it carries: "Nazionalfascismo". 
To understand Salvatorelli's argument we must remember that 
this volume was published in 1923, shortly after the fusion of 
nationalism with fascism, and that it had two parts: the first 
was made up of a series of articles written between 1919 and 
1923, the second by an essay entitled "Nazionalfascismo" 
which had been written especially for the occasion. Sal-
vatorelli's analysis, although based on the observation of 
specific political facts, was however substantially psy-
chological, moralistic and cultural. According to Sal-
vatorelli, nationalism resembled the ideology of the Italian 
humanist petite bourgeoisie: a petite bourgeoisie which was not 
a true social stratum but an agglomeration whose purpose was 
the inherent productive process of capitalist society, in respect 
to which nationalism represented a delayed ideological stage. 
The meaning of this evaluation lay in Salvatorelli's view of 
international capitalism; a view that he explained in another 
volume called "Irrealtå nazionalista" from which it is clear 
that the author identifies capitalism, tout court, with the great 
Anglo-American capitalism which was for him a economic 
force which was healthily international. The question, put in 
these terms, was clear: that no causal link could be established 
between the economic forces which Salvatorelli had defined 
as "healthily international" and nationalism or rather 
"nazionalfascismo"; but things changed when a comparison 
was made between nazionalfascismo and the economic forces 
which were "not healthily" international or in no way in-
ternational. In these cases one could see that nazional-
fascismo was not an ideologically delayed stage in rela-
tion to capitalist economy, but was the ideological stage of 
a newly born or almost newly born capitalism, that is of an 
emerging capitalism which had to struggle in conditions of 
technological, financial and political inferiority and which 
obviously had to resort to the crudest methods to give itself 
space in international struggle. Salvatorelli made a series of 
observations on the rhetoric of nazionalfascismo and on what 
he defined as the "illiteracy of the illiterate", alluding with this 
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to the "generic culture" of the Italian petite bourgeoisie of 
mainly humanistic education: but he did not realize that this 
rhetoric was the weapon with which Italian capitalism 
defended itself to hegemonize precisely the petite bourgeoisie, 
by using a heroic vocabulary to mask the ambitions of the more 
enterprising industrial groups and planning to insert this class 
in the new structures which were being built following a 
progressive (and disorderly) economic development. 
The concept of nazionalfascismo, coined by Salvatorelli, was 
a concept which was suited to the vague ensemble of 
nationalistic currents which represented a state of mind 
common to the middle classes but were not carriers of a 
political plan. Obviously these currents were important, above 
all with respect to a study whose aim was a history of fascism, 
of the origins and development of fascism which can also be 
interpreted as nationalistic mobilization of the masses. The 
Italian historian who has studied these currents more than 
anyone else is Gioacchino Volpe, a nationalistic historian who 
in his "Italia Moderna" studied what he has defined as "the 
various Italian nationalisms". Together with Croce's works, 
this book by Volpe is one of the most serious written on 
nationalism and still represents today the starting point for any 
attempt at an organic reconstruction of the history of the 
Italian nationalist movement and its relationships with other 
European nationalisms. Here it is impossible to sum up the 
contents of this work, but one can say that it describes the 
Italian situation in the early years of the 1900s and that it is of 
no lesser importance than the works of Croce. 
Volpe's definition of nationalism in the very first years of the 
1900s was a national-liberal movement. It was not yet quite a 
doctrine but rather "a more active feeling of national life" 
which he described as "more coherent, more solid, more willing 
and more strongly projected into the future". The picture that 
he drew was of a heterogeneous complex of forces: of a 
nationalism which was varied in which the unifying element 
from a strictly historic point of view was gradually lost: that is, 
amid this variety, the progressive development of an idea of the 
State which could only be connected with the Risorgimento 
tradition in an abstract way, at least as Volpe presented it. In 
reality the insistence with which Volpe emphasized some not 
only antidemocratic and antiparliamentary, but also 
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popularistic aspects of nationalism depended on his general 
outlook: he saw the Italian national Risorgimento as 
concluding in an imperialistic war and the construction of a 
trade-unionised-corporate fascist State. It was logical that from 
this viewpoint mature nationalism constituted a sort of 
political ideological prerequisite for corporatism, but it was 
also true that its variety contrasted with the ideological clarity 
that nationalism would subsequently lend to fascism. Volpe, 
however, was right in pointing out how fascism would harvest 
the fruits of this variety. In his opinion it was here that Italy's 
last revolution would take place: in the integration of the 
bourgeois man with the citizen to form the new figure of the 
productive man. 
Post-Volpe historiography, that is post-1945 developed some 
of Volpe's ideas and those of Salvatorelli and, as I have said, 
tried to illustrate the relationship between fascism and 
nationalism with a tendency to criticize more harshly the 
development of Italy's history during the whole of the 
Risorgimento phase. The majority of this historical production 
has vacillated between describing the backwardness and 
inconsistencies in Italy and the censorship (not completely 
undeserved) exercised by the ruling class. In this context it also 
illustrated fascism's long incubation period which was 
particularly facilitated by nationalism. Many authors, in 
attempting to explain fascism on a long- to medium-term basis 
have again related nationalism to the political ideals and 
philosophy of the "historical right". However, today it seems 
more plausible to make a rather different analogy: to relate 
fascism to the ideals and politics of the "historic left" which 
laid the foundations of Italian industrialism by adopting a 
protectionist policy and by initiating colonial expansion which 
was not alien to authoritarian imposition. 
From the interpretation of nationalism as "literature" one 
therefore passed to a very different evaluation. Gian Piero 
Carocci in his essay on Giolitti and the Giolittian period 
rightly affirmed that nationalism coincided with the 
establishment of large-scale private interests of a monopolistic 
tendency and that in substance it was the ideology of 
monopolistic, national capital in conflict with stronger foreign 
capital and, subordinately, with internal, competitive capital. 
Silvio Lanaro followed the same line of thought broached by 
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Carocci. The former maintained that nationalism was nothing 
less than the ideal and political projection of the corporate-
protectionist block established as a result of indus-
trialization. When Lanaro reached these conclusions the first 
edition of my book entitled "Italian Nationalism" had 
appeared. Naturally, I can hardly be expected to express 
judgment on this book — I can only say that in it I have tried 
to give, in the first part, I hope, a complete summary of 
historiography on nationalism and in the second part an 
outline of the history of nationalism from a political and 
economic point of view. I would like to add, with gratitude, 
that the opinions which I have expressed have been approved 
and shared by eminent colleagues such as De Felice, Aquarone 
and Richard Webster. 
Before concluding I should like briefly to indicate the 
problems to be debated and the most fruitful lines of research, 
at least for the period up to 1918. I believe the main problem to 
be that of writing a political, economic and cultural history of 
the Italian "right" y rhich shows both the continuity and the 
discontinuity in which the "historic right" became "the right" 
pure and simple. It is obvious that the starting point should be 
Chabod's volume on an introduction to Italy's foreign policy. 
Less obvious but worthwhile are the works already completed 
by Giuseppe Are, Alberto Aquarone, Angelo Tamborra and in 
part by Giovan Battista Salinari, all of whom have gone well 
beyond the limits of a simple research into the "right". These 
studies will probably lead us to abandon the traditional idea of 
Italian nationalism as "beggars' imperialism" and will enable 
us to see the connection between nationalism and fascism more 
clearly. They will, above all, allow us to see nationalism in both 
its autonomy and origins in the political-economic-cultural 
scene of Italy between 1800 and 1900. 
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Seppo Hentilä 
The Finnish labour 
movement and national 
thinking until 1907 
As is well known, Marx and Engels left behind no particular 
political theory which might have provided the later labour 
movement with direct instructions for concrete political 
activity. As it was the practice to appeal to classical utterances 
in questions of doctrinal dispute, the history of the labour 
movement throughout the period of the Second International 
(1889-1914) was characterized by a certain irreconcilable 
conflict of theory and practice. Scholars are widely in 
agreement that in various countries the movement encountered 
several unsettled issues of marxist theory while composing its 
line of practical politics.' Attitudes to war and militarism, to 
colonialism, to political general strikes and to the tactics of 
labour parties in general featured on the agenda of congresses 
of the International year after year.' Owing to the nature of the 
International all these questions were subject to a common 
denominator: the relation between national and international. 
At issue therefore was not merely the attitude of socialist 
1 See Helmut Konrad, Nationalismus und Internationalismus. Wien 1976, p. 2 
ff. 
2 Published agendas include Fricke Dieter, Die deutsche Arbeiterbewegung 
1869-1914. Ein Handbuch über ihre Organisation und Tätigkeit im Klassen-
kampf. Berlin 1976, pp. 590-593. 
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theory and the labour movement to nationalism but, more 
widely, the relation of the national and international character 
of the labour movement as a whole. 
The present study will examine national thinking in the 
Finnish labour movement together with concrete national 
policy until 1907 within the broad framework already outlined: 
the nationalism and internationalism of the movement as a 
problem of reconcilability. Limited space will allow no more 
than a critical survey of the matter and the formulation of new 
questions. To answer them will not be possible here. 
1. The problem of reconciling 
nationalism and internationalism in 
the labour movement 
Although great difficulties and serious disagreement within the 
labour movement were caused at the time of the Second 
International by the effort of reconciling theory with practice, 
no critical reservations of importance were made to the theory 
itself except for Bernstein's revision of Marx. In fact, the 
nationalist policy of Marxism was in theory a doctrine without 
contradictions about whose authenticity there seemed to be a 
wide measure of agreement within the movement.' But in this, 
as in many other questions of practical politics, the problems 
which arose produced greatly varying models of procedure. In 
research the view has been widely accepted that the main 
followers of the Marxist classics, such as Karl Kautsky, created 
a basis of growth for political reformism with their efforts to 
retain purity of doctrine to the last.4 
As we think of the rise of the labour movement and the 
historical period of the Second International we observe that 
during those decades nationalism raised its head more, 
perhaps, than at any other time. The problem in its full extent 
3 See Horace B. Davis, Nationalism & Socialism. New York and London 1967, 
p. 211 ff. 
4 This interpretation is summarized by Lucio Colletti, Eduard Bernstein und 
der Marxismus der II. Internationale. Frankfurt/Main 1971. 
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includes the uniting of Germany and Italy, the attempts at 
liberation of minorities subject to multinational great powers 
such as Austria-Hungary and Russia, and the intensified 
competition for colonies between the imperialist great powers. 
Against this background the classics of Marxism in fact paid 
surprisingly little attention to the question of nationalism.' 
Besides, later interpretations of their thoughts are a chapter to 
themselves.' 
Although the Second International displayed a great variety 
of tactical viewpoints with regard to nationalist policy, there 
was a large measure of unanimity on certain basic theoretical 
questions. In the first place national differences were regarded 
as among the problems which only a socialist community could 
finally remove. On the other hand there was firm belief in the 
nature-derived (naturwüchsig) internationalism of the working 
class. The latter was seen as the first social class in world 
history with the ability to cross national boundaries.' 
In the "Communist Manifesto" of Marx and Engels there is a 
famous statement that the workman has no fatherland; this 
was interpreted literally,' which led at once to an 
underestimation of the national question, for Engels, with the 
revolutionary events of 1848/49 in mind, classified certain 
Slavic minorities of Austria-Hungary as "unhistoried" 
(geschichtslose Völker) in the sense that they had never formed 
a nation. Their historic role in the process of world revolution 
was even described by Engels as reactionary, because the 
separatist aspirations of their peoples slowed the realization of 
revolutionary internationalism.' 
The faithful expectation of socialism shown by the Second 
International led in practice to an underestimation of the 
nationalist issue. In the London conference of 1896, to be sure, 
a general appeal for the selfdetermination of peoples, 
introduced by Polish representatives, was approved. This 
meant, in theory at least, that the International condemned the 
Konrad p. 6 ff. 
6 These interpretations are examined by Davis p. 27 ff. 
7 Roman Rosdolsky, Friedrich Engels und das Problem der "geschichtslosen 
Völker", Archiv f. Sozialgeschichte Bd IV, Hannover 1964, p. 245. 
8 Julius Braunthal, Geschichte der Internationale Bd. I. Hannover 1960, pp. 
355-356. 
Rosdolsky p. 186. 
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oppression of national minorities and supported their claims 
for cultural autonomy.10 It was entirely typical, however, that 
not until 1906 did certain workers' parties representing 
national minorities become fully entitled members of the 
international socialist bureau (ISB).11 Only after this, for 
instance, was the Social Democratic Party of Finland able to 
send its own representatives to the meetings of decision-
making bodies of the International. 
In this connection the nationalist viewpoints which emerged 
in the international labour movement cannot be classified with 
any thoroughness. Various main groupings can be distinguished 
in any case. The mainstream following Kautsky did indeed aim 
at securing the rights of minority peoples in accordance with 
the rulings of the above-mentioned London congress and 
others, but attempted at the same time to put the nationalist 
question in its right place in the prevailing Marxist 
interpretation. It was believed, in other words, that the 
internationalism of the working class would cross national 
frontiers of its own volition. The objective of Kautskyist theory 
was to subordinate nationalist policy to the aims of the class 
struggle, which were supported by cultivating class strength in 
the particular form of organized labour. In the practical aspects 
of nationalist policy Kautskyist thinking was based on the 
political status quo; some attempts at freedom by national 
minorities were even regarded as troublesome separatism 
which turned working class eyes away from the main issue — 
the class struggle.12  
The importance of the nationalist question was most 
seriously underrated by the so-called left wing of the labour 
movement in central and western Europe. In old national states 
such as France, England13 and Sweden14 the left wing was 
clearly inclined to an optimistic cosmopolitanism and 
"antipatriotism" which in practice had no realistic basis 
whatever. 
lo 
 Braunthal p. 356. 
11 Fricke p. 595. 12 Cf. Konrad pp. 77-83. 
13 Braunthal p. 366 ff. 
14 
 For unpatriotic feeling in the Swedish labour movement see Seppo Hentilä, 
Den svenska arbetarklassen och reformismens genombrott inom SAP före 
1914. Helsingfors 1979, p. 184 ff. 
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By contrast, the nationalist question was overrated particu-
larly in the labour parties of minority nationalities. In these 
the nationalist struggle was given primary importance, and it 
was not believed that an international working class would be 
realized. These separatist groupings were more than ready to 
ally themselves with the bourgeois nationalist movement.15 
Political problems arising from the question of nationality 
naturally affected the labour movement in Austria and Russia 
most closely. In these countries, moreover, discussion of the 
matter reached the highest level within the International. The 
leading representative of Austro-Marxist nationalism was Otto 
Bauer, whose work "Die Nationalitätenfrage and die 
Sozialdemokratie" was published in 1907. In it he attempted to 
deal with the nationalist question as an all-embracing problem 
of society as a whole, not as a mere phenomenon of "Überbau" 
or superstructure such as it had become in Kautsky's reduced 
interpretation of Marx. Bauer's theory aimed at union between 
the socialist revolutionary movement and the progressive 
nationalist struggle. In this spirit Bauer was prepared to make 
important concessions to the Czech labour movement, which 
was trying to free itself from the pattern of the Austrian Social 
Democratic Gesamtpartei.16 This question was not finally 
settled until the conference of the Second International was 
held at Copenhagen in 1910.37 
Still clearer in a practical political sense was the nationalist 
thinking of the Bolsheviks in Russia, whose leading theorist 
and practical exponent was V.I. Lenin. In articles for a journal 
called Iskra shortly after 1900 he started to outline the doctrine 
of self-determination for peoples. At a meeting of the Russian 
Social Democratic Labour Party held in London in 1903 a 
programme containing such doctrine was approved. It provided 
for a large measure of terriotorial autonomy in Russia after the 
suppression of Tsarism. In the last resort all minority peoples 
would be allowed to decide whether they wished to belong to 
this federation or not. However, the programme did not aim 
necessarily at the dispersion of multinational combinations but, 
15 Davis pp. 140-149. 
16 
 Konrad pp. 93-99. 
17 James Jo11, The Second International 1889-1914. London 1955, pp. 120-
121. 
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on the contrary, at their preservation for the common purpose 
of suppressing Tsarism.18 
2. The question of nationality and its 
status in Finland's "old" labour 
movement 
Finland's autonomous position in connection with Russia made 
it unavoidable that the Finnish labour movement should clash 
with difficult problems of nationalist policy. The relation with 
Russia also provided the movement with a many-sided 
touchstone in tactics. Particularly after Russia had started the 
so-called period of oppression in 1899 — the integration of 
Finland in the realm — the labour movement could not avoid 
defining its attitude to the defence of autonomy. The national 
and class struggles had to be reconciled. In practical policy 
great difficulty was caused by the attitude to bourgeois 
groupings, between whom there were important tactical 
differences of outlook regarding methods of conducting the 
defence of autonomy.19 The nationalist question was made still 
more complicated by Finland's bilingualism: the labour 
movement contained a separate Swedish-language department, 
Finlands svenska arbetarförbund (established 1899).'° Finno-
Russian relations in the labour movement took on a special 
importance in nationalist policy. This problem was further 
complicated by the fact that the main influences on the 
ideology and programme of the Finnish labour movement came 
from Germany on a basis of the Kautskyist interpretation of 
Marxism. In a sense, therefore, a meeting occurred on Finnish 
ground between the Central European mainstream and an 
underground labour movement adapted to special conditions of 
Russia and specialized in illegal, conspiratorial activity. 
18 Davis p. 185 ff. 
'9 Osmo Jussila, Nationalismi ja vallankumous venäläis-suomalaisissa suhteis-
sa 1899-1914. Helsinki 1979, p. 24 ff. (Nationalism and revolution in Russo-
Finnish relations 1899-1914. Helsinki 1979, p. 24 ff.) 
2° Anna Bondestam & Alf-Erik Helsing, Som en stubbe i en stubbåker. Vasa 
1978. 
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The chain of problems sketched above may serve as a 
preliminary explanation of the central position occupied by 
nationalist policy in the Finnish labour movement. If we now 
try to link the nationalist policy of the Finnish labour 
movement to the general problems of the relation between 
national and international in the movement,21 we shall 
encounter question of great difficulty which are still for the 
most part unanswered. It must then be asked how the Finnish 
movement could connect a national struggle for autonomy with 
a revolutionary objective. Seeking an answer to this question 
would involve reflection on the true significance of Kautskyism 
in the Finnish labour movement. How did this ideological 
mainstream of the international labour movement become a 
reality in the concrete political activity of the Finnish 
movement? 
It was already a contradiction that Kautskyism should be 
linked mainly with the facilities for action of labour parties in 
the industrialized countries of central and western Europe. The 
structure of the Finnish working class was quite different, and 
at the beginning of the 20th century the strengthening of class 
power based on mass movement — perhaps the main feature of 
Kautskyism — appeared extremely difficult in Finland. We 
shall return to these matters in more detail later (Chapter 5). 
3. Main features of the Finnish labour 
movement's nationalist policy 
Theoretical and programmatic views expressed in Finland's 
labour movement on the subject of nationalist policy reflected a 
belief in the "nature-derived" internationalism of the working 
class. In practical policy the question was far more 
problematical, causing endless disagreement on interpretation. 
Not only the social mass basis of the labour movement but also 
21 For closer study see Michael Futrell, The Northern Underground. London 
1963 and William R. Copeland, The Uneasy Alliance. Collaboration between 
the Finnish Opposition and the Russian Underground 1899-1904. Helsinki 
1973. 
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the changes which had occurred in the relation with Russia 
continued to influence, indirectly at least, the movement's 
facilities for political action. 
3.1. Before the General Strike of 1905. 
At its inaugural meeting held at Turku in 1899 the Finnish 
labour party professed its connection with the "general" 
international labour movement.22 In the Forssa programme 
approved in 1903 the internationalism of the labour movement 
was proclaimed in almost the same phrases as the Erfurt 
programme in Germany.23 Thenceforward the Kautskyist 
interpretation of Marxism dominated the ideological and 
programmatic line of the Finnish labour movement, and faith 
in the final victory of labour internationalism was unwavering. 
Within the labour movement, however, the struggle to defend 
autonomy produced an attitude which caused disagreement on 
methods of procedure from the first. In principle it was a 
question of whether the labour movement should join the 
struggle under bourgeois leadership or not. Even before the 
labour party was founded the most radical left-wing leaders 
were in favour of withdrawal by refusal to vote in elections or 
other means.24 
After the February Manifesto of 1899 the editor Matti 
Kurikka wrote in "Työmies" ("Working Man") that workers 
should dissociate themselves from the compilation and signing 
of the great national address (as it was known). Part of the 
labour movement's most radical wing agreed with Kurikka, but 
the majority condemned his procedure as unpatriotic.25 
As yet the Kurikka dispute by no means implied a 
breakthrough of the socialist theory of nationalism: his motives 
were mainly personal. Those leading the venture of the address 
22 Seppo Hentilä, Veljeyttä yli Pohjanlahden. (Brotherhood across the Gulf of 
Bothnia) Helsinki 1980 p. 40 ff. 
23 Heikki Laavola, Kun Suomen työväki heräsi. (When Finland's workers awa-
kened) Helsinki 1974 p. 123 ff. 
24 Hannu Soikkanen, Sosialismin tulo Suomeen. (The coming of socialism to 
Finland) Porvoo 1961 pp. 65-66. 
25 Soikkanen 1961 p. 67. 
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had not in fact asked Kurikka and other advocates of the 
election ban to join the delegation working for the address. The 
conflict was such as to draw a clearer borderline, however, 
between the socialist and Wrightian forms of leadership in the 
labour movement, as Soikkanen has shown.26 
Within the movement in any case the thought was beginning 
to germinate that the main task of the labour party was to 
settle the social question. In principle all other problems were 
subordinate to this, or at least secondary to the main question. 
These matters were stressed more forcefully after the Forssa 
meeting, though the breakthrough of socialism in the party 
programme was no guarantee of unanimity in matters of 
procedure. In 1904 two main lines defined themselves, known 
in the literature as the Valpas and Mäkelin trends." The 
dispute over procedure too had as its background, indirectly, 
the attitude to the Russian question, though whether to take 
part in state elections or not was a matter for discussion. The 
Valpas line secured a clear majority at an extraordinary 
meeting of the party held in Helsinki in September 1904. This 
mean that Valpas, taking his stand on Kautskyist theory, 
succeeded in giving first priority to the socialist objective of the 
labour movement. To this chief aim any tactical line taken by 
the party must be subordinated. In elections, for instance, 
collaboration with the middle class was possible, but the labour 
movement had first to obtain guarantees that its partner would 
work for a general and equal right to vote. Otherwise the 
labour party should refuse to vote.28 
Mäkelin with his supporters showed clear sympathy with the 
national programme of the bourgeois constitutionalists, with 
whom he sought collaboration in elections on a foundation of 
the struggle to defend the Finnish autonomy.29 Also the 
Swedish-speaking labour movement of Finland was practically 
unanimous in support of the constitutionalists.30 
Formed in Helsinki in 1904 was a group of so-called labour 
26 
 Hannu Soikkanen, Kohti Kansanvaltaa I. (Towards democracy) Vaasa 1975 
p. 37. 
27 
 Soikkanen 1961 pp. 104-105, Jussila pp. 49-50. 
26 Edvard Valpas. Mikä menettelytapa. (What procedure?) Helsinki 1904. 
29 Soikkanen 1961 pp. 104-105. 
30 Hentilä 1980 p. 80. 
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activists who prepared underground and armed activity for the 
labour movement.31 At first the party leaders gave partial 
approval to the labour activists, but Valpas in particular 
sharply resisted all violence. In this respect also he was an 
orthodox Kautskyist: revolution ought not to be "made", but 
would come of itself in time, when the internal conflicts of 
capitalist society had ripened sufficiently. Besides, Valpas 
feared that labour activism would endanger the rights of the 
labour movement to act as a public body. In his opinion these 
rights must not be risked for a "second-rate" objective such as 
the policy of nationalism.32 
Labour activists from the first had good underground 
relations with many Russian opposition groups and 
revolutionaries. From this followed the links between Finnish 
contact men and bolsheviks which continued until the Russian 
revolution, although labour activism withered away in Finland 
soon after the general strike. In the early stage this network of 
underground relations was variegated: it included Finnish 
middle-class and labour activists, Russian oppositionists and 
international professional revolutionists. Finland, located in 
the "hinterland" of St Petersburg, became a base for Russian 
revolutionaries and at the same time a point of contact with 
Stockholm and further west.33 
Thus the Finnish labour movement was divided into three 
camps on the issue of procedure. The division misleadingly 
recalled the separation of the middle class into 
constitutionalists, concessionists and supporters of active 
resistance. The constitutionalism of the Mäkelin line and the 
Swedish-speaking Finnish labour movement was quite beyond 
dispute. To connect Valpas with the concessionist trend would 
be to oversimplify matters, however, though he was accused 
from time to time of actually collaborating with Russian 
officialdom. In this matter Valpas was a cautious tactician. At 
no stage did he wish to hurry the course of events. His chief 
aim was to maintain purity of doctrine by stressing the final 
socialist objective. As he did not actively support the struggle 
31 Soikkanen 1975 pp. 65-68. 
32 Valpas 1904 p. 76. 
33 
 For closer study see Futrell (note 21.). 
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to defend autonomy he could with reason be criticised for 
conciliating the Russian bureaucracy. 
3.2. Epoch-making effect of general strike 
The general strike of 1905 produced violent changes in the 
Finnish labour movement's scope of action: the labour 
movement became a mass movement and the world's strongest 
labour party in a parliamentary sense after reforms had been 
effected in the Diet. Before the strike the organizing power of 
the labour movement had been scanty, but the whirl of events 
forced the masses into motion. From 1904 to 1906 the 
membership of the Social Democratic party rose from 16,000 to 
some 85,000 and the number of member associations grew from 
99 to no less than 937.34 
The political composition of the general strike compelled the 
labour movement to take a stand on the struggle for autonomy 
with its aims and tactics. The division of the movement into 
three which outlined itself during 1904 may be taken as a 
starting-point for scrutiny, but in the avalanche of events 
which attended the strike totally new aspects appeared. In any 
case — as Jussila has noted — Finland's labour movement was 
drawn in the directions of "revolution" and "nationalism": 
"Kautskyist Marxism demanded isolation from the middle 
class, its idea of nationalism and the fatherland, yet the first 
stage of 'oppression' was felt as a threat to the activity of the 
working class, which was thus drawn into opposition alongside 
the middle class in defence of a common constitution."35 
Within the Finnish labour movement, finding its way through 
the difficult ground between revolution and nationalism, 
several differing trends of procedure appeared at the time of 
the general strike and its direct after-effects. If we confine 
ourselves to the politics of autonomy and nationalism we may 
provisionally divide the movement into two main groups: those 
wishing in some way to take part in the nationalist struggle 
against Russian oppression, and those who stressed the social 
34 Soikkanen 1975 p. 113. 
35 Jussila p. 26. 
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objective of the movement as the primary aim of the general 
strike itself. 
As the general strike began this division was extremely clear 
and rigid. Followers of Mäkelin who sympathized with the 
constitutionalists criticised "Työmies", the party's chief organ 
which Valpas edited, more violently than previously for its 
resemblance to the newspaper "Suometar". An easy target was 
provided for these accusations: Valpas was supported by a 
group of young intellectuals, the so-called November Socialists, 
most of whom had been members of the "Old Finnish Party". 
They included Edvard Gylling, Otto W. Kuusinen, Kullervo 
Manner and Sulo Vuolijoki. Only Yrjö Sirola among this group 
had a background which was clearly both constitutionalist and 
"young Finnish".36 
In the final phase of the general strike the nationalist line 
under Mäkelin's leadership suffered a distinct setback, 
however, because the bourgeois constitutionalists rejected 
Mäkelin's suggestion of an interim government. After this the 
line represented by Valpas and the November Socialists, 
stressing the emblems of socialist class struggle and 
withdrawing from the nationalist conflict, took a clear lead 
within the labour movement.37 
This tracing of boundaries, which affected nationalist policy, 
and the clear rapprochement of the "Työmies" newspaper to 
the "Old Finns" who had moved from government to 
opposition began to cause anxiety especially among Swedish-
speaking members of the Finnish labour movement. Severe 
attacks by the November Socialists, particularly against 
Swedish-speaking constitutionalism, were such as to arouse 
fear among Swedish-speaking Finnish socialists also. As 
evidence of their assertions that the November Socialists were 
"Suometar" in character, Kuusinen, Sirola and others worked 
actively in the association called "Suomalaisuus", founded in 
1906.38 
In spring 1906 a language dispute blazed up in the labour 
movement. The Swedish-speaking socialists went so far as to 
36 Soikkanen 1961 p. 91, pp. 212-215. 
37 Soikkanen 1961 p. 272 ff. 
38 Pekka-Kalevi Hämäläinen, Luokka ja kieli vallankumouksen Suomessa. 
(Class and language in revolutionary Finland) Helsinki 1978 p. 34, note 25. 
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demand eagerly the foundation of their own separte labour 
party. This venture was led by Karl H. Wiik and others. The 
reason for it was, on the one hand, that the party led by Valpas 
had shown its underestimation of the nationalist issue in the 
question of autonomy and, on the other, that the pressure 
exerted on Swedish speakers in the labour movement had 
become extreme. In local workers' meetings and trade unions, 
for instance, Finnish-speaking workers readily condemned the 
whole Swedish-speaking community — from big capitalists to 
labourers — as members of the same "upper class".39 
It was not without reason that leaders of the Swedish-
speaking labour movement in Finland compared their situation 
with the so-called Czech question in the Austrian labour 
movement. In the perspective of Russia as a whole they felt in 
an even weaker position than the Czechs in Austria: Swedish-
speaking Finnish workers in fact belonged to "a linguistic 
minority of a minority people". When the newspaper 
"Työmies" mockingly remarked that "a few Swedish ministers 
had ensured that this should be so", the newspaper 
"Arbetaren" replied that the Finnish-speaking leaders of the 
labour movement, in their national enthusiasm, appeared to 
have no notion of the difference which existed between the just 
demands of workers in a national minority and the position of 
the Swedish-speaking upper class in Finland." 
During the general strike and in the heated atmosphere 
which followed it, support for labour activism in Finland was 
at its most widespread. The underground labour movement 
maintained a network of contacts with Russian revolutionaries 
and bourgeois activists which was close-knit. The possibility 
of armed action was also kept in being by the existence of the 
Red Guards and the prolongation of revolutionary events well 
into 1906. The attitude adopted by the leaders of the Finnish 
labour movement to underground activity was hesitant for a 
considerable time, but the Viapori mutiny in the late summer of 
1906 and certain acts of terrorism in support of Russian 
revolutionaries forced the party to dissociate itself firmly from 
labour activism.=' 
39 Työmies 20.6.1906 and 22.6.1906, for closer study of this discussion see Hen- 
tilä 1980 p. 78. 
4o Arbetaren 14.7.1906. 
41 Hentilä 1980 pp. 59-61. 
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The events briefly sketched in the foregoing may suffice to 
show the political difficulties encountered by the Finnish 
labour movement during the general strike. To be regarded as a 
clarifying factor is the parliamentary reform finally ratified in 
summer 1906, after which the Social Democratic Party adopted 
parliamentary tactics unmistakeably. The party conference at 
Oulu in August 1906 proved important in this connection. Its 
agenda covered all the most inflammatory problems of the 
movement's history. The conference abolished the Red Guards, 
disavowed anarchism and terrorist action, dismissed the 
"minister socialist" J.K. Kari and approved Swedish and 
Russian as official party languages alongside Finnish. At least 
in theory, therefore, an orthodox answer was found to the 
question of language and nationality at Oulu, and Swedish-
speaking Finns gave up the foundation of a labour party of 
their own." These Oulu decisions certainly implied that the 
main line of the Second International was confirmed by the 
Finnish labour movement, but the outcome remained 
incomplete. After the conference there were still several trends 
of party procedure: Valpas advocated "a political general strike 
and ballot", Kuusinen "a union of parliamentary and 
extraparliamentary activity", Haapalainen "preparation for a 
Russian revolution"; also supported were open help by labour 
activists for Russian revolutionaries and a policy following the 
constitutionalist line of the moderates on nationalism. Besides 
this there were separate "public" and "secret" viewpoints, as 
in the case of O.W. Kuusinen, who condemned armed 
underground activity but at the same time worked actively for 
an organization connected with it even after the Oulu 
conference."3 
If the Oulu conference did not succeed in settling the 
question of procedure, its results were still more doubtful in the 
question of nationalism. The declaration of solidarity in 
language and nationalism remained largely symbolic in 
practice. When the so-called second period of oppression began, 
problems of procedure in the Social Democrat nationalist 
42 
 Suomen Sosialidemokratisen puolueen viidennen edustajakokouksen pöytä-
kirja (Oulun kokous). (Report of fifth convention of Finnish Social Democra-
tic Party at Oulu) Helsinki 1906 p. 327 ff, 477 ff. 
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 Hentilä 1980 p. 62. 
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policy were still unsolved. To be sure, the political influence of 
the labour movement was very different after the parliamentary 
reform from what it had been before the general strike: in 
spring 1907, when the first elections for the unicameral Diet 
were held, the Social Democrats secured no less than 80 
members out of 200. Underground agitation, which had 
intensified during the strike, now adapted and the growth of 
the labour mass movement was interrupted.44 
From 1907 to 1917 parliamentary activity became the main 
tactic of the Social Democratic Party. The Kautskyist tactic of 
"waiting for the revolution" acquired a firm foothold in 
Finland as elsewhere. While waiting the intention was to 
increase the power of workers as a class, which meant in 
practice to strengthen organization and raise the cultural 
standard of working people till they were ripe for socialism 
when the time came. 
In this period of parliamentary tactics the relation with 
Russia took on one aspect of supreme importance: attempts at 
reform by parliamentary means failed continually because the 
Tsar dissolved Parliament time after time. In this way 
"revolution" and "nationalism" were firmly bound together, 
and the question of labour movement procedure became 
involved with the Russian connection. 
The position was practically the same as before the general 
strike: the labour movement had to define its attitude toward 
the struggle to defend autonomy. Other questions of 
importance were its attitude to the "Jääkäri" (light infantry) 
movement formed during the first World War and to the 
various groupings of Russian revolutionaries, but these 
problems cannot be dealt with here. 
3.3. The Finnish labour movement and social 
democratic lines of policy on nationalism 
To draw a parallel between the disputes over nationalist and 
linguistic policy in the Finnish labour movement and the 
44 
 Soikkanen 1975 p. 124 ff. 
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trends of the international movement is not without risk, of 
course, as conditions in some countries differed greatly from 
those in others. Finland belonged to those peripheral areas of 
Europe where the question of nationalism was both 
inflammatory and topical. 
The nationalist line followed by Mäkelin and the Swedish-
speaking Finnish labour movement may be compared with the 
"separatism" typical of labour parties among the "unhistoried" 
Slavic minority peoples of Austria-Hungary. This comparison is 
no more than an analogy, of course, as it is not based on 
similar historical conditions. A further common feature was the 
willingness of the socialists, who had supported the national 
struggle, for collaboration with the progressive middle class. In 
Finland Mäkelin and the Swedish-speaking Finnish socialists 
were taken as representatives of the so-called moderate trend 
and criticised for excessive fraternization with the constitu-
tionalist middle class. 
Valpas and the November Socialists may be taken as 
Kautskyists of the Finnish labour movement. Their charac-
teristic was an endeavour to preserve pure doctrine at almost 
any price. Valpas in particular went far in caution: he 
preferred to wait and do nothing if not sure of his position. 
It is the line pursued by Valpas that requires further 
illumination, for the historical picture which remains of him is 
somehow secret and mysterious. It appears too that the picture 
of his work given by contemporary sources needs considerable 
revision, for his inaction over the autonomy question was 
interpreted bitterly by his opponents as fawning to Tsarism. 
Guilty of this were embittered middle-class constitutionalists 
and also the opposition adherent to Mäkelin of the labour 
movement itself. For the moment the attitude of Valpas to the 
question of nationalism is obscured by myths based on 
contemporary notions. 
The "third line" of labour activism signified in one sense the 
extension of the Russian revolutionary process to Finnish 
territory. It was here that the labour parties of Finland and 
Sweden differed markedly in character.45 From the first, 
however, underground conspiracy was foreign to the Finnish 
45 Hentilä 1980 pp. 64-70. 
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labour movement's leaders, who followed western doctrines. 
Sharply rejecting conspiracy, they strove purposefully to direct 
party tactics along parliamentary lines. Geography was 
inescapable, however, and Finland's labour movement in the 
end could not detach itself from the influence of the Russian 
revolutionary process. The events of the revolutionary years 
1917-18 finally showed this in the most tangible manner. 
4. Nationalist image of Finland's 
labour movement in history 
The ideas of Finland's old labour movement are usually 
characterized as Kautskyist, strongly aligned with the notion of 
class struggle. The movement was mainly influenced, it has 
been thought, by ideology proceeding from Germany and, to a 
lesser extent, from Sweden, Russia and elsewhere in Europe. 
On the other hand, the movement's political line before 1918 
has been thought eminently "nationalist". There is now reason 
to ask what these two prevailing interpretations actually mean, 
as they seem to be seriously conflicting. How is it possible that 
a party whose programme followed the main line of the Second 
International could have been especially "nationalist" in 
practical politics? The answer may be sought provisionally 
from the way in which these interpretations originated. 
In its reference to nationalism the historical image of 
Finland's labour movement derives from the settlement of the 
1918 civil war. For the Social Democrats it was essential to 
stress how little the Finnish labour movement had been 
influenced by the Russians, particularly the Bolsheviks. 
Connections of the movement with the Russians must be wiped 
out of history as far as possible, for this was a political 
necessity after 1918 in Finland. As a counterweight the western 
and Scandinavian models of the movement could be referred to, 
but most important of all was to refute the charges of 
unpatriotic behaviour levelled by the middle class. For this 
reason the Social Democrats were obliged to emphasize the 
historical attitude of the labour movement in support of 
nationalism, Finnish autonomy and a policy of independence. 
The leaders of the old labour movement, who took refuge in 
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Soviet Russia, founded the Finnish communist party in summer 
1918. In explaining defeat in the civil wear they were obliged, 
for reasons quite opposite to those of the Social Democrats, to 
belittle the relations of the old labour movement with the 
Russian revolutionaries. In other words, too little had been 
known in Finland of Bolshevik revolutionary theory, and for 
this reason the people's delegation (the red government) had 
been unable to carry the Finnish revolution to final victory. 
The "national image" of the labour movement has been 
projected almost intact into later historical accounts. The 
conflict between Kautskyism and "national character" can be 
explained simply by the situation regarding study. First to be 
examined was the ideological and programmatic development 
of the labour movement in the form of international influences, 
and this made it possible to trace thorouhgly the international 
contacts (ideological mentors, correspondence, journeys, 
underground conspiracy etc) of many types of Finnish socialist. 
But the concrete political activity of the labour movement has 
also been studied in detachment form these influences, with no 
attempt to combine the two elements, which would in any case 
have been impossible. 
5. Summary — new questions 
In the last few years basic research on Finland's old labour 
movement has advanced so far that questions can be put in an 
entirely new form, particularly regarding the general strike, the 
time preceding it and the years 1917-18. Reference can be 
made here to the studies of Soikkanen, Jussila, Kirby, Upton, 
Hentilä, also to those of Ketola and Kujala, which are still in 
progress.46 
46 See the already mentioned studies of Soikkanen 1961 and 1975, Jussila 1979 
and Hentilä 1980. See also David Kirby, The Finnish Social Democratic Par-
ty 1903-1918. London 1971. 
Anthony Upton, Vallankumous Suomessa 1917-1918 I-II. (Revolution in Fin-
land 1917-1918 I—II) Jyväskylä 1980-1981. 
Antti Kujala, Suomen työväenliikkeen kehitys ensimmäisellä sortokaudella 
erityisesti vuosina 1903-1904. (Development of Finnish labour movement in 
first period of oppression, especially 1903-1904) Suomen historian pro-gradu- 
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The new form of question should be based on the above-
mentioned conflict between stress on Kautskyism and the 
national historical image. Jussila has opened the way for this 
by surveying the dilemma of the Finnish labour movement as a 
contest between nationalism and revolution. For purposes of 
historical study the question should focus on scrutiny of the 
relation between class struggle ideology and nationalist policy. 
What attempt was made to solve this problem in the concrete 
policy of the Finnish labour movement before the civil war? In 
practical terms this would imply special concentration on the 
significance of political activity by the labour movement during 
the so-called period of parliamentary tactics from 1907 to 1917. 
This is clearly the least studied period of the old labour 
movement. The attempts of leading persons within the labour 
movement to combine class struggle and nationalist policy 
would form a special topic. 
Although in practice the relation with Russia controlled the 
labour movement's scope of action, it should be possible to go 
beyond it. In other words it should be linked with the concrete 
relation between the nationalism and internationalism of the 
labour movement. This does not imply a mere interaction of the 
two, but their historic, concrete significance in the work of the 
movement. It must be asked, therefore, how the in-
ternationalism of the movement was realized within the 
nationalist policy. This may also provide an approach to the 
question of the part played by Kautskyism in the movement. In 
practical research this would mean addressing ourselves to 
entirely new questions dealing with the relation of Kautskyist 
theory to the concrete political activity of the labour 
movement. How for instance was the Kautskyist theory 
realized in labour party attempts to decide the status of 
crofters and the landless farming proletariat? It would be 
necessary to work through the whole period of parliamentary 
tactics question by question. In addition the nature of the 
tutk. Helsingin yliopisto 1978. (Pro gradu study in Finnish history, Helsinki 
University 1978). 
Eino Ketola, Suomen sosialidemokrattien itsenäisyyspolitiikan muotoutumi-
nen ja suhde Venäjän vallankumoukseen maaliskuusta kesäkuuhun 1917, poliit-
tisen historian lis. tutk. Helsingin yliopisto 1981. (The shaping of an indepen-
dence policy by Finland's Social Democrats and their attitude to the Russian 
revolution from March to June 1917). 
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labour movement as a mass movement and the relation 
between its various forms of activity would have to be 
investigated, for these are the questions central to the 
Kautskyist aim of developing class strength. 
The new form of question outlined here is based on the 
assumption that comparison or analysis of effects has not 
sufficed to give an exact picture of the relation between 
national and international in the Finnish labour movement. To 
show this relation in a concrete historical sense requires a 
study of how internationalism was manifested in the everyday 
nationalist political action of the movement. 
In that case the objects study would be simply the attempts 
at an elucidation (or the abandonment of such attempts) of 
items of Marxist theory or programme by the labour movement, 
and the latter's response to political challenges produced by 
the prevailing system. This might enable the dispute between 
theory and practice mentioned at the beginning of this article 
to be formulated more precisely. 
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Osmo Jussila 
Finland's progress to 
national statehood 
within the development 
of the Russian Empire's 
administrative system 
In accounts of Finland's national history the picture of the 
birth and development of a Finnish nation is strongly tinged 
with the thought of a national awakening and those who 
brought it about. The nation as an organism which awakens, 
grows and thrives is not a concept peculiar to Finland but a 
more general tendency of thought belonging to the romantic 
age. The national awakening is considered to have occurred 
here in the early half of the 19th century, and two phases are 
often distinguished in it, an earlier and a later. The foremost 
awakeners were A.I. Arvidsson (1791-1858, in Sweden from 
1823) and J.W. Snellman (1806-1881). 
These men, particularly Snellman, saw the birth of the nation 
as an inborn process, whereas the young poet-historian Z. 
Topelius in his well-known work of 1843, "Äger finska folket 
en historie?", regarded an external factor, the separation from 
Sweden, as highly significant: only thereafter did Finland 
possess a history of her own. In general, however, the words 
"place desormais au rang de nation", spoken by Tsar 
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Alexander I in his closing address to the Porvoo Diet (sejm) 
began to be interpreted, under the lead of the historian Yrjö-
Koskinen (1830-1903) as meaning that the Tsar was merely 
recognizing an accomplished fact: that Finland had become a 
nation. Contemporaries with the spirit of the Enlightenment, 
such as Secretary of State R.H. Rehbinder, interpreted the 
words thus: Finland became a nation in 1809 by acquiring a 
"political existence" of her own (existence politique). 
The picture of awakening current in the romantic period was 
still alive in Finnish historical writing after the second world 
war. During the last few years, however, increasing stress has 
been laid on matters of state policy — the question asked by 
Topelius in 1843 has become topical once more. In his thesis 
dealing with the Committee for Finnish affairs 1811-26 Keijo 
Korhonen (1963) showed the development of a "idea of 
Finland" in the context of that Committee, in whose 
deliberations arose the first clear realization that the areas 
joined to Russia by the Peace of Hamina formed a separate 
political entity of their own. Later this thought took flight in 
the words of A.I. Arwidsson: "We are not Swedes, we do not 
wish to be Russians, so let us be Finns." 
Factors of state policy and their importance for the 
development of the Finnish nation have been discussed further 
by Matti Klinge. His basic standpoint is crystallized in the title 
of his book "Between Bernadotte and Lenin" (1975), which 
implies that the Finnish nation emerged from the frontiers 
drawn as a result of the policies pursued by the great powers of 
Europe. Finland is the strip of land which Bernadotte finally 
recognized as belonging to Russia, and which Lenin for his part 
recognized in 1917-18 as an independent state. 
The emergence of a "idea of Finland" within a Committee for 
Finnish affairs was not haphazard but almost unavoidable. The 
Committee and the Finnish State Secretariat, which succeeded 
it in 1826, were in fact the bodies which most clearly expressed 
the special character of the new political unit compared with 
other parts of the Russian realm. The Secretariat also acted as 
an intermediary for Finland and Finnish affairs with the 
Russian authorities. In St Petersburg, where the Committee 
and Secretariat worked, it was important and necessary to 
emphasize Finland's special character, which was not so self-
evident at first as it became later. This is clearly shown by the 
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uncertain basis of the notion of a fatherland, of which Keijo 
Korhonen gives several examples in the above-mentioned 
study. 
The Committee for Finnish affairs and the presentation of 
matters directly to the Tsar, not through ministers, (defined by 
law in Finland 1.12.1808) were not exceptional in the Russian 
Empire, however, but were rather the rule in the adminis-
tration of new peripheral territories. Before the Empire of St 
Petersburg regional administrative bodies (prikaz) had been 
added by conquest to Muscovite Russia in addition to the 
normal departmental bodies, which, in fact, were finally 
exceeded in number by the regional bodies. Among others 
Novgorod, Kazan, Smolensk, Vladimir and Siberia each 
received their own prikaz alongside "financial", "ambassa-
dorial", "bandit" and other departmental bodies. The line of 
least resistance when adding a new area was to transfer its 
central administrative organ to Moscow, so that it would be 
governed in the same manner as before but under new masters. 
The regional administration system lost none of its practical 
utility when Muscovite Russia became the Empire of St 
Petersburg; rather, the opposite is true. In his reforms Peter 
the Great preserved the foundations of the order followed by 
Moscow for state and community, borrowing new names and 
forms from the West. The Empire's first conquest was the area 
of the Baltic States, and in 1727 a collegiate body for the 
administration of justice in Livonia and Estonia was 
established in St Petersburg. This was one of a system of 
"regional colleges" created by Peter. At first it formed a 
department of a general "college of justice" but was then 
detached to function independently, also after 1786, when the 
general college was abolished. For economic affairs the 
principle of regional administration was observed in 1731, 
when a collegiate chamber for Livonia and Estonia was opened 
in St Petersburg. 
The county of Viipuri was made subordinate to the college of 
justice for Livonia and Estonia in 1735 and to the above-
mentioned collegiate chamber at the same time. A special 
Finnish department was added and the name of Finland was 
added to the title. The Committee for Finnish affairs formed in 
1811 in fact had its roots in this department, whose records 
were later transferred to the Committee's archives. 
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Finland's "promotion to nationhood" in 1809 meant in 
practice that the areas of Sweden joined to Russia by the Peace 
of Hamina were formed into a separate administrative unit 
such as they had not been previously. After the Peace of 
Uusikaupunki in 1721 Finland (including Ostrobotnia) became 
gradually detached from the rest of Sweden, but this implied a 
new trend of political thinking caused by the growing threat of 
Russia rather than an administrative or "national" separation. 
Provincial assemblies had been held in Finland when it was 
part of Sweden, the last important occasions being in Helsinki 
in 1616 and in Turku in 1676. Although the representatives in 
1616 came from broadly speaking the whole area which was 
joined to Russia in 1809 (also Ostrobothnia, which was 
unusual), there was a vital difference between these earlier 
occasions and the Porvoo assembly of 1809: those held in the 
17th century and before were part of the system of provincial 
assemblies common to the realm of Sweden. Thus the 
representatives of 1616 in Helsinki did not regard themselves 
as "the Finnish provincial assembly", but as "councillors of 
state and provincial estates in Finland," that is to say the 
councillors and estates which existed in Finland during the 
war. 
When examined against this background, the Porvoo 
assembly of 1809 was a new institution, a national assembly or 
Diet, although representatives were elected in accordance with 
old forms and regulations.. For instance Courland, unlike 
Finland, was actually able to preserve the former institution 
intact, for its provincial assembly was an already complete 
whole with a clearly defined area for representatives. For the 
Porvoo assembly, on the other hand, the area was defined only 
during the assembly, and no final definition was made until 
after it. 
Thus representation was arranged for the Åland Islands, 
which were not finally conquered until the Porvoo assembly 
was in progress. While drawing a new state frontier, in fact, the 
Russians created a new institution: the Diet of the Grand 
Duchy of Finland. Its jurisdiction was limited to advisory 
functions, however, in accordance with the autocratic Russian 
mode of government. It was an "advisory body" such as could 
be allowed to exist in the autocratic mode of government 
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according to the opinion of M.M. Speranski, chief advisor to 
Alexander I. 
Still less was old tradition observed in the institution of 
Governor-General, though from time to time this office had 
existed earlier in Finland and its holder in 1808 was a Finnish 
emigrant, G.M. Sprengtporten. By 1809, however, the ap-
pointment of Governors-General in conquered provinces 
bordering Russian territory had become a standard practice of 
the Empire. Set up to assist the Governor-General was an 
official body under which the administrative machinery of the 
conquered country continued work as before, observing and 
upholding civil, criminal and other laws. After Sprengtporten, 
who resigned in 1809, all Governors-General were from other 
parts of the realm than Finland. 
A new institution also created in 1809 was the governing 
Council, known as the Senate from 1816. Before 1809 Finland 
had had no central administrative organ separate from 
Stockholm. The instruction of the governing Council begin with 
an expression of this new requirement: "The success of the 
State demands a central point, a supreme official body for 
provincial administrations ..." 
In Finnish historical accounts the governing Council is 
usually seen as an institution similar to such Swedish models 
as the supreme court and drafting body for general affairs of 
Gustav III. Many facts indicate, however, that its basic plan 
was of Russian origin, especially the combination of the highest 
executive and judicial power in the same organ. Finnish 
attempts to detach the department of justice from the executive 
department as an independet supreme court did not succeed, 
despite many endeavours, before the period of independence. 
Further evidence of Russian origins was the fact that the 
Finnish governing Council was not the only one of its kind in 
the realm. A governing body similar in structure and operating 
principle was established in Bessarabia in 1812. There at least 
the hope was fulfilled which J.F. Aminoff, a member of the 
Finnish nobility and later a senator, expressed in 1811: that 
governing Councils as good as that in Finland would be 
founded by the Tsar for other national minorities in Russia. 
When the title of Senate was granted to the governing 
Council in 1816, it was with the desire to make a clearer 
borderline between the administration of Finland and the rest 
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of the realm. Some contemporaries saw it as a strengthening of 
Russian influence, which of course it was. After this elevation 
in rank statutes and laws promulgated by the Imperial Senate 
of Finland had the same authority as the ukases of the ruling 
Senate, whose application to Finland without modification 
could not be demanded. At this time too it became an 
established practice to send ukases to the Governor of Finland 
for information only: if it was desired to put them into force in 
Finland, the Tsar's ruling had to be obtained through the 
Finnish secretary of state. This limitation, formally confirmed 
in a regulation of 1826, was of great importance for the 
maintenance of a separate Finnish legislation. In 1822 the 
Imperial Senate received premises in a location suited to its 
dignity, the Senate Square in Helsinki. 
Founded in St Petersburg in 1811, the Committee for Finnish 
affairs — whose origins have already been explained — was a 
body for the ordering of affairs in a new area which was 
similar to many other regional committees of the Russian state. 
(Such committees included those of "the western governmental 
districts" 1831-1848; 1862-64, Siberia 1821-38; 1852-64 
and Caucasia 1840-1882.) The Committee for Finnish affairs 
existed in two separate phases, as did two of the above-
mentioned committees, 1811-26 and 1857-91. 
The Finnish secretary of state with his office founded in 1826 
was raised in 1834 to the position of Minister Secretary of 
State, whereupon he became, with a Polish official bearing the 
same title, the second "regional minister" of the realm, ranking 
with other ministers in his relation to the Tsar. Later his office 
came to be known as "His Imperial Majesty's Office for 
Finland". 
In the time of Tsar Nicholas I the system of regional 
administration created for Finland in 1809-26 survived for the 
general reason that the reign of this Tsar was not susceptible to 
changes in the realm as a whole. In Finland's case there were 
several further influences, not the least of which were the 
conservatism and loyalty of the Finns. Finland, unlike Poland, 
was no place for revolutionary thoughts. Among the most 
concrete demonstrations of loyalty was the participation of a 
Guards Battalion recruited from Finns in the suppression of a 
Polish revolt. 
A remark by Nicholas has become famous in Finland: "Leave 
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the Finns in peace. That is the only province of my great realm 
which has caused me no anxiety or dissatisfaction throughout 
my reign." 
Another important means of preserving the regional 
administration was a strong Governor-General such as A.S. 
Menshikov (1833-55). Although Governor-Generalships had 
been abolished in Russia in 1837 they were retained in Moscow, 
St Petersburg and important frontier areas such as Finland. 
Menshikov's predecessor A.A. Zakrevski (1823-31) had 
already in 1826 obtained restoration of the right of direct 
presentation to the Tsar in civil matters affecting Finland, and 
had used it. Menshikov continued the practice and in 1834 
secured the further right to introduce Finnish affairs to a 
Committee of ministers. Through a strong Governor-General 
Finland was of course firmly integrated with Russia as 
represented by the Tsar and his Governor-General in Finland, 
but at the same time effectively detached from Russian 
ministers and the rest of the administrative machinery, with 
which it had dealings only through the Governor-General and 
Minister Secretary of State. One sign of integration was that in 
Menshikov's time, far more than earlier or later, uniform 
statutes and laws were enacted for Finland and the rest of the 
realm. In the preparation of these Russian ministers and other 
officials took part, but communication and consultation passed 
through a narrow channel formed by the Governor-General and 
Minister Secretary of State. 
Detachment in its turn was shown by the fact that 
Menshikov prevented several attempts by Russian ministers to 
interfere in Finnish affairs and bring Russian institutions into 
Finland. The most important example of this was in 1835, 
when the codification of laws, already started, was torpedoed. 
If carried to a conclusion, as it was in the Baltic States, 
codification would very probably have led to the same results 
in Finland. Menshikov is believed to have said: "I will answer 
for Finland, I alone." 
This framework of nationhood which originated with 
Alexander I and survived through the time of Nicholas I 
gathered strength in the reigns of the two following Tsars, 
Alexander II and III. The basic reasons for this were in 
principle the same as before: loyalty and strong Governors-
General. When the Poles again revolted in 1863 Finland was 
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peaceful, and in the same year the Diet met in Helsinki after an 
interval of over 50 years. When the administrative status of 
Poland was lowered to that of a governmental district 
(admittedly a so-called separate district), a new Instruction for 
the Diet was confirmed for Finland (the first constitution for 
the Grand Duchy of Finland to be endorsed by the Tsar's 
signature) and the meeting of the Estates was made a regular 
procedure; Finland received a separate currency (the silver 
mark) and the national army during the Turkish War of 1878. 
By participating in this war the Finnish guards again showed 
their loyalty. 
Menshikov was followed by two strong Governors-General 
who effectively watched their sphere of interest, F.W.R. von 
Berg (1855-61) and Nicholas Adlerberg (1866-81). Between 
them for a short time came the weaker Platon Rokassovski 
(1861-66), but his time was also free from serious injury to the 
sphere of interest. (It may be conjectured, however, that a 
stronger Governor-General would have secured not only an 
Instruction for the Diet but also confirmation of a separate 
form of government, the latter having belonged to the same set 
of proposals as the Instruction confirmed in 1869.) 
These strong Governors-General, particularly Adlerberg, 
were of great importance at exactly this time because from the 
1860s onward Russian ministers began to strengthen their 
position and rise above Governors-General. If the latter had 
not watched their sphere of interest ministers would have been 
able to intervene directly in Finnish affairs and nullify or 
decisively restrict the principle of national administration and 
its scope in Finland. The strong position of these Governors-
General "near the Tsar", as it was expressed, did not mean, 
however, that Russian ministers had no part in preparatory 
work affecting Finland: they merely did not hold a controlling 
position as yet. 
This system of administration for the Grand Duchy of 
Finland served as a basis for the judicial theory of Finland's 
status in the Russian realm or, as the authors of the theory 
preferred to say, the "relation" between Finland and Russia. 
This theory, the creation of Professor J.J. Nordström, 
originated in the early 19th century and developed further as it 
became more widespread. According to the theory Finland was 
in a state of real union with Russia (even the term "personal 
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union" was sometimes used), having its own legislation parallel 
to that of Russia, its own constitution and form of government 
providing for a division of legislative power between the ruler 
and the Estates; the state of Finland was to be ruled by its own 
officials. Held in common with Russia were only the ruler, his 
court and order of succession, foreign policy and supreme 
command of the army. According to the theory the so-called 
general state legislation neither existed nor was necessary 
outside the above-mentioned common topics. 
Although the Russians never approved or recognized a 
doctrine of the state of Finland in the form presented by its 
main exponent Professor and Senator Leo Mechelin (who died 
in 1914) they were obliged to note the surprising emergence de 
facto of a new state north-west of St Petersburg. In 1889 this 
was expressed as follows by Johannes Gripenberg, an official of 
the Minister Secretary of State of Finland: 
"They see with surprise and annoyance that this 
embryo of a state created hurriedly by Alexander I 
in the stormy dawn of the century 'somewhere 
behind Viipuri' has grown in threequarters of a 
century into an autonomous entity displaying all the 
characteristics of a state more or less perfectly 
developed. They see, moreover, that a few hundred 
thousand Chuds, dressed in rags, shod with 
birchbark, fed with bark bread, easily ruled by a 
handful of 'Swedish noblemen' and scraping a living 
at the time of the conquest in the swamps and 
forests of which the newly conquered province 
consisted, now compose, in their eyes at least, a 
unified nation of two and a quarter million thirty 
kilometres from the gates of the capital; a nation 
which reckons the roots of its culture to stretch 
further than those of the Russians themselves and 
which, to crown all, speaks and demands to be 
addressed in a language that the Russians in their 
pride are accustomed to rank with the bellowing of 
cattle and the howling of dogs. To their astonished 
eyes appears a well organized self-governing 
community with thousands of schools where, 
horribile dictu, the language of the realm is not 
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taught, with industries which in part compete with 
their own at the head of the market, with well-based 
finances and enjoying a self-established credit on 
world markets such as many richer countries might 
envy." 
A similar observation, merely expressed in a different manner, 
was made some time later by the well-known Russian 
revolutionary V.I. Uljanov (Lenin), who wrote in 1913: 
"In Russia there are two nations, highly civilized 
and unique for many reasons both historical and 
connected with their conditions of life, which could 
quite easily and naturally exert their right to 
separate from Russia. They are Finland and Poland." 
By 1890 Finland was the only surviving remnant of the zone of 
autonomous territories which had arisen on the western 
periphery of Russia. In 1866 the Russian provincial 
administration had been extended to Poland and its legislative 
system merged with a general system. In the Baltic states after 
1840 codification of laws had meant a considerable degree of 
integration with the laws of the realm. From then on the Baltic 
states were Russian provinces with separate administration. 
The governor-generalship there was abolished only in 1876. 
Bessarabia had lost its special status in 1828 during the reign 
of Nicholas I. 
Finland's turn came at the end of the 1890s. The 
"ministerial" administrative system of the realm, as it grew 
stronger and more uniform, came into irreconcilable conflict 
with Finland's separate development as a state. Though the 
new Tsar Nicholas II was weaker than his predecessors, his 
minister of war Kuropatkin was strong and enjoyed the 
support of a new governor-general, N.I. Bobrikov. Minister and 
governor-general pulled together, the latter's sphere of interest 
having lost its former significance. The Minister Secretary of 
State who had represented Finland's separate national 
administration in St Petersburg had lost status to other 
ministers. The conflict between the "state" of Finland, its 
legislation and Diet and the "state" of Russia became acute 
with the enactment of a new law for conscription or, to be 
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more exact, with the revision of the law of 1878. To circumvent 
the resistance of the Finnish Estates the Tsar quickly ratified 
the so-called February Manifesto in 1899. Speed was possible 
because the basic work of preparation had been done by 
committees in the 1890s. The manifesto with its instructions 
signified final acceptance of the interpretation that "local 
Finnish law" was an exception to the Russian law in general, 
as had also been decided when the laws of the Baltic states 
were codified in 1840. But the manifesto also recognized the 
fact that for purposes of legislation the realm was still divided 
into two parts: Finland and Russia. Finland's own statute book 
neither was nor would have been abolished, as had happened 
in Poland, nor was the extension of Russian provincial 
administration to Finland even planned. Even after the 
manifesto, therefore, Finland was a single clear exception to 
the rest of the realm, though it was not recognized as a state in 
the sense intended by Mechelin, but as a self-governing country 
(oblast). 
Comparisons with Poland and the Baltic area did not console 
the Finns of 1899, however. Large numbers were mobilized for 
passive resistance to the February manifesto and the new 
conscription law of 1901. Against the manifesto an address 
bearing half a million names was compiled, while conscription 
was boycotted systematically under the direction of the Kagaali 
group, which was organized on military lines. One important 
consequence of this mobilization was the strengthening of 
national consciousness and its widespread diffusion. When the 
great address was compiled and conscription resisted, broad 
sections of the people awoke to the thought of how often the 
fatherland was mentioned and what it signified. 
At this stage the emblems which attracted the Finnish nation 
were not linguistic or, as a rule, ethnic but historical and 
legalistic, the social order inherited from Sweden and the 
system of statehood built on it. The core of this was found in 
constitutional law. At its clearest and most vivid this notable 
legalistic concept of nationhood during the "years of 
oppression" is seen in the celebrated painting of E. Isto called 
"Attack", in which the two-headed Russian eagle tries to seize 
the book of laws from a maiden representing Finland. 
Thousands of copies of the painting were circulated round the 
country. 
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During this phase language did not serve as the emblem of 
nationhood for the reason that Finland had two main 
languages. Finnish, spoken by the majority, might in other 
circumstances have become a unifying factor. This was not 
possible now because its position — unlike that of the 
constitutional laws — was not threatened. On the contrary, the 
progress of the Finnish language to a state of juridical equality 
with Swedish reached its conclusion in the language statute of 
1902 at the worst period of oppression. 
The foundation and framework of the structure of Finland's 
nation- and statehood were established as an organic part of 
the extended Russian Empire and the system of regional 
administration typical of it. The framework also received a 
uniform content, well perceived by the people, as part of the 
process through which this system passed, namely its 
dissolution, in the judicial struggle for the constitutional laws, 
the cornerstones of the structure. 
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i 
Aira Kemiläinen 
Initiation of the Finnish 
people into nationalist 
thinking 
There are two sides to the idea of nationalism. One is the 
political principle of national self-determination exemplified by 
the birth of the United States of America in 1776. At that time 
the 13 colonies of England appealed to natural law and the 
equality and rights of man (the right to life, liberty and the 
pursuit of happiness) in their search for independence. 
Similarly the Greek Proclamation of Independence in 1822 
appealed to natural rights, individual liberty and the 
protection of property and honour. Under the principle of 
nationalism a nation (community with a strong sense of 
solidarity) has a natural right to form its own state or at least 
to gain autonomy. The other side of the nationalist idea is 
concerned more with culture than with politics. It stresses the 
right of population groups known as nationalities to develop 
their own language, customs and intellectual culture, which in 
the Romantic Age included in particular folk poetry, folk song, 
literature and art in general. The field of culture widened to 
the extent that laws were regarded as national and national 
sciences were spoken of, though science is generally considered 
international. This idea of nationalism did not necessarily aim 
at an independent state though it was often linked to a demand 
for national self-determination. There was political overtone in 
the demand that a community's own language should have its 
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rights in administration or cultural life. Often counted too as 
unifying factors were native country and common descent, not 
merely land of birth but biological kinship (tribe, race). 
The idea of nationalism applied to language and culture was 
actually formed in Germany in the literary works of Johann 
Gottfried Herder, Wilhelm von Humboldt and the Romantics, 
especially Friedrich Schlegel. This notion had its influence on 
Finland through Professor Henrik Gabriel Porthan of Turku 
Academy, also by the agency of Sweden from the 1820s 
onward. In particular it influenced the Turku Romantics Adolf 
Ivar Arwidsson and J.G. Linsen during the 1820s. As for 
Porthan, he began to publish his work "De poesi Fennica" as 
early as 1766, when Herder was merely starting. Enthusiasm 
for popular language, history and poetry was not the merit of 
the Germans alone, it belonged to the spirit of the age. Pursuit 
of folk poetry, which started independently in Finland, 
acquired typically romantic features from Germany and 
Sweden. Another influence felt in Finland at the same time was 
the Enlightenment, which demanded theoretical education and 
better knowledge of the Finnish language by officials. The 
status of Swedish as the language of officialdom had led to 
neglect of Finnish. Alongside Romanticism and the En-
lightenment there also emerged enthusiasm for antiquity. The 
ideal hero of the nationalist poet Johan Ludvig Runeberg 
contained features of Greek and Roman patriotism. 
From the 1830s onward the national epic Kalevala collected 
by Elias Lönnrot gave a new direction to Finnish intellectual 
life. The importance of the Kalevala to Finnish national 
consciousness is difficult to estimate. In his book "Folklore and 
Nationalism in Modern Finland" (1976) William A. Wilson 
writes: 
"Julius Krohn once said: 'I consider it a certainty 
that without a Juslenius there would not have been a 
Porthan.' We might add that without a Juslenius and 
a Porthan there would not have been an Elias 
Lönnrot and a Kalevala. And without the Kalevala 
and the cultural revival its publication precipitated, 
perhaps there would not have been an independet 
Finnish nation." (p. 26) 
In the following article it is intended to give some material for 
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comparison and estimation of the national importance of the 
Kalevala and other factors. 
The notion of national self-determination — in so far as it 
came from outside — had little influence in Finland at the turn 
of the 18th and 19th centuries. The Finnish officer Göran 
Magnus Sprengtporten took as models the American Revo-
lution and the Dutch form of government when he tried to 
detach Finland from Sweden as an independent state under 
Russian protection (1786-88). He had little support, but after 
moving to Russia he exerted a considerable influence on 
Finland's destiny in 1809. In turn, the world of ideas created by 
the French Revolution probably caused less agitation in 
Sweden and Finland than in many other countries because 
their constitution was already far more democratic than 
elsewhere. The idea of freedom and the principle of nationalism 
may have affected Finland's position in 1809 and later through 
the conqueror, the Emperor Alexander I. He started to rule 
Finland as a Grand Duchy according to the country's own 
laws. If account is taken of the Emperor's weighty contribution 
and Sprengtporten's influence there is no reason to underrate 
the importance of the nationalist principle, though it cannot be 
credited with the country's intelligentsia or the broad nature of 
its society. 
The true effect of the nationalist idea oh the Finnish people 
as a whole can only be observed in the late 19th century and 
early 20th. We must now examine the reaction in Finland to 
the country, the people and to "Finnishness". Were patriotism 
and national consciousness to be found among the population, 
and what was their vision of the country, state and nation of 
Finland in the 19th century? 
If we examine the premises and development of nationalist 
thinking by the Finns, certain facts must be noted. Russia was 
utterly strange to them, as its religion, form of government, 
language, customs and culture were different. Through Carelians 
and Ingrians — Finnish in descent — who lived in Russia there 
had admittedly been contact with the Russian way of life 
unofficially, and south-east Finland had belonged to Russia for 
almost 100 years before being reunited with Finland in 1812, 
but stories of conditions in Russia were frightening, at least 
from the popular peasant standpoint. Sweden on the other 
hand was familiar, for the Finns had been Swedish subjects 
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and citizens, but in the time of Swedish dominance the Finnish 
language and culture had not developed and such a situation 
could not continue. Swedish could not remain the only official 
language in a country where 85-88 % (according to A.I. 
Arvidsson 7/8) of the inhabitants were Finnish-speaking and 
which had no further political connection with Sweden. In 19th 
century Finland this situation caused a twofold nationalist 
movement, of Fennomania against Swedish influence and of 
cautious but gradually more intensive resistance to Russia. The 
Finns did not revolt but created their own state. The issue of 
Finnish nationalism took on a unique character. To be noted 
also is the increase in Finland's population. This had always 
been small, but in modern times it advanced at a good pace, 
especially in the period 1700-1900. About the year 1500 the 
country's inhabitants numbered 100,000-300,000. In 1900 the 
figure was about 3 million with an increase of some 2 million 
during the 19th century. In numbers the Finnish nation began 
to resemble a normal small state. 
Finnish nationalism in the 19th century was of three main 
types. 
1) The nationalism of the Finnish autonomous state or 
"nation state" developed from the earlier patriotism and 
affection for a home region which had been felt in the time of 
Swedish power toward Finland or, more poetically, toward 
"the island of Finland". 
2) National feeling for Finland. The Finnish language played 
an important part in this. It broke out among the intelligentsia 
in the form of Fennomania with Arvidsson as its leader in 
the 1820s and the notable statesman Johan Wilhelm Snellman in 
in the 1840s and later. Their aim was a state whose language 
should be Finnish, with Swedish in a minority position. It was 
held that the Finnish upper classes and intelligentsia were 
originally Finnish-speaking and had adopted a foreign 
language, Swedish. On this basis part of the Swedish speakers 
adopted Finnish ways, even taking Finnish surnames. Fen-
nomanes favoured linguistic supremacy for Finnish, while 
the more moderate aimed at linguistic equality. This nationalist 
movement conquered the Finnish speakers before long — 
farmers, crofters, cottagers, labourers and servants, who from 
the end of the 1850s were able to send their children to Finnish- 
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speaking secondary schools. 
3) National feeling of Swedish speakers toward Swedish 
nationalism in Finland. Their aim was for Finland to be as 
Swedish as possible, with Swedish as the official language and 
Finnish as the language of the common people. The most 
ardent representatives of this trend identified language and 
race, explaining that Finnish speakers were incapable of 
culture. Finland's future would depend on preservation of the 
status of the Swedish language. 
In fact there were two or even three theories opposing or 
supporting each other. By the notions of Romanticism nation 
and language belonged organically together. Snellman for his 
part had noted that one language in a realm strove to 
dominate, and he applied this observation to Finland. By the 
opposite theory language and race belong together, and among 
Swedish speakers in the mid-19th century this was connected 
with the thought of supremacy for the Germanic race. All these 
theories have proved wrong — at least in Finland. Swedish is 
still the second national language of Finland. The race theory 
has turned out to be wrong both scientifically and in practice. 
Only modern — and mainly Finnish-speaking — Finland has 
created an independent higher culture and asserted a sense of 
power (Independence 1917, Winter War 1939). Latin 
scholarship and Swedish administration consolidated western 
culture and Scandinavian society in Finland, but a Finnish-
speaking population and a national awakening brought an 
individualist Finland to the foreground. Swedish speakers have 
of course contributed to Finnish achievements. When Finland 
became part of Russia in 1809 the country's inhabitants had 
full reason to seek a national identity. The situation in fact 
contained features of a crisis of identity. 
We shall now examine nationalist thinking separately among 
the intelligentsia and the common people. The intelligentsia or 
gentry included perhaps 2 % of the population. Its native 
language and home language was almost exclusively Swedish 
— except in south-east Finland, where it might be German or 
Russian. The lower orders of Swedish speakers — mainly in 
cities and coastal districts — were identified only partly with 
the gentry, though they had the same advantages. The Finnish-
speaking elementary and secondary school, the established 
institution of Parliament and municipal administration to- 
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gether with Fennomania created a Finnish-speaking in-
telligentsia from the 1860s onward and to some extent earlier. 
The two Estates of the Diet, the nobility and the middle class, 
were almost entirely Swedish-speaking until the parliamentary 
reform of 1906. The home language of the clergy too was partly 
Swedish. The peasant class was mostly Finnish-speaking. As a 
rule the clergy knew Finnish, as did the lower ranks of 
officials. In rural districts the higher orders usually knew 
Finnish, even if they considered it so inferior that they were 
glad to hide their knowledge. Among social groups there were 
contradictory developments. As a rule there was progress 
toward equality, but in 19th century Finland the difference 
between gentry and common people was emphasized precisely 
on the basis of language. Rapid population growth, on the 
other hand, deepened the gulf between farmers, crofters and 
cottagers, also between farmers and labourers. Farmers 
belonged to the middle class of the more modern society, and 
from among them arose a Finnish-speaking intelligentsia. 
How did the higher Estates look on Finland at the beginning 
of the 19th century? During the time of Swedish power they 
clearly felt that it was a home district. They saw Sweden and 
Finland as parts of the Swedish realm, as they also saw 
Estonia and Ingria before the Peace of Uusikaupunki in 1721. 
Finland to them was a country, not merely a province of 
Sweden. In the 17th century when nations and realms were in 
search of a brilliant antiquity — Olaus Rudbeck in the case of 
Sweden — the Finns found mighty kings and an independent 
realm for themselves, or explained their forefathers as de-
scendants of the tribe of Israel. Although this was erroneous it 
was a sign of national feeling, even of national pride. Although 
the status of the Finnish language weakened in modern times, 
as a background factor it evidently played a part in the 
acceptance of the Finnish people as a unique entity. The 
languages used in Finland from the 13th to the 19th century 
were Finnish, Swedish and Latin. Latin, in which official 
documents were written in the Middle Ages, was mainly an 
academic language in the 19th century. Swedish had always 
been the language of officialdom. On the other hand it had 
never been the language of the church for the Finnish-speaking 
population. As the language of conversation for the higher 
ranks of society Swedish supplanted Finnish in the 18th 
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century, and in schools it replaced Latin. At the end of the 
18th century the Enlightenment and the early romantic 
movement worked against this development. Porthan, the 
leading scholar of Turku Academy, regarded Finnish as his 
actual mother tongue and initiated the study of folk poetry, the 
Finnish language and Finnish history. Sprengtporten, a 
cosmopolitan officer and politician, also said that Finnish was 
his true mother tongue. In 1809, however, most of the 
intelligentsia probably believed that Swedish would remain the 
language of officialdom and culture. A new perspective was 
added by the information that Finnish had several related 
languages such as Lappish, Estonian and Hungarian and that 
it belonged to an extensive family of languages which probably 
stemmed from the east and was beginning to be known as 
Finno-Ugrian. After 1810 this realization led the young 
intelligentsia straight to an appreciation of folk poetry and 
popular language, and traced the path to Fennomania and a 
Finland more conscious of itself. Of notable importance was the 
Diet of Porvoo in 1809, where the four Estates swore loyalty to 
the new ruler and Alexander I, the Emperor and Grand Duke, 
gave his affirmation as ruler, the country's constitution and 
former rights, in their main features, were confirmed and its 
inhabitants spoken of as a nation. On that basis Finnish 
self-government and an autonomous state were created. 
Enlightened officials soon noticed the possibilities of Finland 
and began to lay stress on the country's position as a state. The 
Finnish Estates had accepted the conqueror's invitation to the 
Diet despite the fact that no peace had been signed between 
Sweden and Russia, and thus the assurances given at the Diet 
could be understood as an agreement. The Emperor received 
abundant thanks from the Finns, but despite relief there was 
perplexity in Finland. Leading officials were anxious and in 
the next few decades were careful not to provoke the Grand 
Duke while they quietly and tactfully built up self-government. 
The main point was that the country had a government and 
direct access to the Emperor. A unique nation was to develop 
between Sweden and Russia. Part of the intelligentsia opted for 
a "Finnish" Finland and part for a bilingual native land. The 
most Swedish section wished to remain as before. It favoured 
political liberalism but forgot the Finnish speakers and would 
have left them at the lowest level of society. 
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Finland's intelligentsia was progressive in science and art, 
political thinking and — especially at the end of the 19th and 
beginning of the 20th century — in social activity. The reign of 
Alexander II (1855-1881) was a time of great reforms. 
Contributing to this work was the elite of the intelligentsia, a 
fairly extensive body. There were also those who strove to build 
a personal career in the splendour of the Imperial power 
without regard for the Finnish people. 
What was the situation among the people themselves, 
representing 98 % of the population (85 % if only Finnish 
speakers are considered)? What did it mean to be a Finn under 
Swedish power and after 1809? Did they possess national 
feeling and pride, and was it directed to Sweden or Finland? 
Did they understand what happened in 1809? This is the 
section of the population whose opinions are most difficult for 
a historian to elucidate. It involves explaining the progress of 
the 19th century. 
The events of 1899 may be taken for purposes of comparison. 
It was then that the Finns answered the challenge offered by 
the first stage of the russianization process. The so-called 
February Manifesto was issued, making it possible to enact 
laws affecting Finland without giving a hearing to the Finnish 
Estates. In about 10 days university students — sometimes 
skiing long distances in the countryside — collected more than 
half a million signatures for an address to be given to the 
Emperor-Grand Duke. In a courteous letter the Finns 
expressed deep anxiety but also their belief that the ruler had 
not wished to injure Finland's form of government. This, 
known as the Great Address, was signed by 522,931. Finland's 
total population was 2.7 million. Those above 15 years of age 
numbered 2.2 million. In 1900 their level of education was as 
follows: 
Attended elementary 	 Able to read only 	 Unable to read 
school or otherwise 
able to read and write 
40.7 %-905,025 
	
58.1 %- 
1,289,404 	 1.2 %-26,261 
Over half of those able to write had, in fact, signed the address. 
The number is astonishing even if it is assumed that in some 
cases a father or mother wrote the names of their children. 
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This peaceful demonstration was also a sign of national 
vigilance. At the same time it showed that conditions were 
stabilizing. The signatories hardly feared persecution from the 
Emperor or the Russian government. On the other hand they 
showed notable boldness in putting their names to a document 
criticising the Emperor's actions. The political atmosphere had 
been clouded for some years. The Great Address showed a 
national consciousness of the state of autonomous Finland. 
Another example can be given from 1939 (and 1944). When 
Finland ceded south-east Finland to the Soviet Union after the 
Winter War, about half a million people moved in 10 days to 
the main part of Finland. They left the land of their fathers, 
their homes, most of their cattle and other property, wishing to 
belong to the state and nation of Finland. A clearer sign of 
national consciousness there could hardly be. It may be added, 
of course, that in the last few decades over 300,000 inhabitants 
of Finland have left voluntarily for Sweden to find a better 
standard of living. They live in good conditions but many are 
not happy, for they have lost their language and culture, which 
has proved disastrous for their children. These examples show 
once more the nature of Finnish relations with Russia, Sweden 
and Finland itself. 
How did the Finnish people picture their country in the time 
of Swedish power? In principle Finland had enjoyed equal 
standing in the Swedish realm for 400-500 years. In church 
and court the people were informed of laws, statutes and 
political events. Part of the laws and statutes were translated 
into Finnish. Peasant representatives were sent to the Diet of 
Stockholm. They certainly told acquaintances what they had 
heard. Like the intelligentsia, the people were well aware that 
the realm consisted of Sweden and Finland and that Finland 
contained many provinces and clans such as Häme, Savo and 
Carelia. The name of Finland, which originally had meant the 
south-west part of the country, had been extended to cover the 
whole "Eastland" belonging to Sweden. Not only soldiers and 
officials but also rural inhabitants travelled a great deal. In the 
Middle Ages farms possessed lands hundreds of kilometres 
away. Land settlement had continued vigorously for centuries. 
Rural inhabitants travelled to coastal cities for trade. Farm 
hands and servant girls wandered in search of new 
employment. To the parish church people drove, rowed or 
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walked scores of kilometres. Courts were at great distances. 
Clergy and officials came from far off, and school journeys were 
hundreds of kilometres long. 
In 1809 the Finnish people was obliged to realize that its 
political status had changed radically. The Finns had been 
involved in war, and their army had fought. Now they were 
under Russian power. They might know little of revolution, but 
more important to them was the freedom of a Scandinavian 
people and their own religion. They sent their own 
representatives to the Porvoo Diet. On this multilingual 
occasion speeches and documents were interpreted and 
translated for them. The representatives carried the message all 
over the country. The Emperor seemed to attach great 
importance to the oath of loyalty he received from the 
peasants. Most valuable in terms of information may have been 
the fact that Alexander I's affirmation was read in churches 
and placed on church walls to be read in Finnish. Most of the 
people could read, and though reading was not easy for all, 
there were those who could read well. The Finns seem to have 
reiterated that their religion, laws and rights had been 
confirmed. 
There was little literature in the Finnish language and most 
of it was religious. An exception was the so-called Chronicle 
which was printed in the hymnbook and thus was in the reach 
of most Finns. It was a short chronicle of world history in very 
conservative terms — it began with the creation of the world 
6,000 years ago — but little better knowledge of these matters 
was available even to the educated. Finns had considerable 
knowledge of the history of the Israelites, Assyrians and 
Babylonians, also of Greece and Rome. In 1813 the hymnbook 
contained a different Chronicle. There was an addition in the 
form of Russian history, with no mention made of the 
destruction wrought by Russians or of the "unhappy" battle of 
Pultava in 1709, where Charles XII lost to Tsar Peter the 
Great. But it contained the combined history of Sweden and 
Finland and — most important of all — a description of the 
Porvoo Diet in 1809, the oath of loyalty and the ruler's 
affirmation. 
The Lutheran church considered that authority, that is the 
ruler and the government, received their power from God. In 
the Finnish catechism of 1764 it is stated — in a text framed 
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and hung on walls — that authority is God, and the assurance 
is given that those who do good do not need to fear authority. 
Spelling books included authority with father and mother in 
the fourth commandment. For this reason religious peasants 
were allowed to think that the authority over them had been 
changed by God. It should be mentioned that the Swedish king 
Gustavus IV Adolphus had been dethroned just before the 
Porvoo Diet. It appears that Alexander I took note of this 
situation. He said cautiously that Russian arms apart — 
Providence had seen fit to place Finland in his power. Bishop 
Tengström said at the opening ceremony of the Diet that "tous 
les bons citoyens" were "enchantes de rendre a César les choses 
qui sont a César, et a Dieu celles qui sont a Dieu." In his turn 
the Emperor said at the opening on 28.3.1809: "Par les decrets 
de la Providence appele a gouverner un peuple bon et loyal." 
In his opinion the task of the Diet was: "a completer les droits 
que le sort de la guerre m'a deferes par les droits plus chers a 
mon coeur, plus conformes a mes principes, ceux qui donnent 
les sentiments de l'amour et de l'affection." 
In his closing speech on 18.7.1809 the Grand Duke began his 
famous statement on the elevation of the Finnish people to the 
rank of nationhood by saying: "Ce peuple brave et loyal benira 
la Providence qui a amen l'ordre de choses actuel." He urged 
representatives to assure their fellowcountrymen that the laws 
would remain in force and that their personal security and 
property were unassailable. He hoped that they would deal 
with the matters of greatest importance to the people's political 
existence. Belief in providence and Alexander's attempt to 
conciliate his new subjects made the transfer to association 
with Russia more easy. The smooth assurances of loyalty and 
the show of veneration were partly due to this state of affairs, 
but linked with them still was anxiety as to how the Finns 
would manage matters in their new position. 
In the time of Swedish power ordinary people may well have 
felt that the realm of Sweden and the home country of Finland 
were their native land. Now only Finland remained to them, 
and though Russia could not be regarded as foreign, few can 
have taken it as their native land. When the map and the 
geography of Europe were discussed in the Finnish newspaper 
Turun Wiikkosanomat in 1821, it was said that east of Finland 
is Russia and north is Lapland. At that time Lapland was 
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undivided. At the Porvoo Diet it was made very clear that the 
whole Finnish population was being addressed as "the nation 
of Finland." 
In the early and mid-19th century there were numerous 
peasant poets especially in central and eastern Finland. They 
used the metre of the Kalevala and combined verse writing 
with other work, but they also recited their poems to the public 
and were in touch with The Finnish Literary Society. They 
rejoiced in the foundation of this society and in its work for the 
benefit of folk poetry and the Finnish language. They also 
followed other happenings of their time, speaking in their 
poems of Finland and its various provinces and clans. When 
Paavo Korhonen (1775-1840) of Rautalampi wrote his poem 
"For the Defence of Savo" in 1822, he combined with Savo the 
people of Häme, Kainuu and Ostrobothnia, also mentioning 
"southmen", "coastmen" and "fine fellows from the central 
lands". Pietari Väänänen, a juryman from the Kuopio district, 
had attended the Norrköping Diet in 1800 and the Porvoo Diet 
in 1809. When he wrote a poem of praise to Alexander I he 
addressed it to "the Finns of Finland" saying that the Finnish 
people would bless the Grand Duke who had performed a great 
work for them. Väänänen wrote: 
I say to Finland, 
Making my joy sound, 
playing the strings of the kantele. 
People of Savo, people of Kainuu, 
dwellers in Häme, 
lovable Carelians, 
let it sound in the lanes, 
let it echo in villages, 
instruments and song 
expressing your joy. 
Paavo Tuovinen (1769-1827) wrote in verse of "the growth of 
the Finnish language", thanking Reinhold von Becker who in 
1820 had started the production of Turun Wiikkosanomat and 
had written a Finnish grammar. Paavo Korhonen was also a 
follower of Turun Wiikkosanomat, as is clear from his verse. 
Pietari Makkonen (1785-1851) complained in a "song of 
rejoicing for the growth of the Finnish language" that this 
language "was not allowed in drawing rooms" but "was used 
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in poor villages, low huts, peasant homes, ploughmen's 
mansions." But then "a praiseworthy book society" began to 
teach "the orphan" who then "grew into a beautiful maiden" 
who "can now stand unsupported among the great in drawing 
rooms and splendid chambers." The farmer Antti Puhakka, a 
member of the Diet 1863-82, may have been thinking of the 
past in his poem about "Bad Boy Jussi" whose letters in 
Finnish were not received by officials. In 1847 he demanded an 
improvement and was himself engaged in political activity 
when in 1863 a statute was passed giving Finnish equality in 
principle with Swedish. 
Had they national pride, those whose language was Finnish? 
They were modest in bearing, but showed signs of ability and 
the wish to learn. The popular song "We too deserve respect" 
written in 1816 by the educated official Jaakko Juteini, a 
farmer's son, may be regarded as symptomatic. Respect is 
deserved by the man who clears fields, capable in the work of 
peace and valiant in war, by the gentle, virtuous Finnish girl 
whose red cheeks the grey frost cannot pale, and by the learned 
Finn. Enlightenment has been kindled and new kanteles of 
Väinämöinen are made. Juteini's message has much of social 
import, at the same time bringing out the ordinary people of 
Finland, but he also aims at art, learning and enlightenment. 
On this basis in 19th century Finland great importance was 
acquired by the notion that the main task of a small nation is 
to take part in the development of human culture. 
Finnish-language newspapers showed what information was 
offered to the people and what was the aim of development. In 
1820 Reinhold von Becker, a teacher at Turku University, 
founded the newspaper Turun Wiikkosanomat (1820-31) 
specifically for farmers. It was printed in an edition of 1,000 
and readers were difficult to find, which shows that reading 
was not a vigorous pursuit. It was read nevertheless and in this 
way information was spread. News was given of the countries 
of Europe, of Finnish geography and history and of Finno-
Ugrian peoples. Thus, as it were, a place was sought for the 
Finns among the peoples of the world. Becker ordered a map 
from Stockholm, coloured it himself and distributed it to his 
readers. When Snellman in the 1840s founded "Maamiehen 
Ystävä" (Countryman's Friend) a map — this time of the world 
— was also considered important by that newspaper. The 
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mathematician Ernest Bonsdorff (born 1843) relates that in his 
childhood country people knew little of the ways of the world, 
but when they came to his father's vicarage the latter told them 
of events and also displayed a map. Popular educators seem to 
have wished to give the people an identity. When it was stated 
in a Swedish newspaper that country people should not be 
given the same information as the intelligentsia, the editor of 
Turun Wiikkosanomat — though urging that a dispute should 
be avoided — gave an assurance that enlightenment belonged 
to all. All are then children of "a common fatherland". 
The newspaper also gave information on constitutional laws, 
on the birth of realms and forms of government and on the 
rights and duties of Finns. There may well have been national 
pride in the observation that the literacy of Finnish country 
dwellers was praised even in southern Europe. It was noted at 
the same time that Finnish peasants formed an Estate because 
they had political rights. A common language and consti-
tutional laws were presented as the most valuable possession of 
a people. The message was social and nationalist in tone. The 
importance of patriotism was stressed. The period of Russian 
rule had started well with Finland becoming a state. A period 
of reaction from 1810 to the early 1850s was oppressive, but a 
gradual work of preparation came to fruition in the second half 
of the 19th century, a time of social reform and great 
nationalism at least in the intelligentsia and enlightened 
circles. The Kalevala had appeared in 1835, while Runeberg 
had written the tales of Vänrikki Stool and a national anthem 
in connection with them. The Finnish-language newspaper 
Suometar with an edition as high as 4,500 began to appear in 
1847. The university was given a professor of the Finnish 
language, Yrjö Sakari Yrjö-Koskinen wrote a textbook of 
Finnish history and Finnish elementary and secondary schools 
took root in the 1860s. Fennomania flamed forth in politics and 
education during the 1840s and against it the Swedish 
influence rose with equal fervour. The Finns began to develop 
their state institution with a trend so independent that the 
Russians began to accuse them of separatism. Connection with 
Russia was compulsory, forcing the Finns to be careful in their 
words and deeds, but the situation was not inspiring. What 
could so small a people do against the might of Russia? The 
Finns had a need, however, to speak of their own task in world 
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history — a strong indication of national consciousness — and 
the task they found was to work for education. A means of 
defence was to evolve their own way of life, society, science 
and art, and to make Finland known abroad. 
The Kalevala had great importance in that sense, for the 
attention of the learned in great countries was now turned to 
the previously unknown Finnish people. To the Finnish 
intelligentsia it was a guarantee of their people's ability. To 
ordinary people too it was noteworthy because folk poetry still 
lived to some extent. In Finnish newspapers such as Lönnrot's 
Mehiläinen folk poems were published and there were tales of 
Väinämöinen and Lemminkäinen. The Kalevala provided great 
amounts of cultural material and a good deal of national self-
confidence. However, Finland's independence in 1917 hardly 
depended on it. The nationalist movements were in no specific 
need of folk poetry. An institution of state and the national 
languages Finnish and Swedish were the prerequisites of 
independence. Finland and Russia had very little in common. 
The only uniting factor, in truth, was Russia's military and 
political interest. This in turn was a danger to Finland, as the 
periods of oppression (1899-1905, 1908-1917) showed. When 
the Finns spoke of "national independence" they were not 
thinking of revolt but of their autonomous status; undoubtedly, 
however, they were ready to secede from Russia if a suitable 
opportunity came. 
Finland's intelligentsia was highly nationalist in favour of 
the Finnish state or the Finnish way of life. In most of the 
intelligentsia these halves united, which did not prevent 
supporters of nationalism from being cosmopolitan. Wide 
circles among Finnish speakers agreed with the attitude of 
intellectuals and officials. There had been an extraordinary 
increase in the level of education and in participation in 
politics and administration. In country and town people went 
to school, read newspapers and literature and engaged in social 
activity. Their success depended largely on the success of their 
own state, though the Russians had favoured emphasis on 
Finnish matters. In the first period of oppression attempts at 
russianization gave strength to political national consciousness 
where it had been weak. The result was the previously 
mentioned Great Address of 1899. Before that, perhaps, the 
Finnish way of life had in practice long been of supreme 
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importance to the people. 
In 1845 Maamiehen Ystävä had deplored the fact that Finns 
gave their names a Swedish form when entering secondary 
school. Until the end of the 19th century first names were 
marked in church registers in the Swedish form. People 
themselves began officially to use them in the Finnish form. At 
least from the 1850s onward first names of Finnish origin 
started to be used. Especially popular were Väinö and Ilmari —
names from the Kalevala. Also favoured were Toivo, Onni, 
Jalo, Lahja, Oiva, Armas. Surnames were also given a Finnish 
form, and on Snellman Day in 1906 about 100,000 surnames 
were so changed. This was a year of parliamentary reform. The 
first period of oppression had ended in 1905. 
With Marxism and the labour movement at the beginning of 
the century came a more international outlook and indifference 
to nationalist issues. In reality Finnish socialists wished for the 
country's independence in 1917 though unhappy coincidences 
caused the civil war, in which the Reds took support from 
Soviet Russia and the Whites from Germany who had trained 
activists, that is rebels, the so-called Light Infantry, to fight 
against Russia. They were the elite troops of the battle for 
national liberation — eager university students and plain men 
— who were tragically involved in a civil war. Despite the 
wounds this caused and thanks to national integrality Finland 
fought as a united country in 1939. 
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Matti Klinge 
Let us be Finns! 
The rise of Finland's national culture in the 19th century 
provides an opportunity for analysing the factors that influence 
the shaping of a cultural form: the political structure and ties, 
the manifestations of isolation and special efforts to create a 
separate national culture and the circles of influence which 
participated in this active endeavour. The development of 
Finland in the 19th century is an example of the moulding of a 
culture from the starting point of a changing political status 
and subsequent withdrawal from the earlier cultural affinity. 
Even in broad terms, the role of such a change in status is 
important, if not decisive, and that for at least two reasons. 
One, to which I shall soon return with reference to Finland, is 
institutional separation from the cultural and administrative 
ties of the earlier political connection. The other event that 
occurs with a change in political status is independence or 
autonomy. This is essential, for the birth of a national culture 
is the distinct definition of the geopolitical development within 
which a national culture evolves. With the change in political 
status there comes a definition of the geographical basis in 
accordance with the natural prerequisites and especially the 
ethnic and traditional conditions on which the new culture is 
created. 
The term people or nation is never so strictly circumscribed a 
concept as to be incontrovertible if based on ethnic or linguistic 
boundaries. We require a special political step which decides 
that these tribes or those regional units shall be separate while 
others fuse together. Knowledge of the culture and people to 
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which we must belong then spreads from above, from the 
centres and cultural institutions controlled by them. And this 
doctrine tends in quite a number of remote districts and 
frontier regions to oppose sharply local belief that the 
ethnically and linguistically close dwellers across the frontier 
are strangers while those who live far away in the centres are 
kin. The Catalans of southern France must turn their backs on 
the Catalans of northern Spain and their faces towards distant 
Paris, while the institutions on the other side of the frontier 
stress the importance of Madrid. The boundary has fixed the 
sphere in which each national culture has its being. 
In Finnish conditions, this important change of status 
occurred in 1809 when under the Peace Treaty of Hamina a 
number of provinces listed by name were incorporated in 
Russia, and the victor had decided before the treaty was signed 
on its own institutions for the administrative area that was 
formed in this way. This area had never before constituted an 
administrative entity, though the main parts had from time to 
time been placed under a temporary common administration. A 
distinct but not precisely defined concept of "Finland" had 
already originated earlier. The traditional administrative, 
political and trading centre was Stockholm, capital of the 
centrally governed kingdom of Sweden. The frontier 
adjustment left on the Finnish side many Swedish-speaking 
ethnic groups and on the Swedish side a large Finnish 
settlement, and Lapland with its Lapps was also divided. On 
the eastern frontier, again, in relations with Russia, the new 
administrative area was enlarged with territories some of 
which had earlier belonged to the Swedish realm proper but 
had been detached in various phases, and some of which had 
never belonged to it or had been taken for a short time as the 
spoils of victory but had not come under the traditional 
Swedish-Finnish administration or enjoyed the political rights 
of the realm. But the greatest part of Russia's tribes that spoke 
Finnish or closely related languages was not incorporated into 
the Grand Duchy of Finland. Thus, the geographic formation of 
Finland left it with two ethnic minorities which are still 
distinguishable, the Swedish linguistic minority and the 
Orthodox religious minority of Karelia. Still beyond the new 
frontier were groups which might in one way or another have 
qualified for consideration when the regional entity of Finland 
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was formed. There is especial reason to refer to these features 
of regional determination when discussing Finland. In the 
ensuing debate later in the 19th century on the essence of 
national culture, a debate which retained a character of 
importance until World War II, there was a significant 
polarisation. On the one side there were those who stressed the 
role of the Swedish-speaking part of the people and 
emphasised western ties. On the other side there were those 
who in a sense used the Karelian population as a fulcrum for 
levering the argument on the national culture towards eastern 
origins. 
The new geopolitical unit was not the only outcome of the 
separation of Finland from the Swedish realm. Sweden, too, 
was then born as the geographical entity which generations 
now have known. Although Norway was under the sovereignty 
of the King of Sweden, it retained its own administrative 
organs, language and institutions. A contrary situation existed 
in the bilingual Kingdom of Sweden which historians often call 
Sweden-Finland. The name depicts for present generations the 
size and boundaries of the realm. But in the search for false 
historical continuity it can readily lead us to forget — both 
sides have been guilty of this — that the conception of Sweden 
and Finland dates back to the year 1809. On the institutional 
level this is not immediately apparent for Sweden, for the old 
administration continued. In reality, the difference was 
enormous even at the institutional level, for the Revolution, the 
new constitution and the new royal house resting on French 
revolutionary traditions meant a sharp break from the old. But 
it is especially at the cultural level that an entirely new 
Sweden begins to emerge after 1809. The creation of an 
altogether new national spirit began there immediately under 
the lead of great and minor poets. Prior to 1809, Sweden with 
its Lapps, Finns, Swedes and Pomeranians was still in 
principle a small empire whose inhabitants were joined neither 
by language nor national spirit, but by a common ruler. The 
mental image of Sweden now is a national state, the birthplace 
of Vikings and peasant romanticism, propagation of the people 
and language. From as early as 1810 Geijer began to write and 
teach the history of the Swedish people. The historians before 
1809 had been writing about the history of the state or 
kingdom of Sweden. 
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It must be remembered that the development of Sweden was 
of decisive importance for the birth of Finland's national 
culture. An essential initial feature of this culture can be seen 
in retrospect in the fact that the culture of the end of the 18th 
century by and large continued in Finland although it was so 
strongly renounced in Sweden. Thus, the national moulding of 
Finland starts largely and simply from isolation. It no longer 
follows the path signposted by its former centre. The Swedish 
language continued to be the cultural and administrative 
tongue in Finland. Swedish law and the Swedish constitution 
were preserved in Finland, but Sweden itself adopted a new 
form of government. The Swedish hymnbook was revised under 
the direction of romantic poet bishops soon after the 
separation. But the old Swedish hymnbook remained in official 
use in Finland for another half century. And so on. 
It might be thought that this isolation — in a way without 
any effort on our part — from the former cultural contact 
which had given our culture a specific character was due solely 
to the poverty of Finnish cultural resources. The preservation 
of a cultural profile already regarded as obsolete in Sweden 
might be regarded as a phenomenon indicative of the withering 
of culture, its total inability to keep up with the times. Perhaps 
this was so to some extent. But a more essential consideration 
is that while Sweden plunged directly into the maelstrom of 
Romanticism — not only in the domain of art, literature and 
even politics, but also very manifestly in the humanistic, 
natural and medical sciences, as has been shown recently — 
Finland was incorporated in the Russian empire, where 
romantic idealism was not to have the same influence. The 
ideals of rationalism and neo-humanism of the age of 
Enlightenment were prevalent especially in the western capital 
of the realm, St. Petersburg. It was there that both the highest 
nobility of Finland set on a military career and the broad 
masses from eastern Finland in search of additional means of 
livelihood began to look. The population of St. Petersburg and 
its surrounding provinces had a nationally disparate character. 
German, Finnish and Lutheranism were as perceptible as 
Russian and Orthodoxy. The European languages and the 
cultural tradition of the age of Enlightenment set the trend in 
court circles and among the aristocracy. The new centre for 
Finland came to manifest expressly and at many levels the 
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influences of St. Petersburg which made a suitable 
continuation to Finland's own traditions of the enlightened 
age. The old political, administrative and even cultural centre 
had been Stockholm. There, too, a great part of the burghers 
had spoken German in the 17th and 18th centuries, and a large 
proportion of the lower classes, fishermen, maids and shippers 
of firewood had been Finnish. Both Stockholm and Leningrad 
(St. Petersburg) still have a Finnish church, fairly centrally 
located. Helsinki, the new centre of Finland's administrative 
organs and culture, was built to show imposingly and 
concretely to both foreigners and the Finns themselves that a 
separate political unit, Finland, had come into existence. The 
demonstratively built Helsinki was henceforth to be the centre 
to which the periphery of Finland was to look. 
Romanticism in Sweden, Germany and England was already 
directed both in literature and in historical conception to 
idealisation of the German Middle Ages. But the monumental 
centre of Helsinki was created in conformity with the 
Petersburgian-Baltic neo-humanistic ideals. This "Empire" 
style, which spread everywhere through official blessing, 
became an essential mark of Finland and, thus, of Finnish 
culture. Romantic idealism was a weak current also in Finnish 
intellectual life. While the old university of Finland was still in 
Turku, a wave of German-Swedish romanticism was felt there 
in the 1810s, but it was attenuated even then by the vigour of 
the local neo-humanistic-rationalist tradition. When the 
university moved to Helsinki at the end of the 1820s both it 
and its influential intelligentsia began to express primarily neo-
humanistic thinking. This, I would repeat, is particularly 
important when comparing Finland's development with 
Sweden's as an indicator of the differentiation of their mutual 
national culture. 
The Finnish Literary Society was founded in Helsinki in 
1831. Its aim was to spread knowledge of the motherland and 
its history, further the use of its tongue and develop literature 
in the Finnish language for both "educated compatriots" and 
the "lower classes". In its early years the Society defined its 
main objectives as follows: 
1. The achievement of a Swedish or German translation of 
the Kalevala; 
2. A compilation of Finnish mythology; 
125 
3. A clarification of the Finnish reflexive verb; 
4. The production of a memorial publication in Finnish on 
Porthan; 
5. A Finnish translation of Runeberg's poem "The Elk 
Hunters"; and 
6. The compilation of a theory to establish whether Finnish 
poetry is based on the quantity or stress of the syllable. 
The academic intelligentsia — the only one in the country —
sought to begin the establishment of Finland's national culture. 
The cornerstones were historical research, study of the 
language and folklore, and dissemination of the Kalevala and 
Elk Hunters. 
The Kalevala (1835) was Finland's national epic compiled by 
Lönnrot on classical lines from poems discovered in Russian 
Karelia. Its especial importance was that it laid the 
groundwork on which to build the national continuity — or 
rather an illusion of it — of Finnish culture. The active desire 
of the Finns to make the Kalevala known in foreign languages 
is natural against the background of this continuity of national 
culture. The Kalevala as it were legitimates the aspiration for a 
new national culture. This culture would not be artificial or 
constrained, for in addition to history and language it had a 
monument indicative of an ancient artistic culture of high 
standard. 
The Elk Hunters of Runeberg portrayed the Finnish 
landscape and common men and women in the setting of 
antique bucolic ideals. Runeberg depicted the Finns as 
harmonious, balanced people, cheerful and content even in 
their poverty. This Arcadian idyl was the first and most 
profoundly effective Finnish patriotic portrait. It is of the 
essence that Runeberg's picture of Finland is decisively non-
historical, based on neo-humanistic admiration for the people 
and scenery in which the ancient ideals of balance, moderation 
and harmony dominated. This view of the mother country was 
central still in the song Our Land, adopted as a national 
symbol in 1848, our national anthem which emphasises the 
aesthetic. Pljetnov, Rector of the University of St. Petersburg, 
kept in touch with Runeberg and wrote: "What could be more 
pleasant and useful than to travel in a country where the 
beauty of Nature is in harmony with the customs and 
civilisation of the people. Switzerland had something similiar 
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earlier. But now natural beauty has been spoilt by the horror 
stories of the Revolution. Yes, I am ready to believe that there 
is only one country in the world for you and me in which we 
can find our idea of happiness, and that is Finland. If I 
mastered the two languages spoken there, I would not hesitate 
to adopt that country as my motherland ..." This passage 
dates from 1848, the year when stories of the horrors of the 
Revolution were despoiling natural beauty, to use Pljetnov's 
words. The beauty of Nature also covered man's Rousseauian 
freedom from corruption. And this brings us to the question of 
how imperial Russia viewed the idea of Finland's national 
culture. 
The Russian attitude had been outlined before the Peace of 
Hamina. The preservation, unchanged but appropriately 
supplemented, of the religion, official language, legislation and 
administrative organs of Finland meant in itself abandonment 
of the idea of assimilation. It was never Russia's intention to 
russify Finland, make it a part of Russia. Finland was occupied 
as a marchland protecting St. Petersburg, a buffer against 
Sweden and its western allies. The approval of a special 
administrative system for the country and the emphasis on its 
political existence by building a separate capital make it clear 
that the creation of a national culture was also one of the 
government's aims. The birth of a national culture could not in 
any case be a negative phenomenon from the government's 
point of view, for it widened the separation from Sweden. A 
national culture would gain the people's loyalty and infuse it 
with a spirit of resistance to possible Swedish revanchism. 
Thus, in the government's view, both the Elk Hunters and 
Kalevala and the Finnish Literary Society were positive 
phenomena, and were supported. The government slowly but 
purposefully moved towards increasing command of the 
Finnish language among civil servants. In fact, knowledge of 
Finnish was made a requirement for some civil service 
examinations as early as in the 1840s after a lectorate in 
Finnish was established at the University in Helsinki in 1828. 
Research into Finnish-Ugric philology was begun at the St. 
Petersburg Academy of Science. The first professor of the 
Finnish language was appointed in 1850 in Helsinki, at a time 
when chairs in modern languages were still very rare in the 
world. Indeed, Finland had no chair in any other modern 
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language for over two decades. After certain vicissitudes, the 
position of Finnish alongside Swedish as an official language 
was confirmed by government initiative in 1863 even before the 
parliament that convened then requested it and before any 
other pressure was exerted on the government. These examples 
show the falsity of an assumption often made in earlier 
literature: that the attitude of the Russian government towards 
a national Finnish culture was negative. The government 
opposed all revolutionary trends and western political 
doctrines such as socialism and democracy, but it opposed 
nationalism only when it occurred in association with them, as 
it often did in 19th century Europe. 
National and social thinking were combined in our country 
in the mid-1840s by Snellman. He was an opposition man 
during the reign of Nicholas I, but a government man and even 
a member of the domestic government under Alexander II. 
Snellman's great idea was the replacement of a bureaucratic 
society with a civic society, but in Finnish conditions broad 
participation demanded a change in the language situation. It 
is important in this connection to remember that Snellman's 
doctrine embraced not only education of the masses but also 
nationalisation of the educated class, i.e. gradual finnification. 
Snellman did not want to create a new leading stratum or élite 
by direct education of the people. He wished primarily to 
preserve the old élite, but to change its language. This 
endeavour was largely successful. The movement across class 
lines injected new blood into the leading element, but the old 
leadership comprising noble, bourgeois and particularly clerical 
families remained in charge until the country gained its 
independence and even long after that, until the end of World 
War II. This can be perceived from the lists of cabinet ministers 
or rolls of senior civil servants, for example. Even when an 
"outsider's" name appears, he was frequently linked by 
marriage, often very closely, with the upper class network of 
relations and, thus, with the net of traditions. It may perhaps 
be said that only the entry of the Agrarian Party leaders into 
the political leadership in connection with the gaining of 
independence infused a sizeable new force and agrarian 
emphasis into the élite. Because of their defeat in the Civil War 
of 1918 the working class had to wait until the time of World 
War II (cf. the Social Democrats in Sweden). 
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The upper or middle class of the stratum that was developing 
and moulding the national culture is clearly discernible in the 
pictorial arts and even in the literature. The dominant 
character in Finnish-language literature was Aleksis Kivi. He 
was familiar with the life of the people at their own level. He 
wrote his main works in the 1860s and 1870s, but was not 
widely known and recognised until the 20th century, in fact 
only when the upper and middle classes after the great 
political and intellectual transitional period embracing the 
General Strike of 1905 and the subsequent years were ready to 
abandon the Runebergian popular portrait for the realistic 
image of Kivi. The Finnish pictorial arts of the 1880s and 1890s 
produced a picture of the country and the people that until 
then had been drawn almost exclusively in words. It is typical 
that this picture of the native country was drawn very largely 
in Paris and for the most part mirrored the Runebergian 
harmonious idealism in the new media of bright colours 
inspired by the exoticism of Brittany and the fashion of Japan. 
It is symptomatic that one of the painters of this great period 
of our art, one who had been least instructed and was of 
humble social origin, participated hardly at all in potraying the 
landscape of his country. We can still see today, mostly through 
the lens of the camera, the Finnish landscape as the fin de 
siècle Finnish painters saw it. Runeberg in his landscape poems 
gave the painters of our golden era the guidelines to which 
"Kalevala" elements were added later. The art of painting thus 
remained for a long time, until the period of political transition 
to which reference was made earlier, an extension of the 
national cultural tradition that was shaped in the first half of 
the 19th century. 
There are also artists and works which are suggestive of 
another line or part of our national culture, its aristocratic 
tradition. The thin ranks of the Finnish nobility went over to 
the victor readily in 1809 and immediately afterwards. They 
were prompted by the political development and new trend in 
Stockholm. There had been sympathy on the Finnish side 
earlier for the era of King Gustavus III and its leading 
personalities. Some leading Gustavians became central figures 
in Finland's new administrative organs. To them Alexander I 
was closer to Gustavus III, whom they missed, than was 
Gustavus's son, to say nothing of Bernadotte who was thrust 
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up by the Revolution. But the considerable rewards given to 
nobility also played a role in gaining general acquiescence and 
later loyalty. Moreover, noble titles continued to be bestowed 
fairly generously until 1905, whereas the practice had 
decreased in Sweden and other countries several decades 
earlier. Our very earliest nationalist movement originated with 
the Finnish aristocracy. This attitude had hardly any literary 
or linguistic influence, but it created a firm national tradition 
in the administrative sphere, the civil service and monarchic 
loyalty, and gained success when its members took service with 
the Russian army. Representatives of this aristocratic national 
tradition of ours are Count Rehbinder and Count Armfelt, both 
Minister Secretaries of State, Senator Baron von Haartman, 
the painter Albert Edelfelt, Marshal of Finland Baron 
Mannerheim, and many cabinet ministers and statesmen of 
independent Finland. 
A part of this aristocratic tradition fused with the liberal 
trend which spread to Finland in the 1850s and flowered with 
the beginning of regular parliamentary meetings in 1863. The 
liberal group approved of the Runebergian idea of the native 
country and people, but wished to add historical elements to it. 
Runeberg himself had begun later to fix attention on them, 
especially in Part II of the Tales of Ensign Ståhl which 
appeared in 1860. The liberal concept of history emphasised the 
continuity of Finland's institutions, law, culture and 
parliament, even the continuity of religion which bound 
Finland with Sweden and with the west in general. In the 
liberal optimistic view of history, the institutional and cultural 
germanisation of the Finns was progress, movement towards a 
higher form of culture. The Swedish regime was accorded a 
positive colouring and contrasted especially with the 
bureaucratic censorship of the reign of Nicholas. Pursuing this 
view of history, the liberals revived memories of the war of 
1808-1809 so strongly that the Russians were annoyed. 
The liberal trend was connected with the restructuring of the 
economy. The forest industry gained momentum in the 1860s 
and 1870s, foreign trade expanded considerably, the railways 
enlarged the opportunities for trade, legislation opened the way 
to the establishment of limited liability companies, private 
banks and the industrial use of labour, together with freedom 
of trade. The liberal tradition eventually had a long-term 
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influence on our national culture in the sciences and arts, 
politics and the economy. We might even say that Finnish 
urban culture has continued this tradition both spiritually and 
materially. It has supported the traditions of the Finnish Press. 
The liberal trend cannot be judged solely against the influence 
of the political party that represented it, the so-called Swedish 
Party. For the development of the national culture 19th 
century liberalism was a power group which stressed the role 
of institutions and history and stood for the continuity of 
western influence. Working under its wings for a long time was 
a weak Sweden-oriented trend which did not really come into 
the open until the parliamentary reform of 1906. But nor has 
the Swedish People's Party, which is small, ever been a group 
of Swedish nationalists proper; aristocratic and liberal 
traditions have been more important in it. The 19th century 
liberals had no aspiration to build a unilingual national 
culture. What they wanted was a culture which both linguistic 
groups could share. It favoured, not opposed, the advance of 
the Finnish language, but did not regard any language as the 
sole or even salient attribute of the national culture. 
If liberalism was the cultural trend of the progressing 
bourgeoisie and towns, its counterweight from the 1860s on 
was the Fennomania which stressed agrarian values and found 
its political support in the traditional rural community, among 
the farmers and the clergy. This trend gave itself out to be 
nationalist and saw the moral and material values of 
traditional rural society as the underpinning of the national 
culture. The ideal was the independent, land-owning farmer, a 
living witness to ancient agrarian continuity, a Finnish 
independence free as it were of external political events. The 
leader of the movement, Yrjö-Koskinen, developed a new 
historical view, the history of the Finnish people, in which the 
past was explained in the light of the needs that had led to the 
growth and strengthening of Finnish nationalism. Yrjö-
Koskinen wanted to create historical continuity for the Finnish-
language culture which the Fennomans were building up and 
which was understood as national. Thus, Fennomania turned 
against emphasising external influence and its manifestations, 
especially western influences which were stronger in the 
prevailing cultural climate that the rather negligible eastern 
currents. Indeed, Fennomania was ready to approach Russia 
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and the Russians with a view to displacing the liberal Swedish-
language elements. A part of the Fennomane youth saw their 
movement as socially binding and approached the line 
represented by the Russian Populists (Narodnichestvo). 
However, the Fennomane vision of a rural society left a large 
part of the population on the sidelines. This sector was the 
rural proletariat, the surplus population, some of who moved 
around the turn of the century to the cities and emigrated to 
Russia and America. Similarly, the urban proletariat was 
excluded from this shaping of the national culture. The 
importance of these groups was not revealed until the General 
Strike of 1905 and the first elections by universal suffrage in 
which the socialists unexpectedly gained almost half the votes. 
At this juncture, the national culture was split by internal 
suspicion which was darkened, too, by stiffening Russian 
policy. Finland's quiet but distinctly advancing economic and 
cultural indepencence had made it questinable whether, in the 
changed international situation of the 1890s, the country was 
any longer the loyal buffer state envisaged in 1809. Opposition 
to the more aggressive policy of the Russians led at. the turn of 
the century to intensified education and propaganda aimed at 
gathering broad strata of the population into the fold of united 
opinion. Enormous quantities of legal and historical pamphlets 
and Runeberg's poetry were distributed. After the first 
parliamentary elections, it was felt that the intellectual 
grounds for this activity had ceased to exist, though there was 
no change in Russian policy. Only after the Civil War of 1918 
and after the rural leaders assumed public prominence was if 
possible cautiously to recommence the revival of the 
Runebergian picture of the people that had been put aside in 
1905 and 1907. But there emerged at the same time other 
proposals for the groundwork of a national culture. 
National culture is, of course, a concept that is under 
constant revision. But it does include the information and 
traditions essentially common to the people or a great part of 
the people, common explanations of the national character, 
landscape and history, unanimity on certain values. 
For Finland, the creation of these common values and 
traditions really began after 1809. The primary connecting link 
between citizens both in our country and elsewhere was for 
long the suzerainty of the same ruler, the same semi-religious 
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respect for the monarchy which was the cement that held the 
people together regardless of language, tribe, religion and even 
social class. On this foundation arose new structures of 
common identification which were then consolidated by the 
school system into a code of fundamental national knowledge. 
To a Finland without history came first the Kalevala and the 
peasant idyl, Runeberg's lyrics of the folk and the land, 
gradually other literature of its own. Then came a national 
anthem, its own monuments to Porthan, Runeberg and 
Alexander II, the Press and the railway system. It acquired its 
own capital and administrative organs, then its own monetary 
unit, parliament and, finally, universal suffrage. The great triad 
of Runeberg-Snellman-Lönnrot was canonised. A history was 
written which linked the people who had been contained 
within a given regional frame since 1809 with the twilight of 
antiquity. It learnt the lesson contained in the aims of 
Alexander I when he said in 1809 that Finland had been raised 
to the rank of a nation. Hence the demand for a national 
consciousness: "Swedes we are no longer, Russian we cannot 
become; let us be Finns". It is a theme that has been expressed 
with many variations, first in the letters and exhortations of 
the aristocracy, then in the writings of the intelligentsia. It was 
voiced by swelling numbers of Fennomanes and liberals. 
Finally, it was uttered form the lips of thousands of elementary 
school children, heard in the patriotic songs of countless choirs 
and in many other connections, with different nuances and in 
different forms. 
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Fortunato Minniti 
The role of the armed 
forces in national 
politics (1887 1914) 
1. Chosing a date 
In order to define the role the armed forces have played in 
national policy between the 19th and 20th century we must 
analyze the ways in which such forces have contributed to 
Italian life and, after considering the most important periods, 
choose a date from which to start our discussions. In this 
respect 1887 seems to me to be the most apt, mainly because it 
is equidistant between the establishment of the armed forces of 
the Unified State and their participation in the World War, the 
first difficult, long-term test to which they were subjected. 
However, my interest lies not so much in an analysis of dates 
as in the type of experience gained and the transformations 
undergone by army and navy after 26 years of life and after a 
very disappointing test in the field (1866). 
The army was reformed on the basis of the Prussian model 
(1871-1875); the problem of its command was solved in 1882 
and at the same time the greatest continental military power, 
Germany, and its eternal enemy, Austria-Hungary, showed 
(however relatively and indirectly) that they esteemed its 
quality and capacity by entering into a political alliance with 
Italy, an alliance which could at any moment entail serious 
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military commitment. Moreover, the army had already set foot 
in Africa (1885) and, despite serious conflicts in that continent 
(1887), its German ally was about to entrust a whole sector of 
its Rhine front to the Italian armed forces (composed of 10 to 
12 infantry and 2 to 3 cavalry divisions) in the likelihood of a 
war with France (1888). 
The navy was in full evolution: new types of ships had been 
adopted (battleships, cruisers, destroyers) and a second plan of 
development was rapidly being prepared (1887). 
The armed forces, besides, could also avail themselves of the 
first production of the national war industry (1884-1886). 
They were, therefore, at the peak of a period of expansion 
which was well backed by an increase in military spending 
after sufficiently thorough tests of structures, capacity and 
obligations had been made. This strategic arrangement was to 
remain substantially unchanged until 1908. 
2. The numbers and their significance 
First of all, what was the composition and the strength of the 
army and the navy? 
The Bertole-Viale law was rapidly approved in the first half 
of 1887 and closed the large cycle of organic reforms based on 
the principle of obligatory military service. Such reforms begun 
by Ricotti and continued by Ferrero, brought the number of 
front-line armed regiments to 115 in respect of the infantry (of 
which 12 were for attack — 'Bersaglieri', and 7 were mountain 
troops — 'Alpini') and to 24 in respect of the cavalry. Special 
troops consisted of 43 regiments of artillery (5 for garrisons, 1 
for mountain operations and 1 mounted) and 4 regiments of 
engineers. With the addition of a numerous following of service 
troops (medical, veterinary, disciplinary, accountancy) and 
specialized personnel (military magistrates, geographers, 
topographers, pharmacists, teachers, technicians) these forces 
were governed and administered by 14,208 officers, almost 
11,000 of them trained in combat, and 1,032 specialists. Above 
this was an 'elite' of 479 generals and colonels. All of the 
foregoing was divided into 12 army corps (each with 2 
divisions of infantry, 2 regiments of artillery, 1 regiment of 
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Bersaglieri, 1 regiment of cavalry and service troops), 6 
regiments of cavalry and 7 regiments of alpine forces. In Africa 
another infantry brigade was stationed, reinforced from the 
other troops and composed of volunteers. In the case of war 
another 3 army corps, formed of the youngest soldiers 
finishing service and in the charge of officers in active service, 
could be called up. At the end of the period under 
consideration, the army was strengthened mainly by an 
increase in artillery and corps of engineers (with the addition 
of 10 and 2 regiments respectively) while for cavalry and alpine 
troops the increase (of 5 and 1 regiment respectively) was 
obtained by reducing the number of squadrons and companies 
which composed them. The 6 brigades of cavalry were grouped 
into 3 divisions together with 12 corps of active armed troups 
divided into 4 armies whose command was already established. 
The substance and upper echelons of the corps of officers 
remained substantially unchanged, but there was a significant 
increase in favour of the artillery (585 extra officers, of whom 
13 were colonels). 
The navy in 1890 consisted of 273 ships, total tonnage 311, 
923, armed with 587 items of artillery. There were a mere 736 
captains and 247 assistant engineers and machinists. More than 
20 years later (1911), the navy possessed 342 ships, total 
tonnage 506,755, armed with at least 1,939 items of artillery. 
Captains numbered 999 and assistant engineers and machinists 
411. 
As you can see, this was quite an impressive complex which 
could bring considerable pressure to bear the military 
equilibrium of Europe. A pressure which increased in direct 
proportion to the use of offensive strategies, since the number 
of large units was certainly disproportionate to the re-
quirements of the Italian war theatre. The simple defence of 
Italy's borders, in fact, required less. In particular the North-
Western Alpine arc (which for 30 years was held to be the most 
likely theatre for war) only permitted the marshalling and 
manoeuvre of 5-6 armed corps. But an important point must 
be made. Despite the fact that the navy was undergoing a 
period of intense development the nature of the fleet was not 
such as to rival the French (while it was more than sufficient to 
confront the Austrian). Now, politicians, army and navy were 
all well aware of Italy's naval weakness and of how this would 
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affect its land forces: landings on some points of the Tuscan 
coast could easily take by surprise all the defensive battalions 
stationed on the Paduan plain, at the foot of the Alps and 
among the mountains. The very capital itself was exposed to sea 
attack; and finally, for mobilization, long stretches of railway 
line ran along the coast. These fears, not unreasonable nor 
unfounded, originated from the fact that an entire army, in 
case of war, had to be assigned to the defence of the most 
exposed points of the peninsula. Here the naval forces were 
insufficient to guarantee safety either directly, given the extent 
of the coast, or, more importantly, indirectly, having to cruise 
in open sea in order to drive away the enemy fleet. But since 
such a duty of defence was mainly entrusted to corps of 
reserves, 12 active corps were always available for defence 
alone. 
3. Reasons for lack of balance 
Most of the resources destined for military expediture obviously 
went to the army. Only 18.80 % of effective expediture was 
reserved for the navy in the first 10 years after Unification, 
falling to 16.66 % in the second decade and rising to 23,31 % 
in the third. This increase was enough to ensure a great 
improvement in the quality of Italy's fleet so that, although 
only for a few years, it was ranked third in the world after the 
British and French. The moment in which expenditure on the 
navy was increased in relation to the rest of the aimed forces 
can be dated to the mid-1880s (when it reached 25 %). At the 
end of the century it exceeded 30 % and this level was 
maintained for the first 5 years of the new century. Between 
1906 and 1913 the percentage rose to 35 % and finally 43 %. 
However, land forces have always been a determining factor 
in Italian military arrangements. A factor which can be 
described as characteristic, because if one speaks of the role of 
the armed forces in the life of a country one principally has to 
speak of the army, and this may come as a surprise to those 
who consider, as we must, the geography of Italy. Although 
Italy has a relatively narrow and easily defended territorial 
border (apart from a small section of the Eastern frontier), she 
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has a very extensive shoreline which is completely unsafe. In 
spite of this, the State's military structures are markedly 
terrestrial in nature. The relatively small naval budget is 
explained by the logic or army 'privilege', which I will here 
explain. 
Why, I ask myself, in a country surrounded on almost all 
sides by the Mediterranean, is the army considered so much 
more important that the navy? The reason I can offer, without 
going too far back in time, is_ three-fold. Firstly the conditions 
in which the Unification of Italy was achieved, through a 
process directed by a State, the Kingdom of Sardegna, whose 
politico-military traditions were of a strictly continental 
nature; the ravages of war and attacks of a decidedly 
terrestrial nature; the opposition, finally, of a power, the 
Habsburg Empire, which only looked onto a landlocked sea, 
the Adriatic. Secondly, we must bear in mind the lack of 
confidence which the navy inspired and inspires in political 
parties — a navy which in practice arose from a mechanical 
lumping together of the fleets and officers of two very different 
states: Sardinia and that of the two Sicilies, which were 
shortly to be shaken by a major defeat. Thirdly, for 20 years the 
new State had lacked its own strategy of expansionist policy 
while the policies that prevailed were those dictated by the 
need to coordinate and preserve the recent unity, threatened 
during the whole of the 1860s by a single hostile country, 
Austria-Hungary, and then by two when France joined the 
former. Only in the 1860s did the maritime element become an 
essential component in Italian defensive strategy, but it was 
then not given all the consideration it deserved. In the early 
years of the 1870s, in comparison with the large-scale reforms 
of the army, the modernization of the navy (carried out thanks 
to an extraordinary man, Benedetto Brin who will be 
influential in this field for the next 20 years) aroused less 
interest because it was of less social and political importance. 
In the middle of the 1980s a different attitude was taken, but 
the prevalent mentality of the past lingered stubbornly on and 
this, coupled with the weakness of the armament industries, 
prevented faster progress from being made. 
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4. Power and Strategies 
Having remarked on the characteristics of the armed forces we 
must now ask ourselves what, their effective value was, 
resulting from their degree of (theoretical) power and 
(practical) reliability. The value, that is, that political and 
governmental powers could rely on if forced to decide between 
war and peace, diplomacy and use of force. In other words, 
how did the army and navy figure as a deterrent and what 
chances of success did they have if they actually had to be 
employed? Since the armed forces were certainly quantitatively 
and qualitatively sufficient for defensive use, I would reply to 
the first question by saying that their threat potential was 
indisputable, though more toward Austria-Hungary than 
France given the inferiority of the fleet. I am less convinced of 
their chances of success if actually called upon to attack on 
account of the time needed for mobilization — which usually 
took about a month — but also because of the difficulties which 
the terrain presented close to the frontier — which was a 
disadvantage to attackers but aided the defence. In fact, it is 
true that the adoption of an offensive strategy in the case of 
war with France was subordinate to an alliance with other 
powers. 
The Italian armed forces had also been tried out (against 
Austria) in coalition with the French and Prussians. The 
military convention of 1888 provided, as we have said, that 
about half the Italian army should fight on the Franco-German 
front (utilizing these troops to the full in an explicit 
recognition of their efficiency). From a naval point of view it 
was necessary to wait until 1900. An agreement on balance of 
forces was made with the Austrians in Italy's favour, allowing 
the release of her fleet from the defence of the Adriatic basin 
and successively (1913) from that .of the Ionian. 
Anti-French alternative strategies to the sending of forces 
into Germany through Austria were elaborated by the Italian 
General Staff both before and after the convention of '88. But 
the obstacle presented by the Alps and various fortifications 
always rendered plans in this direction dangerous to such an 
extent that even the violation of Swiss neutrality in the event 
of Austrian opposition to the transit of Italian forces through 
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its territory (1900-1907) and the possibility of a landing in 
Provence (1912) were studied. The Convention was thus based 
on a very precise, carefully prepared and continually updated 
strategy whose only weak point was more political than 
military, that is the attitude of Austria-Hungary. 
The latent reasons for the opposition of the Empire to Italy 
not only rendered the application of the Convention dubious at 
some times but also induced the Italian state to prepare 6 plans 
of war (between 1885 and 1913) despite the alliance. These, 
which all centred around the Trentino "wedge" along whose 
sides the Italian troops were to be marshalled, provided for a 
decisive battle in the Trentino as a necessary first step prior to 
an offensive beyond the river Isonzo. The last two plans (1909 
and 1913) together with a seventh prepared in 1914 to re-
inforce the system of fortifications along the Eastern front, 
were precautions taken in a different politico-strategic 
situation from the previous one in that Austria-Hungary was 
again considered hostile. 
All things considered, I think it is quite clear that the Triple 
Alliance was a very efficient protective measure against both 
Austria-Hungary and France. It also seems clear that the 
armed forces' influence in attaining a high level of Italian 
security was very important and represented their most valid 
contribution to foreign policy. 
5. Internal Order 
Of equal importance, however, was their influence on home 
affairs. Governments, in fact, found the army to be a responsive 
and safe instrument with which to keep public order. In the 
first decade following Unification it was used in repeated, 
large-scale and complex operations (stamping out southern 
brigand activity and uprisings, also in search-operations) and 
in the normal keeping of public order. In the 1890s the army's 
assistance was required in a task which was a direct result of 
this, when a state of siege was proclaimed in Sicily in 1894; 
four years later it was again required to reaffirm the State's 
authority in Milan, half of Lombardy, Tuscany and Naples. But 
no longer; as in the 1860s, with the general consent of all 
politicians. 
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The harshness of the repression appeared, in fact, to some of 
them, and not only the left, to be out of all proportion to the 
danger of the demonstrations. So much so that the military lost 
a considerable amount of popular and also bourgeois support 
— support which had already been shaken by the African wars 
and which had never failed before in difficult moments. 
The keeping of public order, though important, was only one 
of the daily duties of commands and troops working at the 
orders of the political authorities. Nor was it always a popular 
duty. Troops were frequently called upon to assist the populace 
not only in cases of great calamity but also in smaller 
incidents: providing a means of contact between army and 
country which we will expand upon later. The impression from 
what I have so far said that the armed forces were completely 
subordinate to the political powers in external, internal and 
civil defense leads me first of all to approach the crucial 
problem of the relationship between politics and army. 
6. Political Influence 
The figure of the military officer has always been held in 
respect by the public (only in a moment of deep crisis at the 
turn of the century did this esteem waver when the enrolment 
of cadres lagged and resignations abounded, coinciding with 
the significant changeover from upper to middle class as 
provider of new officers); the ruling class considered the armed 
forces, which had already been the instrument of national 
unification, to be the ultimate guarantee of the State's internal 
and external unity. Precisely as such they could not fail to 
have a political influence, and I think it possible to define this 
by looking at the changes in balance of power at the top of the 
military hierarchy and between the latter and the Government. 
The nomination of the Army's Chief of Staff was technically 
at least ten years late because of the pre-existing structure of 
command of the Savoy monarchy: the Minister of War was 
responsible both politically and technically since the Sovereign 
was Chief Commander. When the appointment of a Chief of 
Staff could no longer be delayed — in the context of bringing 
Italian military systems into line with European — the relevant 
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legislation was ambiguous, but the division of power with the 
creation of two authorities — political (Minister), and technical 
(Chief of Staff) — was established. It is difficult to say when 
the latter became more prominent than the former, but it was 
certainly the case in the early 1890s, and in 1900 Chief of Staff 
was officially, not only in fact (as was already the case at the 
end of the 1980s) responsible for the preparation of war plans 
and military agreements with allies, always of course, with the 
Sovereign's agreement. 
Still later came the creation of a Chief of Staff of the Navy. 
There had been a Chief Research Officer dealing with "war 
preparations" working at the orders of the Minister of the 
"Superior Navy Council" (a collegiate body) from 1884 to 1889 
who then, from 1889 to 1907, operated inside the Ministerial 
structure (in a "State and Cabinet Office".) Only in 1907 did 
the Chief become autonomous upon a redefinition of the 
responsibilities of the various ministerial offices and upper 
echelons of the hierarchy (Committee of Admirals), possibly 
because of the larger scope given by the navy to collegiate 
institutions, which, in the army, were only introduced much 
later. 
A "Civil" Minister of War was appointed in 1908 while a 
parliamentary commission was enquiring into the functioning 
of the institution. But this was a much smaller concession 
("Army Council") than the Navy's, since the determining 
elements were merely the Chief of Staff and the four army 
commanders. The Minister, although Chairman, had no right to 
vote; neither had the President of the Council of Ministers at 
the "Supreme Joint Commission for the Defence of the State" 
(created in 1899), whose President was always a member of the 
House of Savoy. 
The years 1907-1908 thus also represent a turning point in 
politico-military operations. Lying behind the Executive and 
Legislative Committees' system of control of military orga-
nizations was a recognition of the clear difference between the 
two fields of responsibility, political and military, that had 
been created. Such a division quickly became worlds apart on 
conclusion of the process which I have placed as beginning at 
the start of the 1880s. Such a process had inevitably been put 
in motion, on the one hand, by the influence of increased 
technology on the military profession, that is by its spe- 
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cialization, and on the other by the progressive growth of a 
society which was becoming more and more divided into 
military and political elites. There were obvious signs that 
Society had assumed different positions from those of the 2nd 
half of the 19th century — thanks also to the development of 
forces which were hostile to the liberal system of politics and 
the institutions thereto related. 
Long before 1908 the most important military men, although 
remaining obedient to the political power as regards 
employment of forces (thus precluding the problem of 
militarism for Italy), were able to reject any direct influence 
(felt to be "extraneous") of politicians in the carrying out of the 
'home' affairs of their institutions. This separation had great 
political significance because it showed that in the running of 
the State the armed forces played a role that was certainly 
greater than that of the Legal and Administrative bodies. This 
was not only on account of their sensitive function but also 
because of their social importance. (At least 200,000 people at 
the beginning of the century depended on this profession 
against 330,000 in all other public bodies). The higher grades 
were in direct and constant contact with the Sovereign — 
although without constituting a "Crown Party". However, 
since the armed forces did not have an autonomous political 
role and a certain number of their personnel participated in 
both governmental and opposition positions in politics, 
especially in the 1880s and 1890s, the separation was not 
politically destabilizing. The authority of the Executive and 
Legislative Committee was not threatened. Politicians, 
however, ended up by granting the military powers complete 
autonomy of choice bot in governing the cadres and in solving 
problems of a not necessarily technical nature. This allowed 
them to maintain a high level of cohesion in the officer corps, 
permitting individual opinions to be expressed but forbidding 
the formation by officers of movements in support of different 
causes which might lead to factions or groups in conflict with 
the administration. There had been the case of a so-called 
"Modernistic" movement led by a subaltern officer in 1903 who 
had voiced the discontent of the more junior ranks of officers 
and non-commissioned officiers encountering in this the almost 
immediate hostility of the military hierarchy. 
The main consequence of this separation thus lay in the fact 
144 
that not only the Executive Committee (also through the 
redimensioning of the role of Minister) but also, as a result, the 
Legislative Committee, lost their chance of directly par-
ticipating in decisions relating to the most important matters. 
All that was left them respectively was the presentation of such 
ideas to the politicians or the approval or rejection of them by 
voting accordingly. 
As you can see, the influence exerted by the armed forces 
was enormous and the relationship between the hierarchy and 
politicians, founded on an increasingly sharp distinction in 
duties, functioned smoothly so long as neither of the two 
parties changed its basic composition. And in the post-war 
period it was always the politicians who changed position, 
while the armed forces adapted to such a change to symbolize 
their basic continuity. 
7. Their Influence on Society 
But the Italian military institution did not exist merely in 
relation to politics, which in this period (up to 1913) was the 
expression of a limited few. It also functioned in respect to 
those citizens who were excluded from political life. Its impact 
on society took place through compulsory military service 
which meant, for society, the form of a draft. Compulsory 
service, however, did not yet mean for the Italian State that all 
men judged fit and of drafting age could or had to do service. 
In addition to numerous exceptions and rejections on health 
grounds, the call-up, for financial reasons, of a small number 
(chosen by lottery) of the eligible category reduced the number 
of conscripted and trained men to a quarter of the whole in the 
1880s. Such a proportion, which rose by a small percentage in 
the early 1890s, began to drop at the end of the decade, and 
was drastically reduced in the first 5 years of the 1900s. It then 
began to rise and reached 34.46 % in 1914. Thus the proportion 
of men performing military service rose from a quarter to just 
over a third. This was not very high, and even allowed the 
drafting of over one million conscripts who had been declared 
unfit (at least half of them from the more elderly categories) 
during the war years. The influence exerted by compulsory 
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military service does not, therefore, seem so serious, especially 
if one considers that it was not equally distributed through the 
regions of Italy. The South and the Islands contributed on a 
smaller scale than other regions, mainly because of increasingly 
massive emigration, but also — undeniably — through the 
people's feeling of complete alienation to the State. These very 
same reasons were probably responsible for the whole 
phenomenon of draft-evaders which in the middle of the 1880s 
rose constantly, until from just under 3 % it reached 10 % in 
1911 and 12 % in 1915. 
If we consider, as we must, compulsory military service as a 
symbol — and for many years the only one — of the active 
participation of citizens in the life of the State, we are forced to 
conclude that neither the lower, higher nor middle classes 
could accept it or were willing to oblige. In particular the 
latter were disinclined to take advantage of one year's military 
service (as from 1871) to keep professional cadres in their jobs 
and thus establish a more efficient communication between 
civilian society and the military institution. 
8. The Economic Burden 
A fact of undeniable importance on both a political and 
economic level was that in the period from Unification to the 
eve of the First World War, governments allotted an average of 
25 % of the State's budget to the armed forces. This equalled 
half the amount available for intervention in key sectors of the 
country's life (in that payment of interest on the public debt 
and administrative expenses inexorably eroded the other half 
of the budget). Amongst other things, it shows us in economic 
terms the importance that the ruling class placed on the armed 
forces and how anxious they where that such a percentage 
should not rise by 5-10 % so as to jeopardise the economic 
and financial equilibrium of the country. There were two 
periods — the end of the 1880s and the period between 1906 
and the war — when military funds were more readily 
available than usual, and this was mainly during the deep 
crisis of the 1890s. 
The question which is often asked is whether this fluctuating 
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but continuous movement of resources was or was not an 
efficient stimulus for economic development through the active 
demand for goods and services it activated. In particular, in 
this period, acquisition of industrial materials shifted from the 
external to the internal market for goods with high 
technological content (large and medium artillery, ship's 
motors, steel plates for battleships). When, in fact, the Navy 
wanted to rid itself of foreign dependence it directly and 
indirectly caused the growth or birth of private iron and steel 
industries, private mechanical and naval industries —
including those founded on foreign capital like Terni, 
Armstrong, Ansaldo, Guppy, Vickers-Terni — while the Army's 
demand could primarily be satisfied by a similar number of 
state-owned arsenals, factories and plants. The army's demand, 
in fact, was only later directed to private war industries. 
Ultimately the industries to benefit from military expenditure 
were the iron and steel, mechanical, chemical (whether private 
or State-owned) and "traditional" leather and wood industries, 
together with construction and various tertiary components. A 
young and brilliant scholar and writer, Francesco Saverio Nitti, 
lamented in this respect that the benefits were not equally 
distributed and were to the South's disadvantage. It is also 
indisputable that there was a disproportion as regards the size 
of the sectors and plants, and the characteristics of the 
technologies used; these were marketing considerations which 
showed the Unified State to be the purchaser of the products of 
one, or very few producers. However, I think I may conclude by 
saying that the advantages on the whole outweighed the 
disadvantages. 
9. The "National" Army 
The close link between the armed forces and the nation thanks 
to the former's participation in the achievement of Unification 
and, more precisely, because of the determining influence they 
had had in wars and armed encounters throughout the period 
did not weaken as time passed. Their participation in national 
politics was, for better or worse, intense. International 
relationships and the internal security of the State — to the 
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extent that it was determined by politicians — could not do 
without their intervention. Their presence was marked in both 
society and economy. And their progressive independence from 
politics, which had definitely been brought about by Adua and 
the states of siege between 1894 and 1898, meant that although 
the public eye lost sight of them their relationship with the 
nation was certainly not severed. In fact, the cadres' education 
and system of values and the indoctrination of the troops 
always found constant application in the nation, or, to use an 
all-embracing term, homeland (Patria), which united people 
and dynasty rather than the more sober term State (with its 
political overtones). Consequently it is not surprising that the 
armed forces represented the professional class socially more 
exposed to the influence of nationalist ideology. 
This was so for a variety of reasons such as mutual 
recognition of traditions and the national ethos; mutual 
aspiration to national power; respect for the principle of 
hierarchy; attitude towards industrialization, which was seen, 
contradictorialy, with suspicion (as a subverter of social 
traditions and with regard to tested and "safe" war weapons) 
and also with fervour (as a promoter of development and new 
war techniques which could give material superiority); and 
finally, on account of the state of political ill-being for 
nationalism and of technical-professional, social and economic 
ill-being for the armed forces. 
To these common values we must add the obvious 
'nationalist' recognition of the armed forces, the military 
stronghold of the nation, and the adoption of a military 
program (formulated by an officer in service with the 
authorization of his superiors) which did not basically move 
away from the objectives of the Army's Staff and which was 
therefore directed at strengthening military preparations on the 
land and sea borders with Austria. 
However, on the whole the cadres and their higher echelons 
did not openly side, as an institution, with the nationalists nor 
could they do so. There were many reasons: first of all their 
"need to be separate", fruit of their detachment from the 
political world; then the tendency of the nationalist movement 
to transform itself from a movement of the élite into a 
movement of the masses, towards which hierarchies are always 
diffident; also unattractive was the presence in the movement 
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of promoters and followers of "dissident" military policies: 
(some "modernists" and Enrico Barone). Finally, the myth of 
Italy as a Great Power did not find much following in the 
armed forces. This was so because recent results on the 
battlefield did not permit it, nor did the possibility of 
employment of these forces in a future large-scale international 
conflict, subject as Italy was, after all, to an alliance; nor, for 
the moment, did the memory of having laboriously climbed up 
the hill since 1906 and the daily difficulties encountered in 
doing so. All this did not allow the armed forces to assume that 
attitude of trust and abandonment to a glorious past and future 
which nationalism required of its followers. 
If, however, the armed forces could not adhere to the 
movement they could at least regard it with sympathy. Nor, let 
us be clear, did the nationalists desire otherwise. For a 
qualified representative of the movement like Luigi Federzoni 
the army, in fact, should be "independent of the nature of the 
State it is called to defend; it need be only national; The Army 
must know how to keep quiet and do nothing else but keep 
quiet." Political silence was thus the great virtue of this 
"national" army (a virtue which in reality was not imposed but 
derived from its character and its most recent past, not to 
mention — as we now know — its future). Such an army 
largely replaced the "Risorgimento" army when the men of the 
1840 generation retired from the scene — the last generation to 
have a direct experience of the facts and passions of that great 
period when the armed forces too, along with the politicians, 
turned a nation into a State. In comparison things are quite 
different for the armed forces now, when the prevailing trend is 
to reject the political content of the life of the State, thus 
impoverishing the armed forces' very relationship with the 
nation and reducing it to a simple defence of dynasty and 
territorial integrity, interior order and the attainment of an 
abstract power in an international field. 
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Alberto Monticone 
Probleme und 
Perspektiven einer 
Kulturgeschichte des 
italienischen Volkes 
während des Ersten 
Weltkrieges 
Meine kurzen und allgemeinen Betrachtungen gehen — ausser 
von einem persönlichen Interesse — von zweierlei Beobachtun-
gen aus, die sich beim Überfliegen der Geschichtsschreibung 
über den Ersten Weltkrieg machen lassen: einerseits ist ein 
Punkt erreicht worden, an dem eine Kulturgeschichte der un-
teren Volksschichten fällig scheint, andererseits wurde jedoch 
deutlich, dass der Wille zur Inangriffnahme einer Geschichte 
der Gesellschaft in ihrem alltäglichen Ablauf weitgehend fehlt. 
Es hat sich nahezu ein Widerspruch gebildet zwischen einem 
vielfältigen Anstoss zur Schreibung einer Geschichte des Ersten 
Weltkrieges aus der Sicht des Volkes und der Unentschlossen-
heit, die Untersuchungen dazu mit einer für andere Epochen 
der italienischen Geschichte gültigen Methode auszuführen. Es 
handelt sich augenscheinlich nicht bloss um — sicherlich vor-
handene — Schwierigkeiten in Bezug auf das Quellenmaterial, 
sondern auch um eine gewisse Voreingenommenheit, die man 
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— sei es auch nur rückwirkend — der Bedeutung der damali-
gen Ereignisse und den zahlreichen, in der bürgerlichen Kultur 
und im Volke entstandenen Mythen zuzuschreiben hat. 
Um aus der durch diese Mythen geschaffenen Voreingenom-
menheit herauszufinden, sollte man vor allem vermeiden, diese 
zu bekämpfen, stattdessen wäre in Geschichtsschreibung und 
Forschung an die Ausarbeitung einer dem Objekt der Unter-
suchung angepassten und dem heutigen Geschichtsverständ-
nis entsprechenden Arbeitsmethode zu gehen. Ich meine damit 
eine Geschichte, die das tägliche Leben einzelner Menschen 
oder Gruppen (vor allem von Familienverbänden) berücksich-
tigt, die die Beziehungen zwischen den historischen Ereignis-
sen und den alltäglichen Vorgängen des menschlichen Lebens 
aufzeigt und die die wechselseitigen Einflüsse des Alltäglichen 
und der Politik beleuchtet, kurz die Darstellung der Umrisse 
der Volkskultur und der darin zu beobachtenden Veränderun-
gen im Italien zwischen Giuliotti, Salandra und Mussolini. 
Bei dieser Betrachtungsweise erweist es sich als nötig, zuerst 
für das Jahr 1915 die Formen und das Ausmass des Patriotis-
mus in den unteren Schichten des Volkes festzustellen, das 
heisst die Auswirkungen und den Grad der Übernahme der in 
den vorangegangenen zwei Jahrzehnten propagierten patrioti-
schen Ideen zu erfassen. Allerdings schenkte die bisherige Ge-
schichtsschreibung den Quellen, die diesen Vorgang der Propa-
gierung des Patriotismus von oben und dessen Übernahme 
durch die unteren Schichten beleuchten, wenig Aufmerksam-
keit. Viele Fragen über die Zusammenhänge zwischen dem Na-
tionalismus und Patriotismus der herrschenden Klassen und 
der Aufnahme dieser Ideen in den unteren Volksschichten sind 
bis heute nur unzureichend beantwortet. Im folgenden ein 
rasch zusammengestellter Katalog von Fragen, die miteinzube-
ziehen wären in eine solche Untersuchung: die territoriale Aus-
dehnung des italienischen Staates; die Idee der "Italianitå" 
selbst; die Auswanderung und ihre Wirkung auf die Idee der 
Italianitå; der König; der Begriff des Feindes (der Österreicher, 
der Deutsche oder der Negus, der Schwarze, der Andere); die 
territoriale Expansion mit dem Ziel der Gewinnung neuen Kul-
turlandes; die Funktion der Frau im Patriotismus (Mutter von 
zukünftigen Soldaten, Erzieherin); die Idee des Krieges und des 
Kriegsdienstes als Virilitätsbeweis; die Wirkung der Uniformen, 
der Fanfaren, der Nationalfeiertage usw. Man könnte diese Li- 
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ste natürlich fortsetzen und die tieferen Schichten in der Men-
talität des Volkes zu erforschen suchen, aber wichtiger scheint 
die Erkenntnis, dass eine neue Methode zusammen mit einem 
neuen Geschichtsverständnis zu den für eine gültige Antwort 
brauchbarsten Quellen führen wird. Im folgenden einige dieser 
Quellen, die dabei berücksichtigt werden sollten: die mündlich 
überlieferten Lieder, Sprichwörter, Gedichte und Erzählungen; 
die Quellen zur Aushebung und Ausbildung der Truppen; die 
Quellen über das Schulwesen (Lesebücher, Register, Berichte 
der Lehrer und Rektoren, Hausaufgaben, Lehranweisungen); 
der Briefweschsel der Soldaten, der afrikanischen Siedler, der 
Auswanderer; das Volkstheater, Plakate; Verlautbarungen 
kirchlicher Würdenträger, Predigten, Gefallenenmessen, Dank-
sagungen; illustrierte Volkszeitungen, Zeitschriften, Romane, 
Bücher und Kataloge der Volksbibliotheken und fahrender Bi-
bliotheken; Heiligenbilder, Devotionalien, Ex Voto; Tagebücher 
von pädagogisch tätigen Leuten aus der Oberschicht (Priester, 
Lehrer, Offiziere, Politiker, Ärzte); Kinderspiele und Kinderli-
teratur und schliesslich auch Quellen "sui generis" (Lieder und 
Hymnen öffentlicher Musikkapellen, Veranstaltungsanzeigen, 
Abfahrts — und Ankunftslisten von Schiffen und Truppenein-
heiten, Informationen über öffentliche Vorbeimärsche usw.). 
Vergleicht man diese Aufzählung der Desiderata mit dem bis-
her Vorliegenden, so wird deutlich, wie wenig hier geleistet 
worden ist; über die tatsächliche Penetration der historischen 
und patriotischen Ideen ins Bewusstsein des Volkes weiss man 
ausser in Bezug auf einzelne politische Splittergruppen oder 
von politischen Parteien abhängige Korporationen (Sozialisten, 
Republikaner, Katholiken, Anarchisten) kaum etwas. Anderer-
seits ist auch festzustellen, dass viele dieser ideellen Faktoren 
im Volk über den Ersten Weltkrieg hinaus erhalten und ver-
schiedentlich noch im Faschismus und während der Übergangs-
periode von der Widerstandsbewegung zur Republik wirksam 
blieben. Ebenso stösst es sicherlich auf Schwierigkeiten, den 
realen Pazifismus der Massen, z.B. der Bauern zu verstehen, 
noch mehr betrifft dies die Mentalität der in der Armee einge-
teilten Bauern. 
Wir haben in der Tat bessere Informationen über die Frontsol-
daten und über die Formen der Auseinandersetzung in der Öf-
fentlichkeit oder in der Familie, es lässt sich jedoch noch wenig 
aussagen über die Beweggründe, die zum Aufbruch in den 
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Krieg führten sowie über die Veränderungen, die die Begeg-
nung mit dem Krieg an der Idee des Vaterlandes und des Staa-
tes bei den Bauern auslöste. Auch über die alltäglichen Lebens-
formen auf dem Lande erfährt man aus den Untersuchungen 
fast nichts, es liegen lediglich einige Studien vor über die Hand-
arbeit der Frauen und über die bedeutendsten Volksfeste. Voll-
kommen fehlen schliesslich Analysen der religiösen und zivilen 
Rituale im Zusammenhang mit Krieg und Frieden, der Umfor-
mungsprozesses der Bildungsinhalte und der Lebensweise in 
den verschiedenen Schichten. 
Man könnte einwenden, dass hier nun lediglich ein "Neophi-
lologismus" betrieben werde, der einfach anstelle der Ober-
schichten das Volk zum Gegenstand habe. Um diesem Einwand 
zu begegnen, sollte man meiner Meinung nach die Untersuchun-
gen auf drei parallelen Ebenen vorantreiben: 1) durch serielle 
Untersuchungen, wie sie bereits für andere Epochen Anwen-
dung fanden; 2) durch die weniger auf die Rekonstruktion des 
Individuellen, sondern mehr des Spezifischen abzielenden Un-
tersuchungen modalen Charakters, die sich mit den Denkwei-
sen, den Verhaltens- und Arbeitsweisen sowie den Kommunika-
tionsarten bei den verschiedenen Schichten in den einzelnen 
Regionen unter verschiedenen Bedingungen befassen; 3) durch 
die Verlagerung des Betrachtungsschwerpunktes von der Front 
auf das Heim, um die Variationen des Alltäglichen in ihren ty-
pischen Funktionen sowie im Gesamtbild zu erfassen. Es emp-
fiehlt sich ausserdem, das Thema "Volk" nicht von den vielfäl-
tigen Beziehungen mit den führenden Schichten und mit den 
politischen Vorgängen zu isolieren, bei denen die Unter-
schichten — wenn auch marginal — beteiligt waren. 
Es reicht indessen nicht aus, den Schwerpunkt der Untersu-
chung zu wechseln und den Bauern in den Mittelpunkt des In-
teresses zu rücken anstelle des Bürgers oder den Soldaten an-
stelle des Offiziers; dies kann — wie bereits in anderem Zusam-
menhang geschehen — schwerwiegende Missverständnisse und 
eine Pseudorevision seitens der Geschichtsschreibung mit sich 
bringen. Eine wirkliche Revision und eine grössere Validität 
der Geschichtsschreibung kann nur durch eine andere Metho-
denwahl herbeigeführt werden, die von einer übergreifenden 
Gesamtidee und von einem echten menschlichen und sozialen 
Interesse für das Gedankengut des Volkes ausgehen sollte. Die 
zahlreichen Querverbindungen zu den übrigen, meist dominie- 
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renden Bildungsschichten der Gesellschaft sollten dabei aller-
dings nicht ausser Acht gelassen werden. Man setze nicht eine 
Geschichte der Besiegten gegen die der Sieger — wie dies in 
der Geschichtsschreibung über das "Risorgimento" vielfach ge-
schehen ist — sondern bemühe sich, um bei diesem Bild zu blei-
ben, eine Geschichte des Ersten Weltkrieges sowohl von der ei-
nen wie auch von der anderen Seite aus zu schreiben, zusam-
men oder getrennt, vorausgesetzt man geht von einer gemeinsa-
men Perspektive aus; dies auch deshalb, weil diese hypotheti-
sche innere Frontlinie keineswegs undurchlässig war, zumin-
dest nicht für fünfte Kolonnen, mehr oder weniger bewusste 
Deserteure und beispielsweise auch das Rote Kreuz. Man sollte 
nicht den Fehler wiederholen, der bereits einmal in den Jahren 
1945 bis ca. 1960 anlässlich einer Revision der Geschichts-
schreibung über das Risorgimento gemacht wurde, als eine Wie-
dereinsetzung der Bedeutung der Besiegten in jener Zeit ver-
sucht wurde, während man sie in Wirklichkeit von der Sozial-
geschichte, in der sie eingebettet waren und aus der sie eine 
weit klarere und der Wirklichkeit besser entsprechende ge-
schichtliche Wertung hätten gewinnen können, isolierte. 
Inwieweit befindet sich nun die Geschichtsschreibung über 
den Ersten Weltkrieg bereits auf dem angegebenen Weg? Ich 
glaube nicht, dass dies der Augenblick ist, um eine bibliographi-
sche Übersicht über die anzuwendende Arbeitshypothese anzu-
fertigen, man sollte eher im Rahmen eines allgemeineren Ur-
teils herauszufinden versuchen, welche der bisher erreichten 
Resultate brauchbar scheinen. 
Für die Neutralitätsperioden konnte festgestellt werden, dass 
die grosse nationale Debatte die Masse der unteren Schichten 
mit Ausnahme einiger fortschrittlicher Arbeiterzellen nicht er-
reichte. Die hier weitgehend als Quelle benutzten Berichte der 
Präfekten liefern Informationen über das Interesse oder die 
Apathie die Bevölkerung; aus diesen und aus ähnlichen Quel-
len lässt sich entnehmen, dass die Idee des Vaterlandes auf dem 
Lande an das Bild des Emigranten gebunden war und dass das 
Bild des Feindes vielfältig und widersprüchlich blieb; für die 
Piemontesen war der Feind der Franzose, für die Lombarden 
und die Veneter der Deutsche, für die Süditaliener eine mythi-
sche Personifizierung des Türken, des Negus, des Deutschen 
oder des ausbeuterischen Fremden. Der Interventionismus stellt 
sich in Süditalien als ein Problem der städtischen und bürgerli- 
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chen Schichten heraus, das die umliegenden Landgebiete unbe-
rührt liess; erwähnt seien hier die Feststellungen von Persön-
lichkeiten wie Nitti oder Fortunato. 
In der Zeit der Neutralität wurde der Krieg als Plage angese-
hen, und selbst in der Kirchenpredigt ertönte der auf den Krieg 
gemünzte Ausruf: a peste et tempestate libera nos Domine. Der 
König und die Regierenden wurden als Hüter und Garanten 
dieses Schutzes angesehen, so dass die Bischöfe in der Folge 
grösste Mühe hatten, der Idee des Gehorsams gegenüber der 
Autorität des Staates genügend ethischen Inhalt zu geben, um 
den bisher als Plage aufgefassten Krieg moralisch akzeptabel 
zu machen. Das libysche Abenteuer, die Enttäuschungen der 
Kolonialbestrebungen und die Aushebungen unter der bäuerli-
chen Bevölkerung vestärkten jedoch nur die Auffassungen vom 
Krieg als Plage. In den Jahren 1914/15 schienen jedenfalls die 
Wiedereingliederung der Emigranten und die Versorgungslage 
nach dem Erdbeben weit wichtigere Probleme. Auch der anti-
deutsche Mythos war noch nicht verbreitet — im Gegenteil, Be-
wunderung und Hoffen auf Unterstützung prägten hier das 
Bild. Informationen aus dem Norden erreichten die unteren 
Schichten Süditaliens oft besser über die in den Häfen ankern-
den Schiffe als über Rom, und überspitzt könnte man sogar for-
mulieren, dass Nachrichten aus dem übrigen Italien die südita-
lienische Landbevölkerung auf dem Umweg über Amerika er-
reichten. 
Nach der Kriegserklärung schuf sich das Volk eine eigene, 
von der offiziellen und nationalen abweichende Einteilung der 
Kriegsperioden, die nach Regionen und sogar dort noch unter-
schiedlich gegliedert wurde. Die Rythmen wurden durch die 
Jahreszeiten, Naturereignisse und Ernten bestimmt, unterbro-
chen nur durch die ersten Wellen von Todesfällen. Im ersten 
Kriegsjahr veränderten vor allem kirchliche Veranstaltungen 
zugunsten des Friedens oder für Gefangene diesen Rythmus; 
des weiteren machte sich bereits das Fehlen von Männern bei 
Dorffesten und als Mangel an Arbeitskräften bemerkbar. Die 
Kontakte zwischen Front und Bevölkerung waren spärlich; 
man bekam kaum Bewilligungen für persönliche Begegnungen, 
es herrschte noch Analphabetismus und die Post funktionierte 
schlecht. Im ersten Kriegsjahr wurde der Krieg vor allem als 
"Corvee" aufgefasst. Materielle Hilfe und patriotische Propa-
ganda å la "Salandra" drangen nicht — oder nur am Rande — 
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in ländliche Gebiete und in den Süden ein. Die Idee von der 
zeitlich begrenzten Corvee und das Warten auf den Frühling 
1916 als Ende des Kriegsdienstes waren die Hauptmerkmale 
der Reaktion des Volkes und der Bauern, die den Anforderun-
gen der Corvee ohne innere Anteilnahme und ohne nach einer 
Erklärung zu fragen Genüge taten. 
In der Periode vom Frühling 1916 bis Februar 1917 mit dem 
Schwerpunkt im Sommer 1916 schwenkte die Volksmeinung 
von der Idee der zeitlich begrenzten Corvee auf die Auffassung 
des Krieges als einer lange andauernden Plage über; dies verän-
derte auch die Einstellung gegenüber dem Kriegsdienst, der 
nicht mehr als etwas Vorübergehendes, sondern als eine Plage 
angesehen wurde, mit der man sich abzufinden hatte. Diese 
neue Auffassung verursachte tiefe Einschnitte in der Volksmen-
talität und führte einerseits zu dem Bemühen, den neuen Anfor-
derungen gerecht zu werden, erzeugte jedoch andererseits auch 
Gefühle der Resignation. Die Mythen entwickelten sich stark; 
der Feind, der in sich alle Schrecken des Krieges vereinigte 
und das fruchtbare Land, das es zu erobern galt; diese Auffas-
sungen wurden allerdings bald von den Briefen der Soldaten 
Lügen gestraft. Die Einnahme Gorizias wurde noch festlich be-
grüsst wie der Endsieg, die sog. Strafexpedition weckte kaum 
noch Emotionen; ausserdem löste sich der Korpsgeist in den 
Schützengräben von der Volksmentalität in den Dörfern. Auch 
auf dem Lande versuchte man die Mobilisierung der Geisteshal-
tung und beschwor in Schule und Rathaus die nationale Ein-
heit sowie erteilte Anweisungen für Hilfsmassnahmen und für 
das Anlegen der Notvorräte. 
Das Charakteristische der nächsten Kriegsperiode vom Früh-
jahr bis Sommer 1917 war der Widerhall, den der Aufruf zur 
Befreiung von der Kriegsplage in den unteren Schichten fand. 
Die bäuerliche Struktur des Dorfes hielt das andauernde 
Fehlen von Arbeitskräften auf die Dauer nicht aus; in der Stadt 
konnten die fehlenden Männer leichter durch Frauen ersetzt 
werden. Die Art der Kundgebungen des Volkes und der Frauen 
zwischen 1916 und 1917 waren nicht nur von spontaner Art 
sondern wiesen auch eine andere Stossrichtung auf als die De-
monstrationen einiger politischer Bewegungen; gefordert wur-
de Unterstützung für die Familien der Einberufenen und Nah-
rungsmittelhilfe — das Volk akzeptierte die Kriegsplage nur 
noch mit Mühe. 
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Der Staat wurde nach der anfänglichen Resignation immer 
mehr als schlechter Vater oder gar als Feind angesehen; im 
Volksempfinden zeichnete sich das Auseinanderbrechen in ver-
schiedene Italien ab. 
Charakteristisch für das letzte Kriegsjahr waren die grossen 
Differenzen, die sich besonders in der Zeit zwischen den 
Schlachten von Capretto und Vittorio Veneto in der Volksmen-
talität zwischen Nord- und Süditalien zeigten: die süditalieni-
sche Frage verschärfte sich entscheidend. Im Norden kamen die 
alten Mythen des "deutschen Feindes" wieder zum Vorschein, 
während zugleich eine vage Politisierung festzustellen war; die 
Menschen fühlten sich persönlich zur Diskussion und Beurtei-
lung des Krieges und zur Mitarbeit aufgerufen. Es bildete sich 
beinahe ein alternatives Volksbewusstsein heraus, sei es defait-
istischer oder patriotischer Natur, aber jedenfalls ein der Regie-
rung entgegengesetztes eigenes Empfinden — das in diesem Zu-
sammenhang wichtige und vom Nationalismus zu unterschei-
dende Phänomen des ursprünglichen Volkspatriotismus harrt 
noch einer näheren Untersuchung. 
In der Volksmentalität des Südens kündete sich nun, nach 
der Corvee, der Kriegsplage und den überstürzten Erwartungen 
das Gefühl an, Objekte einer Fremdherrschaft zu sein, fast ei-
ner Art Besatzungsmacht: wie bereits in der Vergangenheit 
Heere und fremde Mächte das Land beherrscht hatten, so be-
herrschte und verwaltete es jetzt der Staat, um sich selbst zu 
retten. 
Das süditalienische Volk wollte in der Tat über die staatliche 
Besetzung verhandeln in der Hoffnung auf eine Reform der er-
starrten Bodenrechtsverhältnisse; die innere Front Italiens 
verlief eher hier, zwischen dem süditalienischen Volk und der 
Regierung, als zwischen Interventionisten und Neutralisten 
(oder Defaitisten). Das Volk begann ziemlich bald, noch vor 
dem Auftreten der Nachkriegskommission, eine Verhandlungs-
basis in den Beziehungen zu den herrschenden Klassen aufzu-
bauen. 
Aus den Trägern der ständig anschwellenden Flut der patrio-
tischen Propaganda begann sich das Volk jene Protagonisten 
herauszusuchen, die eine patriotische Leistung verlangten und 
von denen man in der Folge auch eine Gegenleistung erwarten 
konnte. In diesem Streben nach einem Do-ut-des-Konsensus 
der Jahre 1917-1918 steckte ein stärkeres Moment des Aus- 
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gleichs als im auferlegten Zwang der vorangegangenen Jahre; 
dies erklärt auch die Verwunderung des demokratischen Inter-
ventionismus, als er sich in der Nachkriegszeit auf Volksebene 
angegriffen sah. Schliesslich möchte ich auch nicht die spani-
sche Epidemie vergessen, die 1918 über eine halbe Million Tote 
forderte: Krieg und Pest gaben sich noch einmal vor den Augen 
des Volkes die Hand. 
Die herrschenden Schichten, aber auch die Arbeiterbewegung 
hatten offensichtlich grosse Mühe mit dieser Vielzahl von Mei-
nungen, die in der letzten Zeit des Krieges im Volke entstanden 
waren, und auf dieser Zersplitterung baute anfänglich auch der 
Faschismus auf, während die nationale Propaganda der Nach-
kriegszeit sich dieses Umstandes nicht bewusst wurde und in 
ihrem Versuch zur Schaffung eines einheitlichen Patriotismus 
scheiterte. 
Von 1964 bis heute wurde in der historischen Forschung be-
reits ein grosses Stück Weges zurückgelegt; man hat das Augen-
merk auf die Belange der Bauern und Arbeiter im Heer und auf 
dem Dorfe gelenkt und Untersuchungen angestellt über die Par-
teien, die öffentliche Meinung, die Wirtschaftsstrukturen, die 
Bürokratie u.a.m. Mir scheint, dass man über das Verhalten der 
Soldaten des Ersten Weltkrieges an der Front und nach der 
Entlassung bereits einen wertvollen Komplex von Studien der 
europäischen Geschichtsschreibung besitzt. Tiefes Dunkel liegt 
dagegen noch über den Auswirkungen des Krieges auf die Fa-
milie: nach der ersten Welle von Geschichtsschreibung über die-
sen Bereich in der kurzen Zeitspanne von 1918 bis in die ersten 
Jahre des Faschismus — charakteristisch sind dafür die Arbei-
ten G. Pratos, L. Einaudis, G. Montaras und der letzten Vertre-
ter der ökonomisch-juristischen Schule — herrscht hier eine 
grosse Leere; die damalige Realität der Landbevölkerung hat 
noch keine genügende Darstellung erfahren, auch wenn ver-
schiedene Forschergruppen aus der Macerata, aus Padua, Turin 
und Rom dazu wichtige Ansätze geliefert haben. Spärlich ist 
auch die Produktion an Untersuchungen, die einen Schnitt an 
einem bestimmten Punkt der zeitlichen Entwicklung darstel-
len; als wichtiger wurden Arbeiten diachronischen und themati-
schen Charakters angesehen. Ein Beispiel dafür sind die von 
Nuto Revelli publizierten Dokumente über die bäuerliche Welt, 
in der die Konstante der Mentalität die Reaktionsdauer auf das 
Unvorhergesehene und auf schnelle Umwälzungen verlängert. 
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Aus der traditionellen Sicht der Geschichtsschreibung kann 
man viel über das Heer, wenig über das Dorf und noch weniger 
über die Verbindung dieser zwei Komponenten derselben Wirk-
lichkeit aussagen. Armee und Dorf, Sieger und Besiegte resul-
tieren so aus den Ergebnissen dieser Geschichtsschreibung als 
konträre Elemente, die sich gegenseitig aufreiben. Nun ist je-
doch offensichtlich der Moment erreicht worden, um im Rah-
men einer Geschichtsschreibung, die die Realität einer Gesell- 
schaft von Grund auf zu verstehen sucht, solche gegensätzliche 
Positionen in einer generellen Perspektive der Volkskultur zu 
überwinden; besondere Aufmerksamkeit muss dabei den thema-
tischen Studien geschenkt werden, die versuchen, die feinen 
und vielfältigen Beziehungen über die inneren Grenzen hinweg 
zu rekonstruieren. 
Wichtig scheinen in diesem Zusammenhang die Beiträge ver-
schiedener Forscher, die an einer Geschichte der italienischen 
Gesellschaft in der Zeit des Übergangs von der europäischen 
Krise des Imperialismus zur Nachkriegszeit arbeiten; hier schei-
nen wegweisendere Ansätze vorzuliegen als in den Einzelunter-
suchungen verschiedener Zeitabschnitte oder Gesellschaftsteile. 
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Pietro Pastorelli 
Italy and the Finnish 
nation, 1917 1919 
This paper has been written with the purpose of discussing the 
attitude taken by Italy towards the independence of the 
Finnish nation from the moment it was declared (Dec. 6, 1917) 
until the day it was recognized by Italy (June 27, 1919). Neither 
for Finland nor for Italy was this to be considered a historic 
event. It does, however, merit some closer attention as it was 
the somewhat laboured beginning of a relationship between the 
two countries which, since then, has always been one of 
friendship, even in periods difficult for both, as I have 
demonstrated in the course of our first meeting at Perugia. 
Prof. Paasivirta has exhaustively dealt with the recognition 
of Finland's independence by the States who won the Great 
War and he has studied Finland's relations with the British, 
French and USA governments in 1918-1919. Naturally he had 
not forgotten that Italy was one of the victorious States, but 
judging its weight inferior to that of the great powers and not 
disposing of Italian sources, he devoted only a few words to the 
Italian attitude: he mentions (p. 37) Orlando, of whom he 
sketches a rapid image, but not Sonnino, who handled the 
whole affair. Also Italian historiography neglected the matter 
— an attitude which is surprising to me, seeing that in Italy 
much thought was given to the subject of nationality during 
the first world war. In some studies the Finnish nation is 
mentioned occasionally, but when this occurs it seems a 
faraway, unknown country to be referred to only for the sake of 
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completeness. Its reality seemed to awaken no more interest 
than that of other national minorities of the Tsarist Empire — 
with the exception of Poland — or of nationalities of the 
Ottoman Empire, as though the "real" nationalities were only 
those that had been "oppressed" by the Habsburg Empire. The 
explanation of this strange lack of interest could be that 
today's studies reflect the various degrees of importance given 
to Italy's relationship with the Austro-Hungarian world as well 
as the Ottoman and Tsarist — the former being near and 
familiar and the other two far away and little known, specially 
the Tsarist. Only very recently Giorgio Petracchi has dedicated 
an excellent study to Italian-Russian relations in the years 
between 1917 and 1925, and in the problem of the Finnish 
nation carries some weight; this is also due — I presume — to 
the conversations I had with him when I published Sidney 
Sonnino's papers. But this can be considered an exception to 
the rule. 
Naturally the situation concerned both sides. For the Finnish 
nation Italy was then a distant and scarcely known reality 
significant only for its art, and the point was overlooked that 
among the most important countries of the Entente Italy was 
the only one which had recently acquired its national 
independence. The first appeal for recognition contained in 
Svinhufvud's message of Dec. 5, 1917 was made to France, 
Great Britain and the USA as well as to the three nearby 
Scandinavian countries, but not to Italy (Kirby, Documents, p. 
203). The Italian government was informed of what was going 
on in Helsinki by the French ambassador in Rome, Barrere, 
who on Dec. 9 received the order to find out if Italy was 
disposed immediately to recognize the new State together with 
the other Western Allies. 
Sonnino's advice was to respond to Svinhufvud's appeal by 
saying that "for the Allies there was no fundamental issue 
opposed to Finland's plea for her independence to be re-
cognized, but that any official decision had to be postponed 
until the situation in Russia had become more stable" 
(Sonnino, Diario, p. 223). Sonnino explained why two 
fundamental reasons existed which spoke against a formal 
recognition: the decision made one week earlier at the Paris 
Conference not to take any action which could be interpreted 
as a complete break-off of the alliance with Russia, and the 
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possibility that the Germans might use the recognition as an 
excuse for trying to demonstrate that the Allies were 
attempting to accelerate the process of the "crumbling" of the 
Russian State. 
It was Sonnino's objective not to discourage those Russians 
who still had feelings of friendship towards Western Allies, in 
the hope of thus favouring their return to power. He had 
succeeded in having his point of view accepted at the Allied 
Conference in Paris and did not now want to see it 
compromised by raising the Finnish question. In fact, the 
breakdown of the Russian State in March 1917 had had a 
special significance for Italy. It represented not only the loss of 
an ally, as had been the case for France and England, but of an 
ally with whom Italy had had to share the burden of the war 
against the Austro-Hungarian State, according to the military 
agreement of May 21, 1915, as stipulated in Article 1 of the 
Treaty of London. One of the fundamental conditions which 
had induced Italy to come into the war had disappeared. The 
consequences could be observed at Caporetto. Now that the 
Bolsheviks had definitely pronounced themselves in favour of 
peace there existed only one alternative for Sonnino: to hope 
that the internal situation in Russia might change after the 
elections. 
The British, the French and the Americans had accepted 
Sonnino's point of view more to demonstrate their solidarity 
towards an ally in difficulty than by conviction, considering his 
policy of waiting too passive to produce the result he was 
hoping for. They immediately took different paths: the 
Americans towards a political answer which was given in 
Wilson's speech of Jan. 8, 1918 which, it was hoped, would 
have its influence on the moderate wing of the new Russian 
Parliament. The British and French on the one hand intensified 
their efforts for a separate peace with the Austro-Hungarian 
State, hoping thus to weaken the enemy's coalition, and on the 
other supported the dismemberment of the Russian State, 
attempting to produce an anti-German line-up in the East. 
As far as the nationalities were concerned, these policies 
differed from each other. Wilson's policy was the most 
coherent, promising the frontiers of 1914 to Russia except in 
the Polish case and the same to the Austro-Hungarian State 
except for adjustments to be made in favour of Italy. The most 
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that the various nationalities could expect was to have their 
autonomy recognized. The British and the French, on their 
part, were also in favour of autonomy for the nationalities of 
the Habsburg Empire, but asked for independence for the 
Russian ones. To sum up; the great powers shaped the 
principle of nationality according to their own interests. 
The same thing happened in Italy in the case of the Finnish 
nation. When, on Dec. 25, Barrere returned to speak of the 
"convenience" of recognizing Finland, Sonnino replied that the 
Allies "could show sympathy for the autonomy or even for the 
independence of the Finns ... helping them in the meantime 
materially by supplying them with food and in other ways", 
but that it was not possible officially to recognize their 
independence for the reasons he had already indicated 
(Sonnino, Diario, p. 240). 
As we know, the French government continued to proceed on its 
path, but was not imitated by the British government. When 
Barrere tried for the last time on Jan. 4, 1918 to convince 
Sonnino by using the argument that the Bolsheviks had given 
their consent to Finland's independence, Sonnino objected that, 
as the Western Allies did not recognize the Bolshevik 
government it was impossible "formally to adhere to a 
dismemberment of the Russian State simply because they had 
agreed to it". He again explained that the alliance with Russia 
(that of Sept. 5, 1914, to which Italy had adhered later) had not 
been dissolved and that it was the intention rather "to try and 
maintain it by supporting Ukrainia and the other provisional 
governments which continued their adherence". He said 
furthermore that "the formal recognition of full Finnish 
independence would discourage all Russian patriots, who 
would despair of ever seeing the reconstitution of a Great 
Russia, be it as a federation only". Sonnino repeated that the 
Allies "should assure the Finns of their sympathy, helping 
them not only morally but materially, but postpone any formal 
recognition of full independence until the installation of a legal 
government in Russia" (Sonnino, Diario, p. 248). These 
quotations indicate that the cause of Finnish independence had 
made progress with the Italian government and was near 
reaching the goal of de facto recognition. It continued to be 
impossible to go any further, merely in consideration of the 
general policy of the government. 
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Sonnino told the Finnish delegates Kihlman and Wolff clearly 
how things stood when the Helsinki government decided 
to ask for Italian recognition in Rome. "I talked things over 
with them", he writes, "and told them that, Italy feels deep 
sympathy for Finland ... I said that I had no difficulties in 
keeping up relations with a de facto government. But at this 
point it was impossible to recognize the independence of this 
part of the Russian State, especially in consideration of the 
extreme strategic importance that Finland had for Russia. I 
concluded that we had to postpone any definite deliberation 
until the Peace Conference, expressing the hope that the 
Finnish move towards independence would not lead to a 
position of subordination to Germany, which was strenuously 
attempting to make a German lake of the Baltic Sea" (T. Gab. 
n. 357, Feb. 28, 1918). 
I have given this detailed report of nearly the entire 
document not only because it represents a testimony of the first 
direct encounter between the two countries but also in order to 
demonstrate clearly the Italian position, that is the es-
tablishment of de facto relations long before de jure 
recognition. Finally it gives a lucid picture at this early date of 
the hasards which the Finnish nation was to face in the course 
of its existence as an independent State. 
The de facto relations thus established had no practical 
consequences whatsoever for the moment, also because Italy, 
unlike the other Great powers of the Entente, had only an 
honorary consul at Helsinki; but it must also be stressed that 
on the Finnish side nothing was done in reply to the 
encouragement received in Rome. 
The general events characterizing the conflict and 
particularly the situation of Finland, which fell — as Sonnino 
had feared — into the German orbit (and even France broke off 
diplomatic relations), blocked contacts with the Allies in any 
case until Germany was defeated. Within the new framework 
created after Nov. 11, 1918 the Finnish government took up its 
battle for recognition again, finding itself in a less favorable 
position than it had been in December 1917. To the obstacle 
represented by the Russian problem was added the fact that 
Finland had found itself siding with Germany. Therefore it was 
a nation which, according to the philosophy of the Allies, did 
not have the same rights as the "good" nationalities, those that 
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had been oppressed by the Austro-Hungarian State. 
An attempt to modify this situation was made by the 
Mannerheim mission in London and Paris, but the most 
noticeable results for the attainment of recognition were 
achieved by the Americans of Finnish origin who insisted in 
defending the cause of their compatriots, and by the com-
prehension which the USA subsequently displayed of Finland's 
food requirements. In fact, while the British and the French 
made political conditions for official recognition (elections, new 
government, favourable attitude towards Allies), the Blockade 
Committee achieved a rapid agreement among the British, 
French, American and Italian delegates, proposing that the 
governments concerned should consider Finland a neutral 
State and therefore establish traderelations through the Inter-
Allied Trade Committee composed of the consuls of the four 
countries in Helsinki (Dec. 2, 1918). With the assent of the 
Allied governments the Committee was formed on Dec. 18 and 
set to work at Helsinki in the second half of January, though 
no Italian delegate had yet been appointed (DDI, v, 1°, pp. 250, 
265, 399, 471). The Italian government, once having agreed that 
the Committee should be instituted, had immediately 
proceeded to nominate Emanuele Grazzi, a diplomat attached 
to intelligence services at Rotterdam, as consul in Helsinki 
(Borsarelli a Comando Supremo, telespresso n. 18485, Dec. 22, 
1918). However, due to reasons I have not been able to 
discover, Grazzi was officially assigned to Helsinki only in 
February 1919, and he arrived there and began to participate 
in the deliberations of the committee only on April 9, 1919. 
This delay had no influence because the political importance 
lay in the fact that the Allied governments had decided to 
institute the Helsinki Committee, which made it clear that 
they considered Finland an economic entity, no more a part of 
Russia. The consequences soon made themselves felt. When the 
Russian problem was discussed at the Peace Conference and 
Lloyd George's proposal to invite representatives of every 
organized group "within the boundaries of European Russia as 
they stood before the war" to the Princes Island was approved, 
Wilson excluded Finland from the list. Nobody objected or 
expressed reservations (FRUS, PPC 1919, III, pp, 676, 686, 
691). "This was generally interpreted to mean", wrote Prof. 
Paasivirta, (p. 87), "that the Western Powers did not regard 
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Finland as any longer belonging to the Russian sphere of 
political control". It should however be stressed that opinions 
regarding de jure recognition of Finland continued to differ, 
though it should have been the logical consequence of this 
decision. The French immediately exercised pressure in favor of 
such recognition, which for them only meant resuming 
diplomatic relations (this happened on Feb. 3); the British, on 
the other hand, continued to make their political conditions 
and the American attitude was more or less the same. 
The Italian government took the same stand towards the 
Finnish nation as in February 1918. It greatly favoured 
Finland's independence, but its de jure recognition had to be 
subordinated to the Russian problem. The reason for this was 
not, as for the British and Americans, that political conditions 
had to be met: it was rather the desire not to complicate 
relations with the Antibolshevik elements whose eventual 
victory — so Italy hoped — would reinsert Russia into a 
European equilibrium. According to Sonnino's view, the new 
"legal" Russian government should have agreed to Finland's 
independence, but at the same time it should have had to treat 
with the Allies on how to fix the frontiers of the new State 
respecting Russian problems of security and strategy. A 
onesided decision on the part of the Allies would not only have 
been inadvisable but would have deprived Finland itself of an 
essential element of its future existence, that is to say the 
consent of its powerful neighbor to its frontiers. 
Therefore, when the British informed the Council of Ten on 
Jan. 27, 1919 of the French request for them to recognize 
Finland, Sonnino insisted on the frontierproblem. "Any 
decision concerning the frontiers of Finland might be regarded 
as a settlement hostile to Russia, if made without hearing the 
Russians," say the minutes of the meeting (FRUS, PPC 1919, 
III, p. 734). Wilson agreed to this viewpoint and the solution of 
the problem was further postponed. 
Sonnino took up the same attitude one month later when the 
British tried to bring the question of the Åland Islands before 
the Council of Ten. He observed that de jure the islands were 
still Russian and that it was therefore inadvisable to discuss 
the matter in dissociation from the Russian problem, 
"especially as in the case of Åland the conference was being 
asked to take something from someone and to give it to a third 
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party", that is to Sweden (FRUS, PPC 1919, iv, p. 171). 
Official recognition by the USA and Great Britain was 
decided at the Peace Conference between April 28 and May 3, 
the initiative having been taken by Herbert Hoover who 
convinced Wilson of its advisability after Finland had fulfilled 
the political conditions that had been made. The frontier 
question did, however, play a certain part in this decision, 
because it was agreed to communicate to the Finnish 
government that it would have to accept the frontiere fixed by 
the Peace Conference. 
When this decision was taken the Italians were absent from 
Paris because of the Adriatic question. Had he been present, 
Sonnino would probably have brought up his objection 
concerning the Russian problem again. However, as Italy had 
not been among the decision-makers it was not bound to apply 
it, and in fact Sonnino did not take any action. The Finnish 
government, possibly under the impression that the Italian 
silence was due to reasons of protocol (the lack of a formal 
request), sent Sonnino an official note on May 18, 1919, signed 
by the Foreign Secretary, Holsti. 
When Sonnino received the document, he added the 
following note for his collaborators: "In practice we maintain a 
relation of friendship with the Finnish government, but we can 
take no further steps until the Conference has discussed the 
general policy to be adopted towards Russia". When also the 
consul at Helsinki, Grazzi, pressed for recognition, saying that 
the Italian silence by now provoked a "painful impression" (T. 
n. 1911/51, June 3, 1919), Sonnino insisted on his point of view. 
"The Royal Government", he wrote, "though expressing its 
most heartfelt sympathy for Finland's national aspirations, 
does not consider it possible to proceed to a formal recognition 
of Finland at the moment, as the other Allies have done. The 
Royal Government maintains friendly de facto relations with 
the Finnish government, but is of the opinion that a definite 
recognition will have to be settled together with the other 
questions concerning Russia" (T. CP. n. 712, June 14, 1919). 
The insistance on this reserve naturally did not mean that 
Italy had changed its opinion on the main issue — the 
independence of the Finnish nation. As a matter of fact 
Orlando signed the letter to Admiral Kolcak on May 26 in 
which the Allies asked, as a condition of recognition of his 
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government, for a promise to recognize Finland's independence 
and to accept the arbitration of the League of Nations if the 
frontier problem between the two States had not been settled 
by a direct agreement (FRUS, PPC 1919, vi, p. 36). 
Prof. Paasivirta gives two reasons for the delay of the Italian 
recognition: the desire not to offend the White Russians, who 
were known to be opposed to Finnish independence, and 
unwillingness to admit the principle of self-determination 
because it was in contrast with the territorial demands made 
by Italy on the Eastern coast of the Adriatic (p. 107). 
From what I have discussed so far it is possible to support 
the first reason, not in the restrictive sense in which he 
proposes it, but in the way I indicated before; without, that is, 
making onesided decisions to obtain Russian consent at any 
cost for a condition (Finnish independence) indisputable for the 
Allies just as much as for Italy. The second reason does not 
seem defendable to me. Firstly, because certain demands made 
by Italy were based on the principle of nationality (apart from 
strategic security); one for example, concerned the coast of 
Dalmatia, and others, as in the case of Fiume, were based on 
the principle of self determination. In the second place, because 
the principle of nationality was never officially questioned, 
though the ways of applying it had been discussed. In any case, 
it had always been consistently supported in favour of the 
Finnish nation, as has been demonstrated in this paper. 
The delay was caused by Sonnino's insistence on his own 
way of considering the question of de jure recognition, an 
attitude which undoubtedly could be called obstinacy after the 
Anglo-American decision in May. One of the first actions of the 
new Foreign Secretary, Tittoni, the day after his appointment, 
was the authorization of Finland's official recognition (T. n. 
394, June 24, 1919), which was declared by the consul, Mr. 
Grazzi, on June 27. He was able to act so quickly, because it 
was only necessary to reverse an obstinate point of view on the 
method to be used. There were no other reasons and thus 
Tittoni thought it opportune immediately to align Italy with 
the position of the other Allies. Also on this point my 
conclusions differ slightly from Prof. Paasivirta's, who 
attributes this alignment almost exclusively to Italy's desire to 
identify itself with prevailing opinion among the Western 
Allies. 
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Hannu Soikkanen 
Nationalism and 
internationalism as 
concepts of the Finnish 
working class in the 
critical situation of 
1917-1918. 
1. Conflicting traditions 
By the time of the First World War the Kautskyist 
interpretation of socialism had established itself as the 
ideological centre of the Finnish labour movement, stressing 
the thought of a social development in which the importance of 
nationalism diminished steadily. Kautskyism held that the 
growing international division of functions, which was linked 
with development toward capitalism, led to international 
solidarity among capitalists and, following the same course, 
among the working class also to an increasing extent. 
Nationalism was regarded as a concept of farmers and the 
petty bourgeoisie, groups of declining importance. To take 
one's direction from it would be to drag the burden of the past. 
From this angle, particularly after the Kotka conference of 
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1909, Finland's Social Democratic Party tried to interpret the 
most difficult question, the relation between Finland and 
Russia. In every party conference before 1917 it was pointed 
out that the two countries had bourgeois interests in common 
and that the bourgeoisie did not defend Finland's autonomy in 
earnest. This notion was repeated in a way which suggested up 
to point that its exponents were uncertain. When the party's 
basic ideas were forming at the beginning of the century, the 
recourse of employers to Russian strike-breakers and their 
assertions that workers had broken national solidarity by going 
on strike had convinced workers that for capitalists an appeal 
to nationalism was merely a means to an end. Thus it 
happened that historical reality and central notions of 
socialism supported each other. 
Within the labour movement, however, factors of some 
weight were working in another, quite opposite direction. Even 
those active in the labour movement lived in a community 
where, particularly after the February Manifesto, the influence 
of nationalist thinking was growing deeper and spreading to a 
broader public. Thus alongside orthodox Kautskyism a pro-
nationalist line began to form. It led first to the creation of 
dissimilar groupings within the movement. At the beginning of 
the century and then in the new situation of the second period 
of oppression there arose on the other hand the so-called 
"Siltasaari line". Its main figures were the editor of "Työmies", 
Edvard Valpas, and the November Socialists who had joined 
the labour movement at about the time of the general strike of 
1905, O.V. Kuusinen being perhaps the most influential of 
them. They held Kautsky's interpretation to be the most 
important, though they did not despise nationalism. But they 
stressed that the labour movement could not resort to 
collaboration with the bourgeoisie in order to protect 
autonomy. Important for the nationalist line was Yrjö Mäkelin, 
who emphasized combined activity as a means to that 
protection. This line of nationalism had some connection with 
reformism and some also with revisionism, whose influence in 
Finland remained slight. The trade union movement was small 
in membership and weak, whereas its strength was 
indispensable for the reinforcement of revisionism. Socialist 
internationalism based on the Kautskyist interpretation of 
capitalist development dominated the party ideology, but a 
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potential force was the powerful stress on nationalism which 
might emerge if the situation changed decisively. In 1917 the 
situation did indeed change after the Russian revolution of 
February. 
2. Bolsheviks work with Finnish Social 
Democrats who pursue nationalist 
aims and collaboration in a changed 
political situation 
After the revolution the Finnish Social Democratic Party 
served with bourgeoisie parties in the government of Tokoi. 
This signified a strengthening of reformism. Although it could 
be stressed that this was an exceptional situation in which 
joining the government implied a change of principle in 
relations with ministerial socialism and abandonment of the 
Kautskyist line with its insistence on the class struggle, 
Finland's Social Democratic Party found itself in an 
extraordinary position during the summer. More and more 
strongly it drew attention to nationalist emblems at the same 
time as collaboration intensified with international left-wing 
socialism. The interlocking of events in Russia and Finland led 
to an alliance between the bolsheviks and the Finnish labour 
movement, in which the new possibilities of the situation had 
caused stress to be laid on nationalism. Parties differed greatly 
in their understanding of the revolution, but recourse to 
collaboration showed the importance of the Russian question to 
Finland. Drawn by the nationalist policy of the Bolsheviks, the 
Finnish Social Democratic Party in June 1917 joined the 
Zimmerwald left-wing Socialist International. This emphasized 
working-class internationalism and criticized the parties of the 
Second International for their support of war exertions; this 
was done primarily to satisfy the bolsheviks. Bolshevik 
promises to allow Finland the right to secede from Russia led 
to this attitude. The growing nationalist activism of Finnish 
party now led to a clash with the interim government of Russia 
and to collaboration with the bolsheviks. To what extent this 
was a matter of tactics and to what extent a matter of principle 
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is difficult to decide. 
The Finns received no support from the Social Democratic 
Party of Sweden for instance, nor from social democratic 
parties of the Entente. In their view the Finnish party's quarrel 
with the interim government of Russia was an act of opposition 
to democratic Russia which also weakened the latter's military 
effort and indirectly benefited Germany. At various stages of 
the war there was a community of interests between Finland 
and Germany, as expressed in the birth of the light infantry 
movement. It extended to the labour movement, which was also 
prepared to make use of German support. Such was the 
attitude of the group which had earlier stressed the emblems of 
nationalism. Reliance on Germany did not lead to wider 
collaboration, however, and the nationalist policy of the 
bolsheviks played a part here. By offering help in the struggle 
against the interim government the bolsheviks neutralized the 
alternative of support from Germany. For the same reason 
collaboration between the labour movement and the so-called 
activists of the nationalist bourgeoisie faded to nothing; it had 
first appeared in the light infantry movement, then in contacts 
occurring in Stockholm during spring 1917, then in the 
enactment of the so-called Enabling Law of July 1917. The 
bolsheviks, who sharply criticized this line, were able to exert 
some influence on the procedure of the labour movement. They 
tried in various respects to strengthen the revolutionary wing 
of the Finnish party and to persuade the latter to cease its 
collaboration with the bourgeoisie parties in the government. 
The Finnish party preserved its unity, which is to say that it 
did not openly divide into two parties, as had happened 
elsewhere. Collaboration, a kind of unholy alliance with the 
bolsheviks which satisfied both nationalists and those who 
aimed at social revolution, kept the two wings of the party 
together and even drew them closer. 
Russia's internal power struggle involved Finland more and 
more clearly as autumn approached. The bolsheviks wished to 
make Finland a support area independent of the influence of 
the interim government, and at the same time the Finnish 
party became more and more opposed to that government. The 
Enabling Law passed on July 18th, which substantially 
extended Finnish rights and established Parliament as the 
highest authority, was partly an expression of nationalism and 
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partly a sign of collaboration with the bolsheviks. In 
connection with this legislation a national front formed when 
the social democrats and part of the bourgeoisie gave their 
approval. In these circumstances nationalist considerations 
might have forced social tension into the background. But the 
interim government had sufficient power to assemble loyal 
forces in Finland. Bourgeois activists had in fact been in 
connection with Germany, and the latter's aims were served, of 
course, by part of the Enabling Law. In association with this 
law a national front came near formation. Social democrats, 
bourgeois activists and agrarians would have composed it. 
The situation thus made it possible for ever-sharpening class 
conflicts to be overcome, and provided an impetus for national 
solidarity. It would have been necessary, however, for the 
interim government to fall or for a front to be formed against 
it. A nationalist front could only have been strengthened in a 
war situation where Germany could have intervened by 
delivering light infantry to the country, in which case the 
chance to accept German aid, which had fleetingly appeared to 
the labour movement at various stages, would have found 
concrete realization. That situation, however, was complicated 
by two matters, the social democrat majority in Parliament and 
the powers conferred on it by the Enabling Law. On the 
bourgeois side it was thought that the main motive of the social 
democrats was to pursue some of the nationalist aims 
contained in the Enabling Law. It is noteworthy that at this 
stage nationalist aims ran parallel with social democratic 
objectives for the extension of democracy or even for tactical 
advantage. 
The Enabling Law also ran parallel with bolshevik aims; this 
fact and the contacts which it implied provided a justification 
for the class struggle viewpoint. The bolsheviks tried 
unceasingly to weaken Finnish national solidarity and 
criticized the participation of Finnish social democrats in the 
government, with the result that the party was divided. This 
social democratic collaboration with the bolsheviks roused the 
suspicion of bourgeois advocates of independence. 
No nationalist front arose on behalf of the Enabling Law. The 
middle-class parties took advantage of the interim 
government's manifesto of dissolution to get rid of the socialist 
majority in Parliament. This cut the ground away from the 
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nationalist standpoint that a united front would be reached 
over social obstacles of increasing severity. Such was the 
disappointment from this stand taken by the middle class that 
the reformist wing of the labour movement was also 
undermined. A situation of such complexity appeared to open 
possibilities for development in many directions. In retrospect 
it also seems that a broad nationalist front might have arisen 
against the Russian interim government. Whether it would 
have been able to prevent the increase of social tension is 
difficult to say. The political events accompanying the 
dissolution of Parliament with its socialist majority led in the 
same direction as social tension. Possibilities for a nationalist 
common front weakened substantially. 
When the interim government had dissolved Parliament and 
the middle class had approved this action, the social democrats 
did not find a clear procedure to follow. Enactment of the 
Enabling Law was linked with rapidly changing situations in 
Russia and had been accelerated by the belief that the interim 
government would be overthrown there. When this did not 
happen the social democrats were uncertain how to proceed. 
They engaged in elections but announced their illegality. The 
social democrats felt themselves in an advantageous position 
because their aims combined radical social promises with the 
struggle to extend the rights of Finland. At the same time, 
however, the social unrest which they had condemned only 
half-heartedly and their collaboration with the bolsheviks 
turned against the social democrats. The elections were won by 
the agrarians, who had been in favour of the Enabling Law and 
were anti-Russian. Despite an intense struggle in opposition to 
the interim government the national spirit turned partly 
against the social democrats. This is explained by their 
collaboration with the bolsheviks and their understanding 
attitude to the military forces in the country, who had been 
infected by the revolution. 
3. Strengthening of class solidarity 
over national frontiers 
The attitude of Finland's middle-class groups changed sharply 
when the bolsheviks came to power. They were now ready to 
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approve detachment from Russia. This was due partly to the 
radicalism of the bolsheviks, partly to their collaboration with 
the social democrats and partly to the dissolution of the 
Russian realm. The labour movement now showed more 
caution in pursuit of independence, at least in the methods 
adopted. From the summer onward the bolsheviks had 
promised Finland the opportunity to secede, and the Finnish 
social democratic leaders relied on this. But they feared an 
open conflict with the socialist Russia then forming. For their 
part the Russian bolsheviks in the previous autumn had placed 
no confidence in the Finnish representatives of the labour 
movement. This was because in negotiations held on 19th 
October the Finns had asked a regional military committee to 
provide arms for the Red Guard. The Russians were unwilling 
to do this, not placing full reliance on the Guard in the event of 
a German landing. Though internal social tension continued to 
grow in Finland, a situation was looming up in which a 
nationalist attitude might replace internationalism with a 
bolshevik reference. It might turn against the bolsheviks if 
they, as holders of power, did not keep their promise of giving 
Finland the opportunity to secede from Russia. As a further 
possibility, part of the bourgeoisie, the so-called activists who 
had stood behind the Enabling Law and to whom separation 
from Russia and anti-Russian feeling were all-important, might 
be prepared to compromise with the social democrats in social 
and political matters. The Finnish Social Democratic Party 
still contained those who hoped to find a common line with the 
agrarians and activists and who looked askance at col-
laboration with the bolsheviks. Yrjö Mäkelin, for instance, who 
had earlier been the most prominent representative of the 
"nationalist" line, was embittered by the dissolution of 
Parliament and at that time prepared to abandon collaboration 
with the bourgeoisie; on 28th October he was again prepared to 
seek a compromise with the activists and to adopt a 
doubting attitude to collaboration with the Russians. Ideas 
differed greatly within the party, for many leaders of the labour 
movement thought at the same time that in October-November 
the revolutionary spirit of the masses was the decisive factor 
and that the party leaders would be literally forced to join the 
revolution and to lead the movement or national rising which 
would in all cases be set in motion. The difficult food situation 
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and the example given by the Russian revolution were 
elevating the revolution into a mass movement, that is a 
popular movement. Class contrasts in Finnish society and the 
critical political situation were a combination pointing to civil 
war from the lowest level. Combined with this was the 
creation, starting in the spring and confirmed in the autumn, of 
two armed citizens' formations, the bourgeois protective corps 
and the workers' guards for maintenance of order. Both were 
partly political and class-based, but they were also intended for 
use against Russian troops, that is they contained a nationalist 
element. 
Revolutionary activists were also to be found in party circles, 
and they included in particular certain Finns of St Petersburg. 
They were bolsheviks in the Finnish labour movement. The 
Finnish nationalist viewpoint held no importance for them. 
They placed the interests of the revolution before those of 
Finnish nationalism, and what mattered to them was the 
success of bolshevism and the creation of a protective wall 
around the Russian revolution. A Finnish revolution could 
serve as this wall. 
Partly as a consequence of political contrasts in Finnish 
society and partly as support for the recent accession of the 
bolsheviks to power, a week-long general strike broke out in 
Finland on 14th October 1917. It did not lead to a revolution, 
however, as the parliamentary group opposed it and a 
compromise was reached in the Diet. Despite internal 
contradictions the Finnish Social Democratic Party was still 
formally intact. The explanation for this is that the situation 
had been so complicated ever since spring. It was not a case 
merely of the activist and revolutionary spirit in Finnish 
society: also involved were a process of extreme complexity in 
Russia and attitudes to issues arising between the two 
countries. 
Since the party had been formed in Finland social questions 
had never been the only or even the principal concern: more 
important was the procedure to be followed in matters 
connected with Finno-Russian relations. Thus revolution and 
the nationalist viewpoint did not clash even when the 
bolsheviks took power in Russia. The starting-point of Lenin's 
policy of nationalism was the acceleration of the revolution by 
means of nationalist self-determination. It was clear that under 
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Tsarism and during the Russian interim government there had 
been no opposition between the nationalist struggle and the 
class struggle of the labour movement except on the question of 
whether to join forces with the middle class on the nationalist 
issue. But this conflict did not arise when the bolsheviks came 
to power, though it had been an issue with all previous Russian 
rulers. To be sure, it brought its own set of problems and 
provided the middle class with nationalist weapons against the 
labour movement. 
4. Nationalism and internationalism in 
the midst of war 
When war broke out the Finnish labour movement still 
remained largely an uniform whole. Though some individuals 
of importance stayed apart from the revolutionary movement, 
no breach of notable size occurred. One explanation of this is 
that the perpetual linking of events in Finland with those in 
Russia created patterns of events in whose connection there 
was no clear conflict between, for instance, socialist 
internationalism and national identification. Intensified social 
and, especially, political contrasts brought it about that no 
adequate feeling of national solidarity arose. Whether the latter 
could have prevented the outbreak of civil war is difficult to 
say. 
In the early phase of the war a powerful sense of solidarity 
prevailed between the bolsheviks and the Finnish leaders of 
subversion. Bolshevik support in the shape of arms and 
exhortations to troops in Finland to take part voluntarily in 
the struggle to be waged here suggested an uniform series of 
revolutions which had first been realized in Russia and then 
spread to Finland. But matters continued in a totally different 
way. The constitution drafted by the people's delegation 
(revolutionary government) was not based ,on the dictatorship 
of the proletariat according to the bolshevik model, but on 
democracy in the widest sense and on the right of popular 
initiative. In the circumstances of war, to be sure, a situation 
resembling the dictatorship of the proletariat prevailed and 
there were signs that the system was moving in that direction, 
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but the clear aim of the revolution was to "conquer" the 
support of a popular majority. Thus the revolution was 
stamped unmistakably with Finnish individuality. It might be 
characterized as a revolution of Kautskyist social democracy. 
Its aims differed clearly form those of the bolsheviks. 
When the constituent bodies of red Finland were formed, 
their attitude laid stress on the special character of two 
sovereign states, even on their conflicts of interest. An 
agreement was made on 1st March, when the Finns attempted 
to make it clear that two traditionally sovereign states were 
concerned. Lenin and the Russians wished to proclaim that this 
was something quite new, an agreement between two socialist 
states whose dominating feature would be internationalism, 
solidarity of the working class regardless of national frontiers. 
In negotiations the Finns drew attention to the great advantage 
the middle class would gain in propaganda if they consented to 
emphasize internationalism in an agreement. This was only 
part of the truth, as Finnish red nationalism grew stronger 
after the opening days of the revolution. "Red" Finland, 
admittedly, was too short a time in being for anything to be 
said with certainty, but despite a common socialist ideology it 
appears that stress on nationalism in relations with bolshevik 
Russia was growing stronger at the expense of inter-
nationalism. Nationalism was forcing its way into the new 
identity of Finland. 
5. Summary 
Though the ideology of the Finnish labour movement was 
Kautskyist socialism, which stressed internationalism, this was 
counterbalanced by a strong nationalist potential which 
appeared in the labour movement in a situation where defence 
of autonomy against the aims of Tsarist Russia became the 
central concern. This is shown by the fact that the main source 
of disagreement in the second period of oppression was the 
tactic to be followed in this defence. The party's general line 
remained strictly Kautskyist with emphasis on the class 
struggle. This is explained by the nature of Finnish society. 
Although since 1907 a unicameral Diet had been chosen in 
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general elections of an identical pattern, this did not create a 
channel on influence on legislation nor a sense of participation 
in the use of power such as would have turned the Finnish 
labour movement in the direction of nationalism. The 
nationalist tendency of the movement is linked with a certain 
political situation and a resulting attitude to the struggle 
against the interim government. When these factors were 
removed, internationalism grew stronger. From the spring of 
1917, to be sure, the social democrats formed part of the 
government and had a majority in Parliament, but this phase 
was so short that a true social patriotism had no time to form, 
though there were indications of it. 
From spring 1917 till the bolshevik revolution events in 
Finland and their connection with the struggle in Russia lent a 
certain tone to the tension between national and international. 
Conflict with the Russian interim government encouraged 
nationalism, while collaboration with the bolsheviks promoted 
identification across national frontiers. 
The Finnish revolution and the formation of a "red" Finland 
pointed to internationalism. In war conditions the bolsheviks 
and Russian troops in this country were seen as allies, while 
the Whites were known as mortal enemies. Measured in this 
way national solidarity was a slight factory during the civil 
war. Yet for a short period there were signs that the transfer of 
power to the Reds was creating a foundation for red 
nationalism. The internationalism shared by red Finland and 
the bolsheviks did not remove the problems which were part of 
Finno-Russian relations. The stress on nationalism is partly 
explained by the wish of the Reds to rule with the approval of 
as many Finns as possible, and they were aware that the 
attraction of nationalism was powerful. But this clearly was 
not a sufficient explanation. Despite a surface touch of 
Kautskyism, nationalism in the Finnish labour movement was 
a strong potential force which emerged unless prevented by a 
situation or by social factors. 
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Massimo Finoia 
Politique economique et 
pensee nationale en 
Italie de 1'Unite a 1918 
En 1860, au moment de sa formation, le Royaume d'Italie 
n'etait pas un Etat moderne. A l'interieur du pays on pouvait 
observer la plus grande diversite de monnaies, d'impöts, de 
droits, de lois et de coutumes civiles, de legislations, 
d'habitudes agraires et commerciales et, surtout, de mentalite 
et de culture. 
La structure geographique et les ressources naturelles 
entravaient la modernisation par l'industrialisation. Voila 
pourquoi le chemin suivi par la politique economique italienne 
a ete si different de celui du Royaume Uni, souvent propose 
comme modele de tout systerve economique. 
Au siècle dernier, 1'Etat Italien a joue un role actif dans 
l'economie. Sur le plan de la doctrine, un des premiers 
problemes examines etait celui du choix entre l'agriculture et 
l'industrie. Le developpement agricole et le developpement 
industriel ne s'excluent pas l'un l'autre mais, ils sont, au 
contraire, complementaires. 
Il s'agissait donc d'un faux probleme. Le vrai probleme etait 
celui de choisir entre liberalisme et protectionnisme. Choisir 
l'agriculture signifiait mener une politique liberale, tandis que 
choisir l'industrie exigeait de mener une politique 
protectionniste. 
Les plus grands economistes italiens se sont rallies au 
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liberalisme. Ces economistes critiquerent systematiquement 
presque toutes les interventions de l'Etat en matiere 
d'economie, en soulignant principalement les gaspillages 
qu'elles entrainaient. Les theses liberales eurent un grand 
retentissement dans le debat culturel et politique, mais leur 
effet reel fut minime sur les decisions de politique economique. 
Le groupe protectionniste etait tres heterogene: il etait forme 
d'economistes, de juristes et d'industriels. 
Selon certains auteurs, l'element de cohesion entre des 
hommes provenant d'horizons si differents etait le 
nationalisme. Ainsi Richard Webster ecrit: "Entre 1887 et 1915, 
le milieu parlementaire italien demeura liberal dans ses 
convictions politiques, mais ses initiatives en matiere 
economique et le concept meme d'interet national etaient déjà 
impregnes d'esprit nationaliste". Selon l'opinion de Vera 
Zamagni: "le nationalisme fut l'ideologie de l'industrialisation, 
ideologie commune, en Italie, aux specialistes et aux 
industriels, aux politiques et aux administrateurs, ce meme 
nationalisme qui inspira la politique des depenses publiques 
comme les mesures douanieres, l'aventure coloniale et meme la 
participation å la premiere guerre mondiale, et qui continua å 
exercer son influence sur les evenements politiques du Pays et 
meme apres la guerre". Les 16 premieres annees du Royaume 
d'Italie virent toutefois la suprematie d'une ligne liberale, mais 
egalement tres active. Avant 1860, l'unification douaniere du 
pays etait realisee avec l'adoption de tarifs douaniers plus 
liberaux que les precedents existant dans les differents Etats. 
De nombreux historiens soutiennent que cette ouverture de 
1'Italie aux importations des produits industriels strangers, fut 
le prix que l'Italie paya å la France et au Royaume Uni pour 
les secours recus pendant les deux guerres d'independance. 
Au cours des premieres annees du Royaume d'Italie 
l'unification du systeme fiscal continua l'oeuvre d'unification. 
Toutefois, l'augmentation des depenses fut plus forte que celle 
des entrées. Ceci s'explique avant tout par les differentes 
traditions fiscales qui existaient dans chaque partie de la 
peninsule. Il ne faut pas oublier, par exemple, que l'impöt le 
plus important, etabli d'apres le cadastre, etait l'impöt sur les 
terrains; mais, en Italie, il existait jusqu'å 22 cadastres, etablis 
å des differentes époques, et selon des criteres differents. En 
1864, on avait déjà introduit l'impöt sur le revenu et les impöts 
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sur les produits de consommation courante avaient ete 
augmentes. Pour en revenir a la situation des finances 
publiques pendant les premieres annees de l'unite italienne, le 
deficit etait couvert par la dette publique. Les titres de la dette 
publique se devalorisaient a mesure qu' augmentait le deficit 
du budget et que des nouveaux titres etaient timis. Le 
rendement des titres, en effet, augmenta de 5 a 9 %. On 
decourageait ainsi les investissements dans l'industrie et dans 
l'agriculture la oil le rendement etait plus faible. De plus, les 
variations de valeur des titres de la dette publique entrainaient 
des mouvements speculatifs. C'est justement pour faire face aux 
speculations sur les titres de la dette publique qu'en 1886 on 
decida de suspendre la convertibilite de la monnaie. La 
contrainte de la couverture-or n'existant plus; l'Etat reussit 
ainsi a obtenir des banques la couverture de son deficit. 
L'augmentation de la circulation monetaire eut un effet 
positif sur l'economie, parce qu'elle entraina une devaluation 
de la monnaie qui favorisa l'exportation. L'equilibre du budget 
fut atteint, quand la gauche remplaca la droite au 
gouvernement dupays. En fait, contrairement a ce a quoi l'on 
aurait pu s'attendre, la droite mena une politique de deficit du 
budget public, tandis que la gauche mena une politique 
d'equilibre. Examinons rapidement les depenses de l'Etat 
durant les premieres decennies de l'Unite italienne. 
Au point de vue de l'economie, au dela de l'unification 
monetaire, fiscale et douaniere (qui ne comportaient pas de 
frais), il etait necessaire de poursuivre une unification 
permettant le developpement du trafic, des communications et 
des echanges; il etait donc necessaire de batir des routes et des 
bureaux de poste, d'etendre le reseau telegraphique aussi bien 
que le reseau des chemins de fer. 
L'histoire des chemins de fer italiens est tres complexe et ne 
peut pas titre resumee en quelques mots. Il est important de 
souligner que l'Italie fut le premier pays qui nationalisa les 
chemins de fer; que les frais pour la realisation du reseau 
absorberent une part considerable des depenses publiques, 
enfin, que ce ne fut que grace a l'intervention de l'Etat que 
l'Italie a eu la possibilite de disposer d'un reseau de chemins de 
fer, ce qui constituait la condition necessaire pour l'unification 
economique du pays et la defense de ses frontieres. 
En ce qui concerne les structures de credit, l'unification ne se 
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realisa que tres tard. Contrairement a ce qui se passait dans 
d'autres pays industrialises, en Italie ont existe jusqu'å 1926 
plusieurs banques d'emission. Une teile situation, parfaitement 
coherente avec la pensee liberale dominant le pays a cette 
époque-lå, derivait du fait que les instituts d'emission du Sud 
s'opposaient a l'unification, voyant en elle la fin de leur 
pouvoir. En tout cas, meme dans le secteur du credit, l'Etat 
opera d'importantes interventions. Etant donne l'insuffisance 
des banques sur tout le territoire national, furent fondees pour 
recevoir les depots, les Caisses d'epargne postales qui les 
versaient a une banque fondee, elle aussi, sur 1'initiative de 
l'Etat, et qui accordait des credits aux Communes. 
Des les premieres annees de l'unification, donc, nous 
trouvons a la base du developpement economique italien une 
initiative d'Etat visant a creer les conditions et les in-
frastructures necessaires a l'economie moderne. Et pourtant, les 
resultats ne furent pas satisfaisants, au moms dans l'immediat. 
La raison principale doit en titre attribuee, a mon avis, 
au fait que l'intervention de l'Etat dans le processus 
d'industrialisation a un effet a long terme. L'intervention de 
l'Etat dans les economies de marche en retard sur la voie de 
l'industrialisation est une condition necessaire mais non 
suffisante. Pour que le mecanisme economique se mette en 
marche, il exige une multiplicite de conditions differentes, qui 
ne peuvent se manifester que graduellement: capacite des 
entrepreneurs, connaissances techniques et culturelles (dans un 
sens anthropologique) de la classe laborieuse, disponibilite de 
ressources, existence de marches de debouches, etc. 
Une incitation vers une politique economique plus active vint 
justement de l'action entreprise par l'Etat. Loin de favoriser le 
developpement de l'industrie metallurgique nationale, les 
depenses militaires et les depenses pour le developpement des 
chemins de fer donnaient lieu å un flux croissant d'im-
portations. 
Au début des annees 80, le ministre de la marine re-
commandait la creation d'une acierie pour la fourniture de 
materiel siderurgique destine a la construction de navires de 
guerre. Avec les fonds de l'Etat et des credits fournis par les 
banques, 1'acierie de Terni fut fondee en 1884. 
En realite l'operation ne fut pas satisfaisante et l'on dut avoir 
recours å des subsides qui donnerent lieu å des affaires 
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complexes et peu edifiantes; c'est ce qui arrive a ces entreprises 
qui ne se developpent pas graduellement. Dans les annees 80 
on mit egalement en place l'industrie de la construction navale 
grace a des subventions pour les fournitures militaires et 
ferroviaires, on adopta des criteres visant a favoriser l'industrie 
nationale. Grace a ces mesures, l'Italie voyait la naissance, a la 
fin du siècle dernier, d'une industrie de base et, par consequent, 
les constructions navales et ferroviaires ne dependaient plus 
des importations. 
La politique industrielle des annees 80 fut accompagnee 
d'une politique douaniere protectionniste, reclamee par l'in-
dustrie aussi bien que par l'agriculture. Le ble et les produits 
agricoles americains, a cause de la diminuition des coüts de 
transport due a l'introduction de la navigation a vapeur, 
etaient devenues considerablement concurrentiels par rapport 
aux produits nationaux. Cette nouvelle politique douaniere eut 
un effet positif immediat tant sur l'industrie que sur 
l'agriculture. 
En realite, cette politique a ete severement critiquee par les 
liberaux, car elle donnait lieu a des privileges et a des 
inegalites. Elle a de meme recu des critiques de la part d'autres 
specialistes. On a, par exemple, affirme que le prix tres eleve 
du ble, en maintenant des salaires eleves, a empeche la 
formation d'un equipement industriel moderne. La question 
tres complexe, est encore debattue aujourd'hui. Nous 
partageons l'opinion demontree par differents arguments 
suivant laquelle il faut placer a la base du developpement 
economique italien, l'action entreprise par l'Etat. Le tournant 
de la politique industrielle et douaniere correspond a 
l'avenement de la gauche au pouvoir. A mon avis, on devrait 
parler non d'un tournant, mais d'une evolution coherente de la 
politique economique, datant des premieres annees de l'unite 
nationale. Cette evolution est liee surtout a l'affirmation 
definitive et l'evolution de cette pensee nationale qui avait 
largement inspire meme l'action des gouvernements de droite. 
Pour en revenir aux faits, il faut reconnaitre que le début de 
la politique protectionniste ne fut pas suivi d'une periode de 
prosperite. De nombreuses banques connurent une crise, et 
l'intervention de l'Etat fut, une fois de plus, decisive pour le 
redressement de l'economie. Entre 1893 et 1894, les deux 
banques plus importantes accordant des credits a l'industrie 
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firent faillite. 
De nombreuses banques, qui etaient en plus impliquees dans 
de graves scandales, furent aussi sur le point de faire faillite. 
Meme la Banque Nationale, l'une des 5 banques d'emission se 
trouvait en difficulte. Par des sauvetages directs des industries 
et indirects des banques, de la part de la Banque Nationale, on 
parvint enfin a une reprise de l'activite economique. En 1893, 
la Banque d'Italie fut fondee, absorbant trois des cinq banques 
d'emission. Les differents aspects de la crise bancaire se 
revelent interessants, parce qu'ils mettent en relief le troisieme 
instrument de l'intervention de l'Etat en matiere d'economie: 
l'aide qu'il accorde en cas de menace de faillite (les deux 
premiers etant les subventions accordees a l'industrie et les 
protections douanieres). 
Cet ensemble d'interventions est å la base du developpe-
ment industriel, localise principalement dans l'Italie nordoc-
cidentale et se caracterise par le developpement de la 
siderurgie, ainsi que par la naissance de l'industrie automobile 
et des industries chimiques et electriques. L'Etat, en tout cas, 
conserva toujours un role actif dans le developpement 
economique en passant des commandes pour de grands travaux 
publics, chemins de fer, armee et marine. En meme temps, il 
continua sa politique de sauvotage economique. En 1907 a la 
suite de la crise economique qui toucha le monde occidental, la 
Societe Bancaire Italienne connut de graves difficultes, qui 
pouvaient entrainer de nombreuses industries dans sa faillite. 
L'aide de la Banque d'Italie evita le desastre. On a ecrit å ce 
propos: "La valeur reelle de la crise de 1907 et de sa solution 
reside dans la demonstration du role irremplacable joue par 
l'Etat dans le processus de developpement; 	 il fut evident 
alors que sans la presence active et fonctionnelle de 
l'Etat 	  le developpement industriel italien aurait ete 
compromis". En 1911, une nouvelle structuration technique et 
financiere de la production siderurgique apparut indispensable. 
Cette operation necessita d'importants capitaux, introuvables 
sur le marche financier, on constitua, en coordination avec la 
Banque d'Italie, un consortium de banques qui se chargea du 
financiement de l'industrie siderurgique nationale. Dans cette 
meme periode, on introduisit le regime "d'importation tem-
poraire" des produits siderurgiques, dans le but d'aider 
l'industrie mecanique, qui ne pouvait etre concurrentielle sur le 
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marche international en raison du prix tres Bleve des produits 
siderurgiques. Entre les premieres annees du XXieme siècle et 
la premiere guerre mondiale, la politique, economique 
commenca å s'interesser plus activement å l'agriculture, 
surtout par des interventions dans le domaine de la 
bonfication agricole. Les problemes de l'agriculture firent 
apparattre immediatement ceux de l'Italie meridionale, zone 
dont la surface couvre plus d'un tiers du territoire national et 
comprend 40 % de la population italienne. Le Sud etait, et est 
encore aujourd'hui, dans une position de sous-developpement 
par rapport aux regions du nord: il est caracterise par une 
agriculture peu productive et par l'insuffisance d'industries. 
Le probleme du developpement de l'Italie meridionale fut 
litteralement ignore, au siecle passé les interventions de 
politique economique n'ont ete decidees qu'au début du 
XXieme siecle. On pourrait meme dire qu'il y eut å cet egard 
un lien etroit entre la politique economique gouvernementale d'in-
spiration avant tout nationaliste et intervenctioniste, et la 
pensee economique dominante, nettement liberale. On pensa 
que l'emigration etait l'instrument le plus efficace pour lutter 
contre la pauvraute du Sud. Entre la fin du XlXieme siecle et 
le début de la premiere guerre mondiale, plus de deux millions 
d'Italiens quitterent l'Italie meridionale vers d'autres pays. 
Mais ce phenomene fut favorise par l'intervention de l'Etat qui 
se chargea de maintenir å un niveau plus Bleve les prix du 
voyage, par des credits accordes å la marine. 
La politique economique de l'Unite å la premiere guerre 
mondiale ne fut d'aucune utilite pour le Sud. Selon l'avis de 
nombreux specialistes, le choix de l'industrialisation entrainait 
inevitablement des avantages pour l'Italie du Nord, vue la 
difficulte, voire l'impossibilite, d'industrialiser le territoire 
national tout entier. Selon d'autres economistes, qu'ils soient 
liberaux on marxistes, la politique economique ne fut pas 
inspiree par la recherche d'un interet national ou general, mais 
par les interets des plus importants groupes de pression, c'est å 
dire la bourgeoisie industrielle du Nord. 
Pour en revenir aux faits, mentionnons rapidement les 
dispositions prises en faveur du Sud. En 1903, l'intervention 
toucha l'une des regions, les plus pauvres, la Basilicate. On 
accorda å cette region des allogements fiscaux, une aug-
mentation du credit agricole, et l'on programma aussi des 
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travaux de reboisement, de voirie et de approuvee bonification. 
L'annee suivante fut approuvee une loi pour l'alimentation en 
eau des Pouilles ainsi qu'une loi speciale qui rendit possible, au 
moins en partie, l'assainissement de la ville de Naples et, entre 
autre, la creation d'une usine siderurgique. Plus tard les 
allegements fiscaux et la legislation relative aux travaux 
publics fut etendue a toutes les regions du Sud. 
La politique economique pour le Midi contribua seulement a 
remedier a quelques graves dysfonctions externes, mais n'eut 
aucun effet sur la structure sociale et productive. 
Selon l'avis de nombreux economistes la politique eco-
nomique poursuivie fut l'instrument a travers lequel, on parvint 
a raffermir ce systeme d'alliances qui avait ete a la base du 
protectionnisme: l'alliance entre la bourgeoisie d'entreprise du 
Nord, qui reclamait le changement, et qui l'obtenait grace a la 
politique economique suivie, et les proprietaires fonciers du 
Sud, qui ne voulaient aucun changement, et qui atteignaient 
teur but grace a cette politique economique. 
A la fin de ce bref tableau de la politique economique 
italienne qui couvre a peu pres un demi siecle, il est egalement 
necessaire de mentionner la politique sociale. Contrairement a 
ce qui s'est passé dans d'autres pays, les formes modernes 
d'assurance et de securite sociale ne se sont pas developpees, 
en Italie, sur la base de l'associationnisme ou de l'initiative 
privee, mais grace a l'intervention de l'Etat. Dans le domaine 
social il faut rappeler que, vers la fin du siecle dernier, l'Etat 
commenca a se charger de l'instruction primaire par un vaste 
programme de constructions scolaires, fonda un institut 
d'assurance specifique (INAIL), rendit obligatoire l'assurance 
contre les accidents, organisa enfin un deuxieme institut oil 
l'adhesion etait volontaire, mais qui recevait une subvention de 
l'Etat. L'assurance contre les maladies resta aux Societes de 
secours mutuel et c'est seulement apres la guerre qu'elle devint 
obligatoire et releva de la competence de l'Etat. Les premieres 
lois en matiere de travail (interdiction du travail de nuit des 
femmes et des enfants; limites d'age pour le recrutement de la 
main d'oeuvre infantile; plafond de onze heures de travail 
journalier), furent inspirees, dit-on, par le desir de favoriser 
certains secteurs industriels en regularisant le marche du 
travail, plutöt que par des ideaux humanitaires ou des 
principes democratiques. Le role decisif de l'Etat dans le 
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developpement economique italien apparait done en pleine 
lumiere. Et ce role n'a pas produit un mecanisme d'auto-
propulsion du marche, mais a ete forme par une pluralite 
d'instruments de politique economique qui, l'un apres l'autre, 
ont provoque ou oriente les mecanismes du marche au point de 
prendre leur place dans les moments de crise. Ces instruments 
sont: les protections douanieres, les commandes de l'Etat, les 
subventions å la production, le caractere public de certaines 
structures de credit, les nationalisations et les aides accordees 
dans le cadre d'une politique de travaux publics, des 
allogements fiscaux et des credits pour les zones sous-
developpees. Comme nous l'avons deja dit, suivant l'avis de 
nombreux economistes, l'emploi d'une serie d'instruments de 
politique economique si ample a ete indispensable pour la 
realisation rapide de l'industrialisation en competition avec les 
pays dans lesquels la revolution industrielle avait eu lieu des 
decennies å l'avance. Il faut reconnaitre que, historiquement, 
les pays qui, apres l'Italie, se sont proposes l'objectif du progres 
economique, ont realise une politique economique encore plus 
active que l'Italie, sans pour autant suivre le modele anglais 
classique. 
Comme on l'a dit "le capitalisme italien se proposait des le 
début d'etre un capitalisme d'Etat", et de l'unification å la 
premiere guerre mondiale, et meme au dela, il est aise de 
reconnaitre les lignes de developpement de l'intervention de 
l'Etat en matiere d'economie aussi bien que les instruments å 
travers lesquels cette intervention fut realisee. 
Ce n'est pas a moi de tirer des conclusions, mais je crois 
pouvoir deduire, d'apres ce que je viens d'exposer, que les 
vicissitudes de la politique economique italienne pendant les 50 
premieres annees de son histoire qui ont suivi son Unite, ne 
peuvent pas titre mecaniquement rattachees au developpement 
d'une idee nationaliste. A mon avis, la politique economique, 
dans chaque periode et en tous temps, n'est pas inspiree par 
des principes ou des theories, mais plutöt par l'interet des 
groupes de pression qui, dans le but de maintenir leures positi-
ons, peuvent accorder certaines concessions a d'autres groupes 
qui s'opposent ou meme representent l'ennemi å abattre. Cette 
these a ete largement developpee en Italie par de monbreux 
specialistes des finances publiques, par les theoriciens de cette 
branche d'etude que l'on appelle "sociologie financiere". 
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